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Abstract
On April 7, 1968, Governor Winthrop Rockefeller claimed that “Arkansas today stands at
the threshold of leading the nation...for a better America,” The Republican Arkansas Governor
spoke on the steps of the state capitol at a memorial for the beloved civil rights leader Martin
Luther King, Jr. who had been assassinated three days earlier. Rockefeller’s claim that Arkansas
could lead the nation came just two years after the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC) formally ended its work in the state to improve racial equality. Their efforts had seen
widespread acceptance of integrated public facilities, increased voter registration and more
meaningful integration of schools. SNCC’s work would not have been possible were it not for
the already moderate approach Arkansas took on race relations and the state’s focus on economic
success rather than white supremacy.
Arkansas has been widely considered a member of the Deep South region of the United
States in terms of race relations. While the state was certainly not a haven for African
Americans, the century following emancipation highlights the racial moderation undertaken by
the state to promote economic growth, the real focus of the mid-South state. This was further
influenced by the geographic diversity of Arkansas that meant that African Americans have been
concentrated along the Mississippi River in the Delta, leaving the rest of the state with concerns
that did not include race. From encouraging freedmen and women to move to the state to work,
to the public condemnation of lynchings, Arkansas has always separated itself from its neighbors
across the River. The two events that are oft-cited as the justifications for Arkansas’ Deep South
reputation, the 1919 Elaine Massacre and the 1957 Central High School Crisis were powerful
anomalies that in reality reflect both the national trends of racial violence, in the case of Elaine,
and the desire by Orval E. Faubus to remain Governor and placate segregationists who

vehemently opposed school integration. These events do not provide the full picture of Arkansas
and its long trajectory toward racial moderation that have been on-going since emancipation.
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Introduction
“To Set a Pattern for the Rest of the Nation:” Arkansas and Civil Rights1
As news broke that civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. had been assassinated in
Memphis on April 4, 1968, riots erupted in cities across the country. In response, across the
Mississippi River in Arkansas, Governor Winthrop Rockefeller placed the National Guard on
alert in West Memphis, anticipating possible trouble.2 Late Friday night, violence broke out in
Pine Bluff as shots were fired between African Americans and the state police, leading to three
Africans Americans wounded and the arrest of 354.3 It is unclear what exactly caused this
violence but the governor worked to ensure it would not continue.
Three days after King’s assassination, on Sunday, April 7, Governor Rockefeller held a
memorial service on the steps of the state capitol in Little Rock to assuage the over 3,000
Arkansans who attended and untold more listening on the radio, from following in a path toward
violence. The only Southern Governor to speak on the death of King, Rockefeller focused his
speech on bringing Arkansans together to acknowledge that everyone needed to work to make
King’s dream a reality in the state.4 He called upon Arkansans not to forget “the importance of
equal education, let us not forget the importance of the environment, let us not forget the
importance of the elimination of the slums, of the ghettos, let us not forget that we all are the
creatures of God, black, white, makes no difference,” as they “set a pattern for the rest of the

Winthrop Rockefeller, Memorial for Martin Luther King, Jr., on the Steps of the Arkansas State Capitol,”
April 7, 1968. Transcribed by author from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQZIr1Hm75M (last accessed April
7, 2019).
2
“Arkansas Guard Unit Alerted,” New York Times, April 5, 1968, 26.
3
“Guard to Pine Bluff,” New York Times, April 7, 1968, 63.
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Ben F. Johnson, III, Arkansas in Modern America, 1930-1939, (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas
Press, 2000) 167.
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nation.”5 Rockefeller boldly claimed that Arkansas could spearhead the national response not
only to King’s assassination, but also in achieving national equality.
In the same speech, Governor Rockefeller acknowledged that race relations were not
perfect, and he hailed communication as the key to moving forward to avoid another of what he
simply called, “1957,” referring to the Central High School Crisis that plunged Little Rock and
Arkansas into the throes of massive resistance.6 And yet, it was the events of 1957 in which
Arkansas did set a pattern for much of the nation in its refusal to submit to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s desegregation order in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). The nation and world
watched as Governor Orval Faubus used the National Guard to prevent the Little Rock Nine
from entering Central High School and desegregating the first school in the city. Refusing to let a
Supreme Court order be ignored, President Dwight D. Eisenhower was forced to step in and
federalize the national guard and bring in the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock to reverse
Faubus’ decision and protect the Little Rock Nine from violence outside the school. What
became a show of federal power over states rights put Arkansas on the map as a major flashpoint
in the emerging Civil Rights Movement and linked it indelibly to the Deep South in terms of its
race relations. Indeed, Faubus retained popularity from white voters in the state and continued to
serve as Governor of Arkansas until 1966, when he finally stepped down and Rockefeller
ushered in a brief period of Republican rule.
Rockefeller emerged as the first Republican governor in Arkansas since 1872, replacing
Faubus after his six terms in office. In terms of racial views, Rockefeller aligned much more with
the Republicans of the nineteenth century than the Republicans of the 1960s who had turned
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their attention to white southerners who felt disaffected by the civil rights movement.
Rockefeller, the grandson of Standard Oil magnate John D. Rockefeller, had lived most of his
privileged life in New York before giving it all up and moving to Arkansas in 1954. A decade
later, he challenged Faubus for the governorship but lost the election.7 Two years later, he was
elected governor with fifty-four percent of the vote and began to initiate a series of reforms that
bought about economic change and the integration of the state police force.8
Just a year after he was sworn in as governor, at King’s memorial service, Rockefeller
promised that Arkansas would set the path for the nation on race relations, suggesting that it
would be a beacon for others to follow as it eschewed racism and worked “together for equality
of man.”9 Rockefeller’s portrayal of Arkansas is one of inherent racism and violence and yet he
is incredibly positive that Arkansas could change. The fact that Rockefeller was the only
Southern governor to address the assassination of King was not a great risk for him, it was in line
with the long history of race relations in Arkansas. Indeed, the 1957 Central High School Crisis
was not a true reflection of the history of Arkansas, nor was the 1919 Elaine Massacre that took
the lives of untold black men and women in the Delta. The racialized acts of violence that
defined the perception of Arkansas were not indicative of the state; I argue therefore, that they
are an anathema to an otherwise racially moderate mid- South, rather than a Deep South state.
While Arkansas had a reputation of violence and racial inequality, it never reached the levels of
Mississippi or Alabama, nor was it Deeply Southern in its cultural identity.

7

Johnson, Arkansas in Modern America, 165.
Tom Dillard, “Winthrop Rockefeller,” Encyclopedia of Arkansas History and Culture
http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=122 (Last modified 4/4/2018)
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Although Arkansas joined the Union in 1836, it was the sixth largest producer of cotton
by the outbreak of the Civil War. Between 1850 and 1860, cotton production had grown from 20
million pounds to 150 million pounds with just over 100,000 slaves doing much of the work.10
With freedom came the establishment of sharecropping along the Arkansas Delta as well as the
migration of freedmen from Deep South states such as Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama to
Arkansas in search of a better life. By 1900, the number of African Americans in Arkansas
increased to 309,000, or 27% of the total population and they increasingly lived in the Delta as
sharecroppers, but 11,800 African Americans owned land despite every effort by whites to
prevent this.11 Indeed, in 1889, Bishop Henry M. Turner of the African Methodist Episcopal
Church claimed that Arkansas was “destined to be the great Negro state of the country,” because
of its more tolerant reputation and abundance of land open to black farmers.12 One of the towns
to prosper from this black migration was Menifee, northwest of Little Rock in the Ozark
mountains. Following Reconstruction and the completion of a railway line, African Americans
became to move to Menifee from Tennessee and South Carolina to what was becoming a largely
black town that worked together to bring about increased landownership and a strong sense of
community.13
While Menifee was a shining example of the opportunities that were available in
Arkansas, the majority of African Americans lived in the Delta region of the state under similar
conditions of those who lived in the Deep South. Yet, I argue that Arkansas never fully embraced
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Grif Stockley, Ruled by Race: Black/White Relations in Arkansas from Slavery to the Present,
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the Deep South identity outside the region of the Delta. The state economy was not completely
dependent upon plantation agriculture and the economic exploitation of black labor. Lumber and
mining made up a significant proportion of the state’s economy in the late nineteenth century and
many farmers were small landholders who produced for sustainability and to sell within a
regional market.14 Arkansas’ diversified economy and concentrated population of African
Americans had huge consequences for the path that the state took following re-entry to the Union
in 1868 in terms of race relations. African Americans have never made up more than 27% of the
state’s population, a significantly lower proportion than Deep South states that is concentrated in
the Delta.15 Thus, the so-called “negro problem” for Arkansas has never been a “statewide
problem,” rather a regional issue that has been concentrated in the central and eastern part of the
state. White supremacists in the state focused the lion’s share of their efforts on the Delta where
the population of African Americans potentially threatened white rule, and occasionally Little
Rock and places like Hoxie, that aroused national attention with its quiet attempt at integration in
1955. African American activists fundamentally did not pose the same threat to white supremacy
in Arkansas as they were perceived to in the Deep South states of Mississippi, Georgia, and
Alabama.
These factors have made Arkansas unique in the United States. Often perceived as a
Deep South state, Arkansas’ history is more reflective of a mid-South state that accepted slow
change in race relations. Despite the 1919 Elaine Race Riot, lynchings, and the crisis at Central
High School, my research reveals that Arkansas never cohesively resisted civil rights activities

14
Jeannie Whayne, Thomas DeBlack, George Sabo, and Morris Arnold, Arkansas: A Narrative History,
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2002), 241-242,272-273.
15
John Kirk, Redefining the Color Line: Black Activism in Little Rock, Arkansas, 1940-1970, (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2002), 4.
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and black equality in the same manner as Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia. This does not
undermine or ignore the atrocities carried out in the state in the name of white supremacy, but
explores the reality of the situation in Arkansas as opposed to its reputation. And this is part of
the longer history of the state that has always seen slow but steady progress in race relations.
Ever since emancipation, African Americans have resisted the will of the white power structure
to succumb to their desire of an underclass and the Civil Rights Movement continued this
trajectory. Black Arkansans have consistently throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth
century challenged white supremacy and Jim Crow laws. Indeed, efforts by Harold Flowers in
the 1940s sought, and succeeded, in challenging voting restrictions in the state. Thus by 1961,
African Americans made up 34 percent of registered voters in large part due to Flower’s efforts
and various NAACP legal challenges at the U.S. Supreme Court that undermined voting
restrictions that had been in place since the late nineteenth century. In Mississippi, African
Americans made up 44 percent of the state’s population but only 5.3 percent of registered voters,
while 13.4 percent of Alabama’s African Americans, who made up 30% of the state population,
were registered to vote.16 By the 1960s, in many areas of the state, economic success was more
important to Arkansans than denying African Americans rights they had already been granted by
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The state had lost business due to the Central High
School Crisis and it had taken leading businessmen in Little Rock to intervene to re-open the
city’s schools in 1959 as the crisis continued. As Governor Rockefeller stated in his memorial
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speech, 1957 caused Arkansas untoward economic suffering because of a “lack of
communication,” not because of racial hatred.17
While history has often associated Arkansas with the Deep South response of violence to
the Civil Rights Movement due to the 1957 Central High School Crisis, its white citizens were,
in reality, more receptive to the demands of activists. Outside of 1957, there was little violence
or mass opposition in Arkansas regarding civil rights activities as civil rights activists and
organizations were able to persuade business leaders of the threat violence and the perception of
a violently racist state might have upon business interests. Economic success was the ultimate
goal for many white Arkansans, and the racist reputation of the state did not send the right
message to the growing industrial desires of leading businessmen. In contrast, the Montgomery
Bus Boycott of 1955-1956 shows that economic interests did not deter whites in Deep South
states from resistance or violence. Following the well-known refusal of Rosa Parks to move to
the back of the bus, the city’s NAACP chapter initiated a boycott and lawsuit that challenged
segregation on public transportation.18 Throughout the year long boycott, African Americans
were attacked by members of the White Citizen’s Council and others frustrated at this group of
African Americans challenging the system of white supremacy. The Citizens’ Council even
firebombed burgeoning civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr.’s house. The boycott put much
strain on the bus system, which lost about two-thirds of its income and most of its riders. And
yet, the negative economic impact upon the bus system was not a deterrent to many whites in
Montgomery, whose focus was maintaining the racial status quo.19 While African Americans in

17
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(New York: The Free Press, 1984), 51-63.
19
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Alabama had to protest and challenge segregation on city busses, in Arkansas, bus companies in
Little Rock, Hot Springs, Pine Bluff, and Fort Smith misunderstood an earlier 1956 U.S.
Supreme Court decision and desegregated public transportation with no protests. Even once they
realized their mistake, integration remained and the bus systems were successfully integrated
with little opposition.20 Thus, even before 1957, Arkansas showed signs that it would not
respond to the Civil Rights Movement in the same manner as the Deep South.
As Arkansas continue to grapple with the consequences of 1957, King built on the
momentum of Montgomery and established the Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC),
a somewhat conservative organization that challenged inequality through religious leadership.
Civil rights activities following 1957 did not spark nationwide attention until February 1960,
when four college students initiated a lunch counter sit-in in Greensboro, North Carolina.
Students attempted to desegregate department store lunch counters through nonviolent direct
action, as they were tired of waiting for the white South to acknowledge African American rights
and the slow pace at which the NAACP and the SCLC fought for equality. By April, over fifty
thousand students had participated in sit-ins across the South, following the Greensboro
example.21
Little Rock was one of those cities affected by the sit-ins. On March 10, 1960 fifty
students from Philander Smith College sat-in at the downtown Woolworths lunch counter. When
the lunch counter closed, all but five students remained seated and were arrested by the city’s
Chief of Police Eugene Smith.22 Student protests divided the local African American community

20

Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 101.
Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1981), 11.
22
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as many in Little Rock were not ready or willing to start another protest. Even the president of
Philander Smith College, M. Lafayette Harris, was not in favor of the sit-ins, stating that he did
not “subscribe to mass action in dealing with difficult problems,” although he did not go so far as
to suspend or expel the participating students.23 The students had little outside support in 1960,
the NAACP were struggling to maintain their presence in the state following legislative efforts to
undermine them and the older generation of black leaders in the city did not like this new cadre
of students potentially undermining their efforts and slow, moderate racial progression. The only
local group supportive of the students was the Arkansas Council on Human Relations (ACHR).
They were frustrated by the lack of local support for sit-ins and student involvement in civil
rights and director Nat Griswold glumly noted in November 1960 that, “Pfeifer’s Little Rock
store has discontinued its lunch counter. The space where it was is now filled with lighted
Christmas Trees and Baubles.”24 No more explanation was needed. Removing the lunch counter
at Pfeifer’s signaled that perhaps the lunch counter was no longer profitable for the department
store and it was easier to remove a hotspot of civil rights activity in the city rather than
integreate. Businessmen at the time were unwilling to make additional changes to black equality
so soon after the Central High School Crisis and were not subjected to a media frenzy over this
new form of activism, allowing them to maintain segregated lunch counters. While this
resembles the sit-in movement taking place across the South, it sparked a more conservative civil
rights organization to protest in the Delta.
In Pine Bluff, the Delta’s largest town, it was the local chapter of the NAACP who began
to push for public facility integration. Students were expressly warned by President of Arkansas

23
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AM&N to “refrain” from joining the sit-ins. President Evans preempted possible student
participation and stated that arbitration was the more “reason[able]” method to address issues in
Pine Bluff.25 While it is unclear how the students felt about this request by the University’s
president, students did not sit-in until 1963. However, on March 24, 1960, the local branch of the
NAACP called for a boycott of a number of department stores that did not allow African
Americans to eat at their lunch counters. Dr. David Parker, dentist and president of the Pine
Bluff Branch of the NAACP announced the boycott of two of the main department stores in Pine
Bluff, F. W. Woolworth Co. and J. J. Newberry.26 At a meeting on Sunday, March, 27 in which
it was estimated that over 700 African Americans attended, Parker and others encouraged
participation in the boycott. “This will go on as long as two days, two months or a lifetime if
necessary,” Parker said. “This boycott…will determine whether or not we deserve what we are
asking for – services of all kinds at the stores.” The Arkansas Gazette noted that the majority of
those in attendance were middle-aged, unlike most who were participating in sit-in efforts across
the country, and that Parker and the NAACP were not willing to commit to picketing these stores
in addition to the boycott.27 While they did not match the students protesting across cities across
the country, the NAACP in Pine Bluff clearly saw the larger issue facing equality in America:
economics. It was not until August 1963 at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom that
African Americans truly attempted to confront the deep economic disparity between whites and
blacks. King did not shift his focus to the economic struggle until 1965 following the passage of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. This placed the Pine Bluff NAACP
ahead of the national movement in attempting to confront the economic struggle caused by more

“AM&N President Asks Restraint,” Arkansas Gazette March 25, 196, 2A
“Pine Bluff Store Boycott is Urged,” Arkansas Gazette March 25, 1960, 2A
27
“NAACP Rally Backs Boycott at Pine Bluff,” Arkansas Gazette March 28, 1960.
25
26
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than half a century of Jim Crow segregation and limited educational and economic opportunities
to build wealth for African Americans.
While the Civil Rights Movement was ramping up its efforts in the Deep South by 1962,
Arkansas continued to experience token school integration in Little Rock and the Delta as well as
a complete failure to integrate its public facilities. Indeed, for many blacks in the state,
meaningful school integration was more important than being able to sit and eat at a lunch
counter. Thus, most of the efforts between 1960 and 1962 had been organized by local and
statewide organizations to enforce Brown v. Board and ensure black children received the best
education they could possibly attain in Arkansas. Even once SNCC created the Arkansas Project
in 1963, they continued to address the needs of local African Americans in tandem with the goals
of the national organization.
The culmination of civil rights activism, resistance, and resilience that took place in
Arkansas ever since the 1919 Elaine Massacre, led to a rather alternative path that SNCC took in
Arkansas. Their understanding of the role of the media and the fear that negative publicity would
have on any further racialized incidents, aided the methods and success SNCC had in being able
to affect the lives of black Arkansans. This work explores the history of the Arkansas Project and
examines how SNCC’s national tactics of confrontation with white supremacists and the media
explosion that often followed did not take place in Arkansas. Although Arkansas traced its
heritage and its cultural identity back to the Confederacy, in many ways, this research reveals
that areas of Arkansas were not as resistant to change as other Deep South states. Towns in the
Arkansas Delta could not afford bad publicity nor an economic boycott of their stores and major
businessmen in Little Rock did not support such violence against civil rights protestors. They
were fearful of continued economic reprisals after the Central High School Crisis as no new

11

businesses entered the city until 1960.28 Thus, when SNCC field secretary Bill Hansen arrived in
Little Rock in October 1962 to bring about lunch counter integration, business leaders were more
eager to listen to the demands of activists and avoid negative media attention, which prompted
the movement toward integrated facilities in January 1963. SNCC’s efforts in Little Rock were
not resisted to the degree as they were in the Delta, but even in the Delta SNCC experienced
much less violence and resistance than in Mississippi and Alabama. This research will show that
this was never a statewide organization like SNCC’s efforts in Mississippi. It was only in the
Delta and Little Rock where meaningful integration was challenged by whites but where,
particularly after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, public integration began in a mostly
peaceful manner. SNCC’s Arkansas Project spent four years in the state working with little
attention or pressure outside of Arkansas, slowly bringing about meaningful integration and
African American voters that helped elect Winthrop Rockefeller in 1966.
This dissertation will assess the long history of race relations in Arkansas to reanalyze
well-known events in the state’s history to argue that the Natural State does not deserve its Deep
South reputation. Arkansas was certainly no haven for African Americans and events such as the
Elaine Massacre and the 1957 Central High School Crisis certainly reinforce the violent and
racist reputation of the state. However, this ignores the diverse regional differences in Arkansas
that denied the state a cohesive racial identity that constantly acted to undermine and prevent any
racial progress. This, coupled with the states lower black population that was largely
concentrated in the Delta region, ensured that the state would take a different path than its Deep
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South neighbors across the Mississippi River, one in which economic success and security was
more important than racism.
Defining the Deep South and its relationship to Arkansas is the subject of Chapter One. A
number of historians have come to understand the Deep South through its relationship to
enslavement of Africans and culture that are unique to the region. None of the ways in which the
Deep South is understood includes Arkansas, and this chapter provides an understanding of the
state following emancipation that included a migration of blacks to Arkansas to escape the terror
of the Deep South. As the population of African Americans in Arkansas steadied at around 25
percent and concentrated in the Delta, the state followed a mid-South trajectory as it worked to
entice industry and promote economic growth in the state. Although the Elaine Massacre killed
unknown numbers of black men and women in 1919, this event was in line with increased
national racism following the return of black soldiers from World War I. This atrocity sits firmly
within Red Summer and the national rejection of racial equality, and the fact that it took place in
the Arkansas Delta suggests that African Americans felt more secure in their ability to challenge
the racial status quo.
Chapter two completes the story of the Elaine Massacre with the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in 1923 that all-but freed the men from Death Row. The tireless efforts of Scipio
Africanus Jones and the NAACP to challenge the legitimacy of the trials created a path for future
civil rights activists to use the federal courts to uphold the basic constitutional rights afforded all
Americans. Despite these gains, Arkansas suffered through two natural disasters and the stock
market crash of 1929, much in the same way as the nation. The dire economic constraints placed
upon the state following these events highlighted, not just for Arkansas, that racism was alive
and well. Across the South and North, black Americans faced deplorable conditions as white

13

land and business owners sought to recoup their losses by depriving others of federal aid,
something President Roosevelt failed to overcome. Across the country, Economic survival was
the goal of the 1930s, and that was achieved at the expense of African Americans.
World War II precipitated much change for the nation, particularly Arkansas. This
chapter will argue the state emerged in 1945 with a new focus on economic growth and diversity
that coincided with a lenient approach to race relations. As the government focused on economic
issues such as highway improvements and methods to bring about industrialization in the state,
Harold Flowers began to increase black voter registration while the national NAACP pursued
various legal challenges to political and social inequality that saw the end of the white primary
and segregated education. Arkansas was at the forefront of change and seemingly foresaw the
writing on the wall when the University of Arkansas welcomed its first black student in 1948,
thirteen years before any Deep South state. This was true at the elementary level as well – two
school districts in Arkansas integrated immediately after Brown and despite some attempts to
destabilize integration, more schools across the state followed. Arkansas’ focus on its economic
future did not allow for a stringent racist policy until Governor Faubus was pushed into a corner
by a cohort of white segregationists seeking to eliminate any chance that the burgeoning Civil
Rights Movement might spread across the Mississippi River.
Chapter Four reassesses the well-known 1957 Central High School Crisis that saw
Arkansas become the face of massive resistance. Governor Faubus, in his attempt to bring about
economic progress in the state, staved off staunch segregationist Jim Johnson’s 1956
gubernatorial attack, but then used the impending integration in Little Rock to appease white
supremacist voters. In blocking integration, Faubus suggested that he was a segregationist, when
it reality he simply wanted to remain Governor of Arkansas to instill his economic agenda. Yet,
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the crisis at Central High School severely limited economic progress in the city and state as new
industry stayed away from the state that dominated headlines. As tensions in the city eased and
businesses began to reconsider Arkansas, the Civil Rights Movement exploded in 1960 thanks to
student sit-in protests that led to the establishment of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC). The sit-ins led to no change in the status of integrated public facilities in
Little Rock in part due to the opposition by older black leaders who did not want to see their
roles undermined by these young and inexperienced students. This was true in Pine Bluff where
students were threatened with expulsion if they participated and where the NAACP instead
launched an economic boycott of segregated lunch counter. The Civil Rights Moment played out
differently in Arkansas, where focus on the economic impact of segregation was key.
Economics remained the deciding factor in 1962 for businessmen in Little Rock when
SNCC field secretary Bill Hansen arrived to reinvigorate the student protests. Chapter Five
explores the quick turnaround in support of sit-ins in Little Rock and the establishment of the
Arkansas Project in the Delta. SNCC’s ease at persuading local businesses in Little Rock to
integrate was not replicated in the Delta where white supremacy and older generational black
resistance ensured a more protracted battle for equality. Yet, despite the increased violence and
resistance, the Arkansas Project led the way in integration of lunch counters in Pine Bluff and
increased black voter registration by the end of 1963.
SNCC spent their final years in Arkansas focused on the Delta and widespread
implementation of the Civil and Voting Rights Acts. Chapter Six highlights the work of the
Arkansas Project to bring about change for blacks in the most resistant part of the state. The most
violent resistance to civil rights took place between 1964 and 1966 as SNCC workers continued
to push for the change that was by this point federally mandated. As the national organization

15

moved to black power and the expulsion of whites in 1966, the Arkansas Project collapsed in
rejection of SNCC’s segregationist mandate. Former SNCC workers continued to operate in the
state as Arkansas took a sweeping turn against the gubernatorial hopes of segregationist Jim
Johnson and instead election Republican Winthrop Rockefeller.
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Chapter 1:
Chasing the Deep South
Arkansas’ trajectory as a mid-South state, began long before it joined the Union in 1836.
The geographical diversity of the state limited the spread of cotton plantations in the eighteenth
century, which remained a frontier state well after the Civil War. These factors, as well as the
demographics of Arkansas ensured that it remained on the periphery of the Deep South without
embracing all that that meant in terms of race relations. This chapter will reveal that Arkansas
began to piece itself back together after the Civil War, economic recovery was more important to
most Arkansans than perpetuating continual violence and repression towards its black citizenry.
State politicians encouraged black migration from the Deep South, so desperate they were to
rebound economically that required land cultivation and laborers to expand cotton production in
the Delta. Arkansas was far from the model state, but economic interests overpowered racial
violence until 1919 when perhaps the worst race massacre in United States history took place in
Elaine. This massacre, that killed perhaps hundreds of African Americans in the small Delta
town was more reflective of national trends that took place following World War I and the fear
that white supremacy was losing ground across the country. Indeed, the Elaine Massacre was the
result of frustrated black sharecropped who sought to unionize to ensure fair prices for their
cotton. These men and women took a stand against white supremacy in Arkansas at the
culmination of national white on black violence that had largely impacted urban areas. They
began a protracted movement for civil rights that would not begin in the Deep South until World
War II and benefitted from Arkansas’ geographic and economic diversity.
To fully understand civil rights activism in Arkansas, it is necessary to assess the larger
history of Arkansas race relations and the state’s relationship to the South. While academics such
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as Adam Rothman, Robert Pierce Forbes, J. William Harris, and Allison Davis have all sought to
understand and define the Deep South, their definitions do not encompass Arkansas either
geographically or in social, political, or economic terms. Even notable Arkansas historians such
as Jeannie Whayne, Carl Moneyhon, Grif Stokely, Charles Bolton, and John Kirk all shy away
from proclaiming Arkansas to be a Deep South state. These historians are all correct in their
assessment, yet I argue that Arkansas is a mid-South state whose integration into the national
economy superseded its ties to the Deep South and overwhelming control of its black population.
It was not simply on the periphery of a Deep South identity.
One of the main reasons why Arkansas never fulfilled its Deep South reputation is due to
the geography of the state. Arkansas is one of the most geographically diverse states in the

Figure 1: Map of Arkansas’ Geographic Regions1
South, encompassing six regions – the Ozark Mountains, the Ouachita Mountains, the Arkansas
River valley, the West Gulf Coastal Plain, the Mississippi Alluvial Plain (the Delta), and
Crowley’s Ridge – that have all impacted the social and economic progression of the state. If one
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were to draw a line from the Northeast to Southwest corners of the state, you would see a stark
divide in terms of elevation and climate, with the Ozark and Ouachita Mountains climbing over
2,000 feet above the Delta and Plains.2 These environmental variations in Arkansas meant that
the state was never reliant upon only one agricultural enterprise, as the soil was so varied that
few crops could grow across the state. Even so, in the nineteenth century, cotton became a
crucial source of income for the state, being grown predominantly in the eastern and southern
regions. And with the increased reliance upon cotton, came the increased demand for enslaved
labor. During the course of twenty-five years, Arkansas dramatically increased its production of
cotton and use of enslaved labor, but it still lagged behind Deep South states as the Civil War
broke out in 1861.
While Arkansas has never geographically been a Deep South state, it is widely considered to
be so. Historians, social anthropologists, and political scientists all confer different meanings to
the term Deep South. Each tend to focus on a of politics, society, or the economy as the base of
their analysis. While the South is partially defined through shared geography and cultural ties,
the Deep South is considered to be a sub-region that in many ways relied upon slavery for its
economic and political output. This definition does not take into account the culture that emerged
within the Deep South, which similarly makes it unique and a part of, but distinct from, the
South. For historians, the Deep South is indelibly tied to the expansion of slavery beyond the
original thirteen colonies of the United States. Adam Rothman argues for a more narrowed
understanding of the Deep South to include only three member states – Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Alabama.
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The 1803 Louisiana Purchase was the catalyst for the expansion of slavery and plantation
agriculture. While the federal government grappled with the larger questions of land rights,
American Indian removal, and statehood for territories west of Georgia, thousands of Americans
and their enslaved labor forces moved to these regions to reap the rewards of King Cotton.3 As
the United States took control of the Mississippi River and saw the successful use of steamboats
to transport goods, the Orleans territory became a hub not only for sugar production but also a
mercantile center selling cash crops such as cotton from the Mississippi River. The proliferation
of steamboats along the Mississippi “lowered shipping costs, increased capacity, and accelerated
the circulation of goods and people around North America,” encouraging more and more people
to move to the territories of Mississippi, Orleans, and Missouri.4

Figure 2: Map of the United States between 1819 and 18245
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The federal government was in part responsible for the establishment of the Deep South
through the Land Ordinance of 1785, which required rectangular land surveys of undeveloped
land to ease the process of property rights as settlers moved to new territories. Between 1807 and
1812 almost half a million acres of public land was sold in the Mississippi Territory, mostly to
wealthier members of society who could afford the two dollar per acre cost.6 Many of these
settlers bought this land to take advantage of the fertile soil to grow cotton using enslaved labor.
The increase in land that came with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 ensured the spread of cotton
agriculture and use of enslaved Africans to grow the cash crop, destroying Thomas Jefferson’s
hope that slavery would die out and a class of yeoman farmers would spread democracy and
civility across the burgeoning nation. Instead, the migration of thousands of frontiersmen to these
new territories, alongside the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade in 1808, created the Deep
South as a region distinct from other Southern and slave states. Indeed, while the legal transAtlantic slave trade ended, an international and illegal slave trade continued, as enslaved
Africans were shipped to New Orleans from West Africa and the Caribbean. However, this was
not enough for plantation owners in the Deep South, whose continued expansion and need for
slave labor led to a growth in the internal slave trade from Eastern states such as Virginia,
Maryland, and Delaware.7 These Eastern states moved away from the use of enslaved labor and
instead turned toward the sale and exportation of enslaved labor to these new and expanding
territories. Still economically reliant upon enslaved Africans, these Eastern states became known
as the Upper South and distinguished themselves from the Deep South in their labor force and
economic reliance upon enslaved labor.
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While the Orleans territory became the state of Louisiana in 1812 and the Mississippi
territory was split into the states of Alabama and Mississippi in 1819, at no point did Congress
challenge their use of slavery. The same could not be said for Missouri, who applied for
statehood as a slave state in 1819. What should have been a routine admission of a new state
turned into a debate about the future of slavery in the United States following the introduction of
the Talmadge Amendment, which sought to cease the expansion of slavery in Missouri. For over
a year, Congress debated on the future of slavery not only in Missouri, but across territories that
would eventually become states. It was decided that Missouri would enter as a slave state, but
Congress decreed that slavery would not be permissible in states above the 36°30′ parallel,

Figure 3: The Missouri Compromise, 18208
Missouri’s southern border.9 The Missouri Compromise showed the power Southern
congressman had to influence federal legislation and the threat felt by the expansion of the South
among Northern congressmen.10 While much of the focus has been on the Missouri
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Compromise, there was a simultaneous debate taking place about the state of slavery in the
Arkansas Territory. Attempts to prohibit slavery from the territory narrowly failed in Congress
but this was all part of a larger issue concerning the political strength of slave states and their
potential to undermine free and Northern states in national politics.11
The Missouri Compromise was a fiercely debated issue not only in Congress, but across
the country. Never before had the issue of slavery so consumed the nation. While Robert Forbes’
monograph on the Missouri Compromise does not deal directly with the Deep South, he does
argue that it was at this moment that Southern states unified in their demands to maintain and
expand slavery across the territory, shaping the South as a region. The line that separated present
and future slave states from free states quickly came to define the North from the South in all
aspects of politics, economics, and society, even after the Compromise was nullified by the
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854.12 While Forbes’ work focuses on the Congressional debates and
political wrangling over the fate of Missouri’s statehood, he also analyzes the perception of
slavery and its economic benefits that helped define the Deep South. Until the rise of King
Cotton, many Upper South slaveholders were moving away from slavery, believing it to be
immoral and not as economically profitable as industrialization that began to spread across the
North. But as cotton plantations swept across the South, its value was clear – the price of
enslaved Africans rose from about $400 in 1814 to $1,100 by 1819 and the domestic slave trade
became critical to the Upper South economy.13 And it was this argument that Southern
Congressmen and supporters of slavery used to defend the institution. It was too economically
intertwined with the nation to be limited to certain states if the Republic was to remain intact.
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The Deep South then was a critical region for the economic success of the country, and
Southerners united behind fears that the federal government, headed by Northerners, sought to
remove slavery and cripple Southern economic and political strength. As the nineteenth century
progressed, the strength of slaveholders across the South increased economically and politically
while at the same time the actual price of cotton stagnated and declined.14 Despite the decline in
cotton prices, thousands of Americans flocked to Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana to profit
from cotton, making them the three largest cotton producing states in the nation, supplying about
sixty percent of the country’s cotton.15
To a lesser extent, this migration took place in Arkansas, which by 1860, produced
“367,393 bales of ginned cotton…[worth] $16,165,29216. By 1860, the Lower South states of
South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas were the only
ones in which cotton was truly King and who subsequently were the first to secede from the
Union before President Lincoln’s inauguration on March 4. Therefore, it was those Deep South
states who were most fervently tied to cotton and the use of enslaved labor that sought freedom
from what they increasingly saw as a tyrannical federal government. Historian William Freehling
argues that Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia were part of what he calls the
“Middle South,” states that did not quite belong to the Deep South’s reliance of cotton and
slavery nor the Upper South states that grew little cotton.17 For these historians, including
myself, the Deep South is indelibly tied to the high production of cotton and the reliance upon
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enslaved labor to produce high yields and high profits. As the sixth largest producer of cotton by
the outbreak of the Civil War, Arkansas was on the edge of the Deep South, but not quite a part
of it.
The economics of the Deep South had profound implications on society and the way in
which the races interacted with one another. The Deep South connotes “a place frozen in time,
marked by violent extremes of action and belief,” a result of the failings of Reconstruction.18
William Harris looks beyond enslavement and the Civil War to see the ways in which white
society adapted but remained in control until the outbreak of World War Two. Thus, from a
society in which it had been imperative for whites to maintain a close eye on their enslaved labor
force, emancipation resulted in whites taking no responsibility for black lives, seeking to
segregate them from society and limit their freedom and access to the benefits of American
citizenship.19 But white planters in the Deep South continued to rely upon the exploitation of
black labor for their own economic success. After Reconstruction in the Mississippi Delta,
speculators bought up much of what Harris describes as “wilderness” and, with the support of
government funded levees, cleared the land for cotton plantations. This resulted in the migration
of black workers seeking to purchase land but who for the most part ended up as sharecroppers
on white owned plantations.20 This was similar in Arkansas as much of the available land was
“unsettled swamps, piney woods, and uplands” that needed much work before cultivation of a
crop could begin.21
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After emancipation, the nature of race relations in the Deep South was forever altered. No
longer property and a source of wealth for white landowners, African Americans were now
employees who in theory had rights but in reality were treated little better than they had during
enslavement. As Jim Crow segregation hardened after the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson Supreme
Court decision, black suffrage was almost completely erased by various laws across the former
Confederacy. Removed from political life and subject to the will of the landowners, black
sharecroppers were subject to the will of whites but, as the twentieth century progressed, many
were able to move into the black middle-class and own land, become professionals, and succeed
despite segregation.22 World War I saw a rise in cotton prices and demand for plantation labor
and the Deep South was unable to ignore the national call for patriotism and loyalty that whites
believed would undermine Southern culture and the inequality of blacks. Black support for the
war increased, as did black activism. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), organized in 1909 to help uplift and support African Americans, was able to
move into the Deep South during the war and spread a message of hope and real action to end
segregation. Much of this activism came from the urban black middle-classes, not from those
who were trapped by sharecropping, a distinguishing feature of Harris’ understanding of the
Deep South. But resistance takes many forms. Some black laborers were able to buy land, others
received their education, while many simply refused to buy into the system of white
supremacy.23
In 1941, four social anthropologists conducted research in Natchez, Mississippi, to fully
understand life in the Deep South. Deep South: A Social Anthropological Study of Caste and
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Class, is a detailed account of society, economics, and politics in the region. This seminal work
does not make an argument for the creation of the Deep South but instead analyzes the current
state of affairs in the region. Deep South defines the region as the states of “South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana,” as well as the relationship between
black and white and the reliance upon plantation agriculture that marks the region as distinct
even within the South.24 Deep South claims that the region is divided not only by class
distinctions but also by caste, that is, irreconcilable differences between the races. The work
claims that “both Negroes and whites recognize the fact that the white group is superordinate in
power and prestige” thus solidifying the divergent treatment and opportunities between the
races.25 Whites control the system, receive the social, political, and economic benefits of the
white “caste”, often at the expense of black labor. Thus, the Deep South maintained two separate
class systems, one for whites and one for blacks, that did not intersect, even when middle- and
upper-class blacks were economically superior to poor whites. This can be seen as different in
Arkansas where, by the turn of the century, a small but growing class of middle-class blacks
emerged to counter segregation policies. Black businesses and professions sprang up to cater to
the growing black community, particularly in urban areas. It was the black middle class who
negotiated with whites and sought small, but meaningful change for all blacks in the state, while
still maintaining the appearance of submission to white supremacy.26
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Much of the relationship between the races that Deep South describes is a direct result of
emancipation and the need to recover from the Civil War that devastated much of the land in the
former Confederate States. Emancipation removed the ability for slaveowners to closely monitor
and regulate their former property, but their need for a stable and secure labor force ensured new
laws and customs were created to recover economically. Afterall, the freeing of close to four
million enslaved Africans did not mean that they were accepted as equals in society but instead
called for a new society that continued to ensure white superiority in black majority states. Thus,
the rise of Jim Crow segregation that was largely complete by 1900 ensured both white
superiority and a large labor force that for the most part was restricted to sharecropping and other
low-income and dependent forms of employment such as domestic servants and porters. While
most of the former Confederate States established new methods of control of the lower caste,
they did not move away from single-crop agriculture.
Rothman and Forbes successfully argue that the Deep South emerged following the
Louisiana Purchase and the expansion of slavery to the new territories at the turn of the
nineteenth century and the nation’s response to this. Harris uses the economic reliance upon
cotton to explore how society functioned following Reconstruction. Deep South, however,
focused their research on the impact this had on society in the early twentieth century that
continues to resonate today. So much of the conversation regarding the Deep South is
inextricably intertwined with cotton. Cotton defined much of Southern agriculture since the
invention of the cotton gin in 1793. Despite Thomas Jefferson’s hopes that slavery would die out
in the newly formed Republic, the cotton gin ensured the expansion of slavery to the far reaches
of the country and across the South following the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. As more and more
land was made available for purchase following the forced removal of American Indians in
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territories east of the Mississippi River, planters almost exclusively began to cultivate cotton
using enslaved labor for sale in Northern and British markets for textile production. By 1840, the
South was the dominant force in cotton – exporting 1.5 million bales of raw cotton a year, or
two-thirds of the world’s supply.27 As the Civil War broke out, the South produced 4.5 million
bales of cotton, dropping to a measly 300,000 in 1864.28 While plantation owners sought to
regain their position as the world’s largest exporter of cotton following the Civil War, they failed
in part due to the general decline of cotton prices as a result of a saturated and depressed market.
In 1875, a pound of cotton sold for eleven cents, dropping to nine cents in 1885 and less than
five cents in 1894.29 Despite the decreasing profits to be made from cotton, plantation owners
continued to demand it be grown on their land by sharecroppers and tenants well into the
twentieth century, with little use of technological advancements until the end of World War II.
And to ensure the production of cotton, control over the black labor force was essential.
The Deep South then can be defined in large part through white control. Control of the
labor force and social interactions between the races was critical before and after the Civil War
for whites to ensure their economic and political strength was maintained. Before the Civil War,
control was essential to limit the opportunities for slave rebellions and produce the maximum
yield of a planter’s cotton crop each year. Following the Civil War, fear of the black majority in
Deep South states resulted in Black Codes, restrictive measures to limit the freedom of the
formerly enslaved to force them into a caste system that continued to abuse their labor for the
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benefit of white landowners. While all Southern states passed laws restricting the rights of
blacks, they tended to be more severe and detailed in the Deep South. In Mississippi, for
example, black laborers were not allowed to quit their job before the end of their contract. If they
did, they would not receive any of the wages they had earned to that point and could be arrested
and returned to the job if found. Not only did this law tie blacks to their plantation employment
until the terms of their contract had been met (which could be years if they owed money to the
landowner), it punished whites who in any way aided blacks who did leave their jobs.30 Thus, the
laws created incentives to keep blacks tied to the plantation despite their desire to move or
change employment. The perceived need to ensure a docile labor force and control every aspect
of black life is a key component to understanding the Deep South and the way in which civil
rights activities unfolded following the Civil War.
Despite the varying definitions of the Deep South, none directly include Arkansas. Davis
and Freehling situate Arkansas as an Upper South state, while Rothman barely mentions the state
despite its position north of Louisiana. The massive economic growth that cotton bought to the
state in the 1850s and the proportion of enslaved Africans to whites was not enough for Arkansas
to completely associate with the Deep South. Indeed, the state’s initial reluctance and refusal to
secede from the Union following the 1860 election suggests that Arkansas was conflicted about
its position in the Union and the path it wanted to take. The deep divisions between Arkansas’
geographic regions and economic reliance upon enslaved labor continued following
emancipation as the state attempted to recover and rebuild economically, socially, and
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politically; therefore, for the purposes of this research, the Deep South will be defined as the
states of Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia.
Following the 1803 Louisiana Purchase, the future state of Arkansas, came under the
control of the United States and immediately began to adopt the economic, social, and political
institutions of its new nation while simultaneously being relatively ignored by the federal
government. Arkansas was viewed as an “isolated wilderness,” filled with numerous American
Indian tribes and whites who had come together to survive and make a living in what has been
termed the “middle ground.” 31 This relationship would end by the middle of the nineteenth
century as American Indians were increasingly forced further West by President Jackson and
whites came to dominate Arkansas politically and economically. For example, in 1828,
Cherokees in Arkansas accepted the Treaty of Washington and moved to modern day Oklahoma
as increasing numbers of whites moved to the territory.32 While the removal of American Indians
took place in the central and western regions of Arkansas, white plantation owners bought their
families and enslaved Africans to the Delta region to establish cotton plantations along the
Mississippi River. The growth of slavery in Arkansas was slow before statehood, with 4,576 by
1830, about fifteen percent of the territory’s population, but quadrupled over the 1840s to
19,935.33 The special census that was required to ensure Arkansas had a population of at least
40,000 needed for statehood showed that Arkansas’ population was actually 52,240 and
Arkansas became the 25th State on June 15, 1836.34 Just four years after statehood, Arkansas’
population stood at 97,574 as farmers from the East sought to capitalize on the available land and
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opportunities the new state offered. While many whites from the Upper South moved to
Northwest Arkansas and lived in the mountains, surviving on small scale agriculture growing
corn and raising hogs, just as many moved to the eastern regions along the Mississippi to try
their hand at cotton. 35
Arkansas was not able to compete with cotton production in states like Mississippi or
Alabama until the eve of the Civil War. In 1840, the state produced six million pounds of cotton
and increased production to over twenty-six million pounds by 1859, most of which came from
the Delta.36 In contrast, Mississippi, the largest producer of cotton in the country, produced 535
million pounds in 1959, and Alabama 440 million pounds.37 This growth would not have been
possible without the plantation’s reliance upon enslaved labor. By 1860, there were 111,115, or
25 percent, enslaved Africans in Arkansas controlled by 11,000 landowners.38 Mississippi had
almost four-times as many enslaved Africans as Arkansas – 436,631 that made up 55 percent of
the total population. Alabama similarly have 435,080 slaves, 45 percent of the population while
Georgia had the largest number, with 462,198 slaves that made up 44 percent of the population.39
Slavery was not limited to the Delta regions: it existed across the state with small scale farmers
owning between one and four enslaved Africans, but it was the larger land and slave owners who
dominated the economy and society.40 Roughly three quarters of the slave population lived in the
Delta region, and by 1860 they produced 367,393 bales of cotton, making Arkansas the sixth
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largest producer of cotton in the country.41 Arkansas was on the brink of joining the Deep South
in terms of its cotton production and expansion but those hopes were destroyed with the outbreak
of Civil War in 1861.
Arkansas had been a state for just twenty-five years when it seceded from the Union on
May 6, 1861. Although tied to the Confederate states because of its use of enslaved labor, the
state as a whole did not support secession. The election of 1860 forced the nation to face the use
of enslaved labor and the perceived threat Abraham Lincoln posed to the peculiar institution.
Much like Tennessee, the legislature and population in Arkansas were split over the question of
secession. In the western regions of the state where slavery was less entrenched, many wanted to
remain in the Union, and indeed fought for and support the Union forces once the War began.
Meanwhile, the central and eastern regions were in favor of secession as they were determined to
limit the power of the federal government and continue to use enslaved labor. As the first battle
of the war broke out in Fort Sumter, South Carolina and President Lincoln ordered Arkansas men
to join the fight to suppress the Confederate army, the state quickly moved toward secession,
fearing an imminent attack by federal troops.42
The Civil War destroyed the slow progress Arkansas had made and caused economic
devastation. Thousands of men from the state fought in the war, either voluntarily or through
conscription, and some even fought for the Union. For those who remained in the state, food and
supply shortages became a dire problem.43 The battles in Arkansas largely centered around
efforts to capture the capital and it was in this efforts that fleeing slaves moved to the safety of
Union lines. Union soldiers established a base in Helena where they re-grouped, fought off
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Confederate attacks, and became a safe haven for fleeing slaves. Union Brigadier General
Samuel Curtis, intentionally or not, encouraged slaves to flee their homes with the promise of
“free papers” to all who had been forced to aid the Confederates. Slaves fled their homes to
follow Curtis, taking with them as much as they could carry. Following the 1862 federal policy
to use black troops for the war, 5,500 black soldiers were enlisted in Arkansas. The remaining
freedmen sought other means of employment from the Union but few succeeded. Life at camps
was little better than slavery so much so that some freedmen returned to their plantations to
escape from the lack of food, supplies, and disease that spread.44 However, these men and
women were now free, no longer enslaved to their landowner and were awaiting the outcome of
the Civil War to determine what freedom meant.
Yet for whites, fleeing slaves dictated race relations after 1865. White plantation owners
who believed (or at least argued that) they treated their slaves well, were shocked to find them
running to Union lines. They saw it as deceitful and ungrateful, “uncivilized and inhuman” to
abandon their owners.45 Landowners were dumbfounded that their enslaved workforce were not
happy with this arrangement and sought freedom, a situation happening all over the South as
news of the Union Army’s position was known. Not unique to Arkansas, this seeming betrayal of
enslaved Africans ensured hostile race relations following the Union victory as plantation owners
no longer believed in paternalism nor the trustworthiness of African Americans. The need to
keep a close eye on their property was abandoned for unabashed racism and increasing
segregation to remove any relationship between the races. This transition began in 1863
following the capture of Fort Smith and Little Rock by Union forces, leaving the Confederates in
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control of just the southwest corner of the state. Much like Tennessee, skirmishes continued until
the surrender of Robert E. Lee on April 9, 1865, but by then Arkansas was already well into its
Reconstruction period.
Following President Lincoln’s proposed 10 percent plan for Reconstruction in December
1863, Arkansas began to prepare to re-join the Union. In January 1864, a state convention was
held that removed slavery from the Constitution and voided secession. An election was then
called for mid-March that required citizens to vote on the new constitution and have at least ten
percent of the 1860 voters swear an oath of loyalty to the Union that would allow Arkansas to rejoin the Union. Arkansas overwhelmingly voted in support of the new Constitution and swore
their loyalty to the United States – over 12,000 for, and only 226 against.46 Isaac Murphy, the
only delegate to oppose secession in 1861, was elected Governor and ushered in early
Reconstruction efforts. Arkansans were on the verge of starvation and there was little help from
the state government who had few resources to rebuild the state’s economy and relied heavily
upon the federal government for assistance. Despite the legislature’s struggle to really begin
Reconstruction and help its citizens recover from the Civil War, on April 14, Arkansas became
the fourth Confederate state to ratify the 13th Amendment, after Virginia, Louisiana, and
Tennessee. A day later, Lincoln was assassinated, and Vice President Andrew Johnson took
charge and ushered in his own program of Reconstruction.
Johnson provided hope to conservatives in Arkansas that emancipation would not mean
equality or freedom. Many former Confederates created a conservative faction within the
Democratic party that disagreed with many of Governor Murphy’s policies. In particular, they
were afraid that he would push for black suffrage and true equality that would undermine white
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supremacy and control in the state. This was an abhorrent idea particularly to plantation owners
and elites who had for so long relied upon free black labor and their submission to white wealth
and success in society.47 The success of the Conservative Democrats in the 1866 election
suggests that many bought into these fears of what true freedom might mean to whites. Many
former confederates returned to various local and state positions and immediately turned their
attention to the control of black labor. While Arkansas did not follow in the path of Mississippi
and pass restrictive labor laws, they did pass laws requiring written contracts for work lasting
longer than one month.48 As historian Carl Moneyhon notes, “on the surface, the law appeared to
be fair,” but it was quickly manipulated to limit the freedom of African Americans.49 Written
contracts between laborer and employer were required and were initially fair. However, the need
to secure a cheap labor force and get the economy back on track ensured that freedmen were
quickly trapped by these contracts that were upheld by local justices of the peace and the
Freedman’s Bureau.
Created in 1865 by Congress, the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands
gave aid and assistance to former slaves as they transitioned into freedom. This huge national
project to oversee and protect freedmen was immediately limited in Arkansas by its lack of
resources. Between 1865 and 1869, only seventy-nine Bureau agents worked in the state, mostly
in the Eastern and Southern regions.50 In order to encourage freedmen to work on their
plantation, some owners “established schools” to secure labor. This eased the difficulties faced
by the Freedmen Bureau to raise funds to create schools even as blacks flocked to these
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educational facilities. In 1868, attendance at Bureau schools peaked at 1,672 but for many,
economic security took precedence over education.51
Many freedmen sought to own their own land and work for themselves but that hope was
dashed when President Johnson restored property rights to former Confederates and over 95,000
acres of Arkansas land was restored to its owners.52 Thus, like freedmen across the former
Confederacy, black Arkansans were limited to working or renting land on plantations. The labor
system had been implemented following the fall of Little Rock to the Union and continued,
without Bureau interference, well into the twentieth century. Contracts were signed between
employer and employee in which a lien against the crop was used as security for future wages. In
1865, Bureau agents believed this was a successful system as freedmen were able to earn as
much as $1,000 for their work and thought it had made race relations “more amicable that
elsewhere in the South.”53 Yet, freedmen were not satisfied. It quickly became apparent that if
freedmen were not allowed to own land, they preferred to work their own parcel of land, for a
share of the crop rather than wages and the Bureau supported this despite the potential misuse of
this system. By 1867, share tenantry was the most common form of labor on plantations
throughout the state. Landowners provided “land, stock, feed for the stock, house and quarters,
all necessary fuel, all cotton and other seeds, bagging and rope, and advanced all necessary
rations and clothing during the year.”54 This system was easy to abuse as tenants had to pay back
the cost of the supplies from their yield of cotton which was never enough, leaving tenants
indebted to the owners and tied to the land for another year. This system of sharecropping was
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widespread across the South as a new form of enslavement. Plantation owners limited the
freedom of movement of their laborers through debt and instituted new means of control that
Douglas Blackmon calls “slavery by another name.”55 This system was pervasive in the eastern
and southern regions of Arkansas because landowners small and large refused to move away
from the production of cotton. Planters hoped that cotton prices would stabilize and they would
be able to return to their pre-Civil War success, but poor weather proved to be a problem that
caused landowners themselves to become indebted by 1867.56 Smaller landowners were
eventually pushed out by the consistently low prices, concentrating cotton production into the
hands of larger landowners who were wholly reliant upon the labor of poor tenants and
sharecroppers. The ever-dwindling profit margins made cotton one of the riskiest agricultural
pursuits, yet they continued to grow cotton for another hundred years hoping for a different
outcome.
When Congress took over Reconstruction in 1867, Arkansas came under the control of
the Fourth Military District with Mississippi, and both had to draft new state constitutions that
provided for “universal male suffrage” and ratify the Fourteenth Amendment before they could
re-join the Union.57 A constitutional convention was held in January the following year and gave
sweeping rights to African Americans, including the “right to vote, serve on juries, hold office,
and serve in the militia.” The constitution also gave full citizenship rights to black men, much to
the frustration and fear of white conservatives who wanted to maintain their authority over
African Americans. However, with the aid of 22,000 newly registered black voters, the
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Constitution of 1868 was approved, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and Arkansas reentered the Union on June 22, 1868.58 Mississippi took an additional two years to pass the
requirements to re-join the Union on February 23, 1870.
For the next seven years, turmoil erupted between Republicans and ConservativeDemocrats who sought to undermine Reconstruction and return to power. Republican Governor
Powell Clayton worked to protect the rights gained by blacks, as well as their lives from
increasing violence from former Confederates. The Ku Klux Klan, formed in Pulaski, Tennessee
in 1866, was just one organization that terrorized African Americans and their supporters across
the state. However, violence and voter interference led Clayton to declare martial law in the state
in 1868 and lasted until the following spring with the successful removal of the Klan from the
state.59 No other state in the Deep South was able to do with without the aid of the federal
government. In 1870, Conservative Democrats, many of whom had been denied voting rights
due to their participation in the Confederacy until now, were voted into the legislature, and by
1873 had gained control of the House and Senate, thanks in part to the mayhem within the
Republican Party. Arkansas Republicans fought over who should replace Governor Clayton,
which resulted in a protracted political battle between Joseph Brooks and Elisha Baxter that did
not end until 1874 when President Grant intervened and gave his support to Baxter.60
In clear control of the legislature, Conservative Democrats called for another
constitutional convention that signaled the end of Reconstruction in the state. They dominated
the convention and worked to undo many of the initiatives from the 1868 Constitution. The
Constitution of 1874 imposed low tax rates, sought to limit the power of the state government,
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giving much power to local councils. This was overwhelmingly supported by Arkansans who
also voted to elect a majority of Conservative Democrats to the legislature and the first
Democratic Governor since Isaac Murphy.61 Reconstruction was over and with it went the hope
of meaningful equality for African Africans in the state. While there remained some black
representation in the legislature and local offices until 1893, most blacks remained tied to
agricultural labor as Arkansas struggled to join the New South.
Popularized by Atlanta Constitution editor Henry Grady in the late nineteenth century,
the New South ideal advocated a shift away from the reliance upon agricultural products to more
industrialization in the South. Advocates of the New South argued that the region needed to
rebuild after the Civil War, a feat that many major cities had not been able to complete by the
end of Reconstruction.62 For Henry Grady and others, industrialization was the key that
separated the North from the South and led to the Union victory. States sought Northern capital
and industry to bring about an economic revolution in the South that required a huge growth in
railroads. East of the Mississippi River, railroad development grew from 13, 259 miles in 1889 to
27,655 a decade later. West of the Mississippi that number was even higher – railroads expanded
by 211.4 percent.63 In Arkansas, there were 2,373 miles of railroad track by 1893 bringing the
state further into the national economic markets.64 This was critical for the state as it continued to
work toward economic recovery despite resistance to change, particularly from cotton farmers
who continued to rely upon this cash crop for their own personal success.
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As railroad production saw the growth of markets, largely for cotton in the Delta, the rest
of the state relied upon a more diverse range of agricultural goods to sell. Unable to grow cotton
outside of the Delta on a large scale, the western regions of the state grew wheat, corn, and
apples. Farmers in these regions had less success in the national markets than did cotton before
Reconstruction, but railroads provided a means to sell these goods on a larger scale, increasing
the diversity of agricultural goods in the state. In addition to agricultural diversification,
Arkansas was able to bring about the extraction of raw resources such as timber and coal that in
turn bought in mills and factories by the turn of the century. Timber was a particularly lucrative
industry and accounted for twenty-two percent of the “total value of the state’s agricultural,
mining, and manufactured goods” in 1890.65 Agriculture continued to dominate Arkansas’
economy into the twentieth century, but it failed to bring about the New South ideal. The
economy was unpredictable and prices for all agricultural products faced precipitous decline in
the 1890s that continued periodically until the outbreak of World War I in 1914, which saw a rise
in prices for cotton, lumber, and minerals that, in the minds of landowners, justified the state’s
continual reliance upon agriculture as its economic mainstay.
Urbanization did occur in the late nineteenth century as a result of these New South
efforts. By 1900, nine percent of Arkansans lived in urban areas – towns with at least 2,500
residents, creating a new, albeit still racist, social order.66 The homogeneity of small towns was
lost in the cities of Little Rock, Fort Smith, and Pine Bluff as Northern investors and migrant
workers relocated. Urban areas became key to industrialization as businessmen, lawyers,
merchants descended to towns and cities to conduct their business. Workers, skilled and

65
66

Moneyhon, Arkansas and the New South, 5, 31-32.
Moneyhon, Arkansas and the New South, 41.

41

unskilled, also moved to urban areas to leave behind the risky business of farming. African
Americans enjoyed the benefits of urban life. While segregation expanded into the twentieth
century, some black workers were able to move into the middle classes and establish their own
businesses catering to their community. In Pine Bluff, there were at least 235 black businessmen
operating in the city, directly challenging white supremacist notions that black men were lazy
and intellectually inferior.67 Many of these businessmen were incredibly successful. Wiley Jones
had been enslaved in Jefferson County but freedom saw him pursue a number of capitalist
enterprises, including barber, waiter, owner of the only streetcar line in Pine Bluff, and even
“proprietor of a racetrack and stables” named after himself. He was believed to be one of the
wealthiest black men in the South, certainly in Arkansas.68
The success of African Americans in business and the escalating poverty faced by rural
Arkansans increased racial tensions. Poor whites were offended that blacks could succeed
economically and were equally outraged by the increased confidence of black tenants to
challenge the treatment they received.69 In 1891, black tenants in Lee County, who were
members of the Colored Farmers Alliance, demanded an increase in wages from 50 to 75 cents
per pound. When the landowners refused, the tenants began a strike that resulted in cotton gins
being burned down and the murder of a plantation manager. The sheriff sent a posse of men out
to find the protestors, but a mob of white men intervened and hung nine strike leaders.70 While
unusual, but not unheard of in Arkansas, it did represent the lengths whites were willing to go to
deter a mass uprising of black labor. White laborers also took matters into their own hands when
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they felt threatened by black farmers. White tenants believed that they needed to limit the
number of black tenants in their community as landowners typically preferred cheaper black
labor. To remove this economic problem, whites used the practice of “nightriding” to threaten
and attack black workers and their homes.71 In 1898, white nightriders sought to drive out
African American sharecroppers in Helena, Phillips County to open up jobs for whites. But white
planters fought to protect their labor force and even attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to arrest
and prosecute nightriders, thus highlighting how valuable the labor of African Americans was to
the landowners and their need to maintain racial harmony and control. For the most part,
however, little was done by authorities to stop nightriding, and violence against African
Americans escalated with the rise of lynchings.
The 1890s saw a peak of lynchings in Arkansas even as the state continued to move
towards this New South ideal.72 Viewed as a form of extra-legal violence used to limit black
progress across the nation, lynching was “one of the vital organs within the body politic of white
supremacy…Lynching did not result from a breakdown of, or a challenge to, law and order – it
was law and order.”73 Reasons given for lynching in Arkansas and across the South included
murder and sexual offences against white women. It was argued at the time that black men
“assaulted, ruined, and ravished” white women, all polite terms for rape that aimed to protect the
supposed purity and innocence of white women.74 Yet, as black Progressive activist Ida B.
Wells-Barnett argued in her seminal work on lynching, the accusation of rape was more often
actually a consensual relationship between black men and white women. She further contends
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that many of these men who were lynched under such justifications or other supposed crimes,
were actually “leading businessmen” who epitomized the “progress of the race.”75 While it is
impossible to know the number of African Americans lynched in Arkansas or the true reasons
behind them, Arkansas saw the lowest number of reported lynchings between 1889 and 1918 of
Deep South states. Georgia and Mississippi topped the list with 386 and 373 reported lynchings
respectively. Texas was third with 335, Louisiana had 313, Alabama 276 and Arkansas was fifth
with 214 reported lynchings.76
Thus, while the New South ideal had bought about positive economic change and
potential in Arkansas by the turn of the century, conditions for black Arkansans were in decline.
Violence was on the rise, and Arkansas had effectively disenfranchised African Americans, who
made up just over a quarter of the state’s population. In 1891, the legislature increased the power
of local election officials to mark the ballots of illiterate voters. This led to a decline in registered
voters who did not trust that their votes would be cast for their preferred candidates. The
following year, the legislature went one step further and passed a poll tax amendment that
required citizens to pay a fee months before each election season. These two policies served to
effectively disenfranchise many poor black and white Arkansas.77 The final nail in the coffin for
black disenfranchisement was the exclusion of blacks from the Democratic Primary elections
that was statewide by 1906. Few African Americans supported the Democratic Party and it was
the only party that mattered by the twentieth century, thus whites ensured that they had total
control of politics in the state for the foreseeable future.
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Despite the challenges faced by African Americans in Arkansas following the end of
Reconstruction, thousands of black migrants from east of the Mississippi moved to the state to
escape the brutality of the Deep South. Freedmen flocked to Arkansas from more oppressive
states such as Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama in search of a better life. AME church Bishop
Henry Turner called Arkansas, “the great Negro State of the country.”78 This was the beginning
of a mass migration of African Americans, who first moved West to the frontier south states of
Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and the Mississippi Delta. Between 1865 and 1914, over
200,000 black migrants moved to Arkansas, in part due to its reputation for “racial tolerance.”79
They also moved for the higher earning potential of the Delta, even once sharecropping became
entrenched in society. But for many blacks, Arkansan and migrants, landownership remained the
goal. According to historian Story Matkin-Rawn, in 1870, “one in seventeen black Arkansans
owned land, compared to one in thirty-six black Georgians and one in fifty-one black
Alabamians.80 By 1900, 11,800 African Americans owned land in Arkansas but the increased
violence and political hostility towards African Americans saw black Arkansans seeking a new
home outside of the state.
Thousands of black Arkansans desired to leave the state by the 1880s, although few were
able to do so. Even fewer sought to leave the country altogether. Kenneth C. Barnes notes that
between 1879 and 1899, approximately six hundred black Arkansans participated in the Back to
Africa movement, leaving the United States for Liberia in West Africa. More Arkansans moved
to Liberia than from any other state in the late nineteenth century despite slightly better race
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relations than the Deep South states.81 The American Colonization Society (ACS) required that
African Americans seeking passage to Liberia fund their way to New York. The cost of travel to
Liberia and six-month’s worth of provisions cost the ACS $100 per person and preference was
given to those who could contribute at least $25 to underwrite these costs.82 Thousands more
failed to raise the funds necessary to make the trip but the Back-to-Africa concept was so popular
that blacks in Arkansas created the Liberia Exodus Arkansas Colony to support immigration
efforts. Barnes argues that while the organization claimed poverty and political discrimination,
the real motive for many Black Arkansans to move to Liberia was instead to “redeem and elevate
Africa.”83 They bought into the concept that Africa was uncivilized and savage, and while they
themselves were poor, they could civilize and bring Christianity to the region. This was very
much in line with racist European justifications for the colonization of sub-Saharan Africa that
occurred in the late nineteenth century. Yet, Liberia was the only country in sub-Saharan Africa
that did not come under colonization efforts, save for African Americans who saw it as a place
free of white control and repression. While Arkansas saw significant numbers of African
Americans leave for Liberia, most migrants sought solace closer to home. By 1900, almost
20,000 had moved to Oklahoma and Texas and thousands more would depart North over the next
fifty years. Thus, in many ways, Arkansas served as a temporary home to African Americans
following the Civil War. While certainly not the Deep South in its treatment of them, it was also
not the promised land that Turner had suggested. Many thousands of African Americans did
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remain in Arkansas and successfully bought land or established businesses. But for others, they
sought more than what the Southern state could provide.
This movement of African Americans to-and-from Arkansas rapidly escalated in 1914
with the outbreak of World War One in Europe. Northern industries sought cheap labor and
thousands of black Arkansans joined the Great Migration North to escape the deplorable
conditions of sharecropping. Over twenty-three thousand black Arkansans moved North between
October 1916 and May 1917, and although the number of blacks in Arkansas rose to 472,000 in
1920, they became concentrated in eleven counties in the Delta.84 This was in part due to the
increased price of cotton and the need for black labor that in turn allowed black farmers to buy
their own land in the Delta. In 1915, one pound of cotton sold for eleven cents, rising to forty
cents in 1919. This allowed black ownership of land in the Arkansas Delta to increase by forty
percent between 1910 and 1920.85
Despite the increased black ownership of land, the majority of black Arkansans
continued to work for whites in the Delta, who were increasingly concerned about the docility of
their labor force. While this had always been the case in Phillips County, the war had worsened
these tensions as patriotic fervor took hold and white fears of a black insurrection or demand for
meaningful equality arose. This caused whites to be more concerned with toeing the line between
control and outright violence against black workers who were at risk of heading North or
fighting back. In a 1916 report of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations,
investigators in Arkansas found “a state of acute unrest is developing” with signs of “the
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beginnings of organized resistance” as the poor conditions for sharecroppers continued.86 It
would not be until after the war and the return of black soldiers that this would be proven correct,
not just in Arkansas but across the country.
Black Arkansans signed up for the draft in droves. 17,544 black Arkansans were inducted
into service and many served in part to prove their loyalty to the United States and in hopes of
ending racial discrimination against them.87 Indeed, the NAACP believed that “if thousands of
American black men do fight in this world war, then who can hold from them the freedom that
should be theirs in the end?”88 But as the War ended in 1918 and black soldiers began to return
the following year, those expectations were immediately dashed. Across the country, whites
feared the attitude of returning soldiers, having served in the military, and the impact of their
experiences with white Europeans upon their ability to submit once again to white supremacy.
Tensions rose so high in the Delta in 1919, that two black veterans were lynched over
accusations of improper behavior toward whites as they returned home in uniform.89 But this was
just the beginning. Throughout the United States, racial violence erupted between March and
October 1919 in response to this increased migration of African Americans to Northern cities
and the return of black soldiers. During what James Weldon Johnson, field secretary for the
NAACP termed “Red Summer,” there were an estimated thirty-eight race riots that took place
between February and October, mostly in cities. One stood out from the rest. The Elaine
Massacre was the only rural race riot during Red Summer, and it resulted in untold numbers of
murdered African Americans.
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Phillips County was one of the largest slave counties in the state and in 1919, blacks
outnumbered whites by about 10-1.90 According to Greenfield Quarles, one of the lawyers
appointed to represent the black Elaine defendants, Phillips County “was placed entirely under
Negro rule” during Reconstruction and freedmen had much control of their state of affairs until
the end of the century, creating tension when white plantation owners regained control of politics
in 1875.91 Attempts in 1917 by white labor organizers to unionize black railway workers in
Phillips County failed when the two men were arrested and charged “with “threatening and
intimidating” black workers”, with the judge calling it the “most unpropitious time for creating
dissention in the ranks of labor.”92 While this effort to unionize workers failed, landowners
underestimated the resentment and frustration felt by black sharecroppers who knew they were
being cheated. “Planters charged outrageous prices for goods sold to their tenants and planters
made agreements with other planters not to hire tenants who left owing money unless they paid
their bills.”93
Sharecroppers in Phillips County and beyond understood that as individuals, they had no
power to change the situation but as a group, they might just get some concessions. Thus, in the
summer of 1919, Robert Hill, leader of the Progressive Farmers and Household Union organized
a number of meetings in Elaine to discuss their options and potentially unionize. On the night of
September 30, 1919, approximately one hundred black men, women, and children had gathered
in a church for a meeting of the Hoop Spur Lodge three miles north of Elaine, when at about
midnight shooting commenced outside the church between the guards and three men who had
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pulled up in a car outside the church. Though it is not known how many blacks were killed in the
shootout at the Hoop Spur church, W. A. Adkins, a security employee of the Missouri Pacific
Railroad, was mortally wounded and a second, deputy sheriff Charlie Pratt, received injuries
from which he would recover. Whites immediately began to panic. Rumors swept up and down
both sides of the Mississippi River that blacks, who so outnumbered whites, had started an
insurrection. Within hours of the initial incident that had taken the life of one white person, a
mob estimated to be between six hundred and a thousand whites armed with shotguns and rifles
poured into the Elaine area the next day on October 1 from Helena and Delta towns, such as
Marianna in neighboring Lee County, but also across the river in Mississippi and Memphis.
Though whites in the area claimed that there had been no indiscriminate shooting of blacks, the
evidence overwhelmingly suggests that whites slaughtered blacks, including men, women, and
children, the only unanswered question being how many. Estimates of the number of black
deaths during the riot range between twenty to 856, with more often seen estimates hovering in
the low hundreds.94
It took 500 Federal troops from Little Rock to end the massacre and bring calm to the
county as 285 black men were arrested for their supposed participation. However, landowners
needed their labor force back as it was time to harvest cotton so many were freed and released to
the landowner, who assured authorities that their workers were not troublemakers and had not
participated in the violence. 122 men were charged with participating in the riot and moved to
the jail in Helena, where they remained unharmed from possible lynch mobs. A week later, their
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trials began and saw all of the defendants found guilty by an all-white jury. By November 5,
1919, the first twelve black men given trials had been convicted of murder and sentenced to die
in the electric chair. As a result, sixty-five others quickly entered plea-bargains and accepted
sentences of up to twenty-one years for second-degree murder. Others had their charges
dismissed or ultimately were not prosecuted. This case would ultimately lead to a Supreme Court
decision ruling that the defendants had not received a fair trial. But in Phillips County itself,
tensions remained and the truth of what actually occurred would remain undisclosed.
In many ways, the Elaine Massacre should make Arkansas part of the Deep South. And
yet, it is more reflective of national trends that took place following World War I and indeed
show the activism of black sharecroppers to ensure they received fair prices for their cotton.
Certainly, the eastern and southern regions had very similar trajectories to Mississippi, Alabama,
and Georgia, but as a whole the state did not rely upon cotton agriculture nor the use of enslaved
or indebted black labor for its economic success. Forces in the central and western parts of
Arkansas rejected secession, fought for the Union, and turned to the party of Lincoln to bring
about real change for the economy and racial progress, but not equality for African Americans.
Despite the violence that mirrored the South and the difficult lives faced by many African
Americans living in the Delta, Arkansas was preferred to Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia as
thousands of migrants trekked across the South to move there. But as the twentieth century
progressed, Arkansas continued to defy its Deep South reputation and support incremental black
progress.
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Chapter 2:
Roaring through Disaster
Arkansas witnessed some of its darkest moments between 1919 and 1939. While much of
the country experienced the 1920s as a decade of opulence and lavish spending, Arkansans saw
continued decline of agricultural prices, bouts of intense racial violence, and two natural
disasters that stretched the state beyond its limits. This, combined with the 1929 stock market
crash, saw the state economy collapse and efforts to revive it directly hurt African American
tenants and sharecroppers. Arkansas’ agricultural collapse, racial violence, and extreme poverty
during this period may seem to align the state with the Deep South, but vigilante groups formed
throughout the Midwest to regulate farm prices, Seattle hosted the nation’s longest lived
Hooverville, and the Ku Klux Klan drew most of its membership from outside the former
Confederacy. During this time period, much of the country looked like the Deep South.
Arkansas earned its reputation as a Deep South state in this interwar period, but so did much of
the country when economic survival became everyone’s priority. Even President Franklin
Roosevelt, the most proactive president on race relations to date failed to ensure his New Deal
programs were enforced on a fair basis. And Arkansas did not wholly match the Deep South
even amid these dire conditions. This chapter will argue that civil rights activism was already
brewing thanks to the tireless work of Scipio Africanus Jones to free victims of the Elaine
Massacre from Death Row. The resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan did not result in the same type
of violence in Arkansas, indeed, the Klan focused its efforts on enforcing prohibition and gaining
political power rather than attacking African Americans. This, coupled with the smaller
participation of black Arkansans in the Great Migration, highlights that even at Arkansas’ worst,
it did not match the horrors taking place elsewhere.
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The lynchings of Henry Lowery and John Carter bookmarked the twenties, but they were
both roundly condemned by Governors McRae and Martineau, who considered these lynchings
an affront to the racially moderate state they oversaw. One glimmer of hope during the New Deal
was the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, which bought together black and white farm laborers to
challenge the unfair treatment they received. This unification across racial lines was born out of
despair in the Delta and suggested that it was possible for the races to come together to fight a
larger tyranny they both suffered from – the all-powerful landowner. Race relations between the
two world wars was nothing short of disastrous as the whole country focused on economic
regeneration over social progression.
The 1920s saw the United States attempt to forget the horrors and aftermath of World
War I and enjoy the seemingly booming decade of opulence and opportunity. Consumerism was
on the rise, as Americans spent their hard-earned wages on material possessions to “keep up with
the Joneses” and show off their supposed wealth that was in many cases bought on credit.
Excessive spending on consumer items was not the reality for many living across the South or in
rural areas who had little access to the material possessions found in urban centers. Cotton prices
peaked in 1920 at 37.5 cents per pound, but overproduction and the boll weevil infestation
ensured a rapid decline to just over 10 cents per pound in 1921.95
As African Americans were left to pick up the pieces of their lives, neighborhoods, and
communities from the horror and destruction of Red Summer, many Americans were hopeful
about the new decade. However, black hopes were dashed early in the decade following the
Tulsa Massacre of 1921. The massacre is believed to have been the worst in American history,
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with deaths numbering in the hundreds. Tulsa was home to a substantial number of middle class
African Americans who lived in the affluent suburb of Greenwood, which had established a
“largely self-sufficient community…fewer than sixty years after slavery ended.”96 The success of
African Americans and their demand for equality of the law in Tulsa was a cause of tension for
many whites in the city. As black soldiers continued to return home from World War I, they
expected to see continued racial progress in Oklahoma. It was the return of these soldiers and the
high expectations of black residents that led to the rapid escalation of violence. In Tulsa, the
catalyst that started the massacre was the arrest on May 30, 1921 of Dick Rowland, a young
African American man accused of sexual assault against Sarah Page in an elevator. Tensions
quickly rose as rumors spread across the city. As with the riots during Red Summer, there is no
conclusive narrative to the events that took place on June 1 and 2. Rowland was held on the top
floor of the courthouse, surround by groups of both whites and blacks. At some point on the
evening on June 1, shots were fired, although it is unclear who fired first.97 Subsequently, white
mobs drove into Greenwood and began hours of violence that saw the complete destruction of
the neighborhood. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
reported in The Crisis that “shooting was going on and that motor cars and airplanes were being
used by white people in the battle.”98 The Governor, James, B. A. Robertson, called in the
National Guard to put an end to the violence, leaving hundreds dead and over five thousand
African Americans arrested for their supposed role. The violence was over within twenty-four
hours, but the destruction was immense. The whole neighborhood had been destroyed, upending
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sixty years of progress and relative success that could never be replicated in the city after the
massacre. Oklahoma was just barely a decade into statehood when the Tulsa Massacre occurred
and highlighted the continued violence against African Americans for their success. This
narrative reverberated throughout Arkansas, having itself just experienced the Elaine Massacre
and proved to many that it was not just the Deep South that could treat its black citizenry this
way.
The lack of awareness of the Tulsa Massacre often leads one to believe that Red Summer
was the be-all and end-all of racial violence following World War I. Yet, it can be argued that
Tulsa was a continuation of Red Summer, for there were many similarities between it and the
many other race riots and massacres that occurred. Whites were frustrated at the economic
success of African Americans and the expectation from black soldiers that they would no longer
be treated as second class citizens. The only difference between the riots is that Tulsa took place
two years after Red Summer, but that does not mean that the racial hostility of that year were
over. Indeed, Tulsa shows that tensions remained high, as African Americans continued to push
back against white supremacy, enforce the rule of law, or simply exist in white spaces. The sheer
level of destruction in Greenwood suggests that whites used the full force of their rage to
completely destroy the black community and shut down any notion of equality. Black Wall
Street never fully recovered from this atrocity, and it led to a mass exodus of African Americans
out of Tulsa and Oklahoma. And this was not just a Southern problem. Red Summer had largely
taken place outside of the South but the perception remains that the Deep South was the worst
for race relations.
African Americans had been leaving the South ever since the end of the Civil War but the
outbreak of World War One saw vast numbers moving North in search of better employment and
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racial environment. James N. Gregory’s extensive research of census data shows that 437,154
African Americans left the South during the 1910s, encouraged by men like Robert Abbott,
Chicago Defender founder, who sold the idea of the North, particularly Chicago, as a better
home for African Americans with its industrial jobs and somewhat more equitable society.99 For
African Americans, the desire to escape Jim Crow segregation and a life of sharecropping, made
the North, and for Arkansans the West, particularly appealing. The failure of Henry Grady’s
New South plan to industrialize the South meant there were few economic opportunities for
lower class blacks, which, compounded with the South’s daily treatment of them meant for
African Americans who could afford it, they took the nearest train North. This trend continued
until the 1970s, with an estimated 810,614 blacks leaving the South in the 1920s, seeking
opportunities to experience the roaring twenties and participate in this period of excess and
consumption for the sake of consumption. The numbers leaving the South declined in the 1930s
to 391,641 as the Great Depression hit the country, and white landowners forced their labor to
remain on the land to bring about economic recovery from various natural and economic
disasters. Yet, by the 1940s, 1,447,229 African Americans moved North as industrial growth
expanded once again due to the outbreak of World War II. Migration numbers remained
relatively stable through the 1950s as 1,105,836 left the South, declining in the 1960s to 812,907,
as African Americans chose to remain, perhaps believing that the Civil Rights Movement would
finally bring equality to the entire nation.100
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As with every other Southern state, Arkansas did not escape the loss of its black citizens,
but it was not as severe as the Deep South. During the 1920s, Arkansas lost over 200,000 people,
of which 63,651 were black.101 During the same decade, Alabama lost over 124,000, Mississippi
lost 121,000, and Georgia lost 85,000 African Americans, over four times the population loss
than Arkansas. Black Arkansans largely moved to the industrial North, with 15,118 moving to
Illinois, 5,173 to Michigan, 3,769 to Ohio, and 1,427 to Indiana. The majority, however, moved
just north of Arkansas to Missouri (22,522) and Kansas (4,299) while another 4,795 moved out
west to California, following the train routes available to them. It was not just African Americans
seeking to leave the state, indeed, most of the migrants were poor white farmers who could not
compete with cheap black labor on plantations.102 Of the 196,069 whites who left Arkansas
during the 1920s, the majority either moved across the border into Missouri (44,584) or across
the country to California (43,795). Other popular states were Illinois, Michigan, Kansas and
Colorado.103 The problem facing all southern states by 1940 was the “population pressure” on
rural communities that had more people than there were jobs, compounded by agricultural
advancement that further decreased the need for human employment.104 Many whites left the
state, and the South, for the same reasons African Americans did, to find stable and secure
employment.
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While the state lost over 200,000 people during the 1920s, Arkansas Delta counties saw
an increase of in-migration as whites sought to monopolize “land that has not before been under
cultivation.” By 1930, 79.4 percent of Arkansans lived in rural areas as economic endeavors
continued to focus on agriculture instead of industrialization, further limiting options for local
citizens.105 Economist William Metzler estimated that the farm population in Arkansas increased
by “approximately 60,000” between 1930 and 1935, which he attributes, in part, to a “movement
back to the farm” from those who left during the 1920s.106 Clearly a result of the Great
Depression and the lack of employment opportunities sent Arkansans back to agricultural work
to be able to feed themselves and their families. Yet, even by 1930, Metzler argues that in
Arkansas “farm population increase was most rapid in those areas already overpopulated,”
meaning that these rural areas were unable to sustain their populations, that would normally have
led to out-migration that was not viable during the Great Depression.107 Indeed, while historian
Donald Holley focused his research on the migration of Arkansans between 1940 and 1970, his
data estimates that Arkansas’ 200,000 population loss between 1920 and 1930, amounted to 10.9
percent of the total population, 11.3 percent of the white population, and 9.8 percent of the black
population. These percentages all dropped over between 1930 and 1940, as one would expect
during the Great Depression, in which the state lost a total of 359,993, or 6.9 percent, which
amounted to a white population loss of 6.9 percent and 7 percent black.108 Thus, the Great
Migration for black Arkansans between 1920 and 1940 was more of a trickle than a flood but
represented huge change for the individuals that did leave. It also suggests that many African
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Americans both chose to stay in Arkansas or move there from the Deep South, still searching for
the elusive promised land.
Many black Arkansans who left did so because of the threat and fear of violence,
predominantly in the Delta. While some in Arkansas sought to forget and deny the horrors of the
Elaine Massacre, the lives of the Elaine Twelve remained in jeopardy as they were held on Death
Row. Their initial execution dates had been set for December 27, 1919 and January 6, 1920 but
were postponed as various legal efforts were underway to secure their release. In spring 1920,
the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that six of the men, known as the Ware defendants, should
face retrial in Phillips County due to a technical error – in their rush to convict the men, the jury
had not indicated the degree of murder. The remaining six Moore defendants, however, had their
initial guilty verdicts sustained.109 The NAACP, with the aid of local attorneys George C.
Murphy and Scipio Africanus Jones, continued their legal efforts to overturn the death sentences
of the Moore defendants and free the Ware defendants and the other sixty-five men who
remained in prison. Jones was one of, if not the only black lawyer in Arkansas and by far the
most prominent. He had been born into slavery in Arkansas in 1863 and by eight he was reported
to be the only literate member of his family. By 1885, Jones was a schoolteacher, having
graduated from Bethel Institute (now Shorter College) in North Little Rock, a school established
by the African Methodist Episcopal Church to provide a place of higher education for African
Americans. At a time when there was no formal law school for prospective black lawyers to
attend, Jones spent his spare time studying and preparing to pass the bar exam, which he did on
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June 15, 1889. 110 He was well-respected among white lawyers in Little Rock and immediately
following the Elaine Massacre, Jones sought to intervene on behalf of the incarcerated men.
Initially, the NAACP hired former Confederate officer and Arkansas Attorney General George
Murphy to represent the defendants, but African Americans had already begun sending money to
Jones to represent them.111 Eventually the two men came together with the blessing of the
NAACP to appeal the guilty verdicts of the Moore defendants, which reached the United States
Supreme Court in 1923.
While the Moore case was being appealed to the Supreme Court, prosecutors of the Ware
defendants sought to postpone their re-trials pending the higher court’s decision. In what legal
scholar Rayman Solomon calls a “brilliant, tactical move,” Jones sought to have the case against
the Ware defendants dismissed as the state had delayed the case for two consecutive court terms,
a violation of Arkansas’ “speedy trial act.” This was successful and on June 25, 1923 the six men
were released.112 The Moore defendants, however, would see their case reach the United States
Supreme Court following a writ of habeas corpus petition in which Jones argued that the initial
trial “was a sham because of the deal that the Helena elites had made with the mob in order to
prevent a lynching.” This was the first time the U.S. Supreme Court granted a habeas corpus
petition that challenged a state court conviction, previously the writ was used only to “challenge
the jurisdiction of the state to keep a person incarcerated.”113 On February 19, 1923, the Court
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handed down its 6-2 decision. The majority stated that the defendants’ initial trial had taken
place in a mob environment and that as such, they had not received a fair trial. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, in his opinion wrote that,
“But if the case is that the whole proceeding is a mask -- that
counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave
of public passion, and that the State Courts failed to correct the wrong;
neither perfection in the machinery for correction nor the possibility that
the trial court and counsel saw no other way of avoiding an immediate
outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court from securing to the petitioners
their constitutional rights.”114

The Supreme Court here agreed with Jones that the trial was a sham, that it was
predetermined, and that the state had at no point corrected this violation of the defendant’s
constitutional rights to a fair trial. Thus, they argued that the Supreme Court had to intervene to
ensure the Moore defendants received a fair trial afforded to them as American citizens.115 The
case was handed to the district court for a re-hearing but Jones worked hard to ensure that the
men were not tried and convicted once again. Jones negotiated with Helena’s white leadership,
Governor Thomas McRae, and the NAACP to secure the eventual freedom of the Moore
defendants. Jones pressured business leaders in Helena to agree to a settlement to avoid any
further negative publicity that a re-trial would have, as they were trying to “promote and reestablish” Helena as a progressive Delta city.116 They did not want negative attention bought to
the city by another trial about the Elaine Massacre and instead sought to reshape their image as a
safe place for African Americans and white businesses. Thus, the Helena leaders agreed to a
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settlement that commuted the men’s death sentences to twelve years, with the possibility of
parole after four years. On January 13, 1925, the six Moore defendants and seventy-one others
who had been given life sentences for their participation in the Massacre were released from
prison during Governor McRae’s final hours in office. The ordeal was finally over for these
victims of the Elaine Massacre, who had escaped lynching and the electric chair to claim their
freedom as the state simply sought to move on from this blight in its history and return to better
race relations, or at least avoid the national press.
The release of the remaining victims of the Elaine Massacre and the quiet dismissal of the
events that took place suggest the desire by Arkansas to distance itself from such horrific racial
violence. Delta whites in particular did not want to be perceived as a Deep South state that
treated African Americans with such brutality, particularly as national horror at continued racial
atrocities began to pick up steam with anti-lynching legislation making its way through
Congress. Such a reputation could have ruined the continued influx of African American laborers
to the region that financed the lives of white landowners. However, one of the long-lasting
impacts of the Elaine Massacre was the increased federal oversight of state court legal
proceedings. Moore v. Dempsey actively disavowed the Arkansas legal system for its handling of
this criminal case. This case expanded the legal protections afforded by to courts against state
courts and farcical trials that guaranteed the death penalty for accused black victims. The
Supreme Court had now added another level of oversight of a state’s legal system that would be
applied to all states as a result of the Elaine Massacre and unlawful trials and state appeals. It
was Moore that led the NAACP to pursue legal challenges to Jim Crow segregation and
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inequality that would lead to the victory in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.117 It was clear
through Moore that it would be on the shoulders of the federal judicial system to protect the
rights of African Americans, that civil rights organizations had to use the appeals system to
challenge the blatant racism in many of the legal decisions that were made in state courts across
the country. Thus, the legal civil rights movement was born in Arkansas by the dogged
perseverance of Scipio Africanus Jones and the NAACP to save the lives of the Elaine Twelve.
The ability of Jones to work on these cases, even once the national NAACP got involved,
highlights how different Arkansas was to the Deep South. This could not have happened
elsewhere. Jones was treated with respect by black and white society and he was able to
negotiate with white politicians and businessmen in the Delta to free these men six years after the
massacre occurred. His leadership continued until his death in 1943, showcasing the ability for
black civil rights leadership to flourish, even in areas of white resistance, the Delta.
While Jones was able to free victims of the Elaine Massacre, racial violence continued in
the state, albeit on an ever-decreasing scale. Lynchings had long been a physical and
psychological tool of white supremacists to spread fear among the black population of their
possible fate if they stepped out of line. They occurred largely in the South, but also in the North
and West and a form of control. Arkansas was no different. The known number of lynchings in
Arkansas did not exceed those in the Deep South but they are alarming and indicative of how
little African Americans lives were valued. The true number of lynchings will never be known
but based on research from Tuskegee University and Monroe Work Today, 151 African
Americans are known to have been lynched in the state during the 1920s. That is slightly lower
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than the 158 African Americans lynched in Mississippi, 195 in Alabama, and 154 in Georgia
during the same decade.118 The 1920s were generally a period of decline in lynchings across the
South as whites began instead to manipulate the legal system to ensure blacks were convicted of
supposed crimes and executed by the state. This came about in part due to the increasing efforts
by the NAACP to pressure Congress to pass anti-lynching legislation that would make lynching
a federal crime. In 1921, Republican President Warren G. Harding publicly announced his
support for such legislation, stating that “Congress ought to wipe the stain of barbaric lynching
from the banners of a free and orderly representative democracy.”119 Congressman Leonidas
Dyer of Missouri introduced an ant-lynching bill to the House of Representatives three years
prior that would allow for the prosecution of “negligent law-enforcement officials” as well as
members of the mob. This bill passed the House in 1922 but failed in the Senate where it came
up against Southern Senator’s resistance who ultimately killed the bill after a week of
filibustering.120 No anti-lynching legislation was passed until 2018, when presidential hopeful
Kamala Harris and Tim Scott’s “Justice for Lynching Act” was unanimously voted into law.121
The inability to pass a bill condemning and protecting victims of lynching highlights the sheer
power of white supremacy beyond the Deep South in the federal government but this attempt in
the 1920s did slow the rate of lynchings.
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Henry Lowery was one of the first high-profile lynchings to take place in Arkansas
following the Elaine Massacre. Yet, the violent murder of Lowery was condemned by Governor
McRae who called into question the unnecessary nature of his death. Lowery, a tenant farmer
who owned livestock in Mississippi County, killed his landowner O.T. Craig, and Craig’s
daughter Mary over a payment dispute on Christmas Day, 1920. Lowery’s demand for a written
statement that he was not indebted to Craig was an “affront” that caused Craig and his sons’ to
attempt to kill Lowery that instead resulted in the death of Craig and Mary. While the outcome
was different, this was not an uncommon response to black requests for proof of their debts. Just
eighteen months after the Elaine Massacre, Craig’s response was par for the course in the Delta
as landowners needed to retain their labor force and maintain white supremacy through the use
of violence and fear.122 The massacre had sent a stark message to African Americans that they
were not to challenge the system, nor question their employer but it had also shown landowners
that black sharecroppers and tenant farmers were not necessarily going to follow these
proscribed racial roles of black subservience. News of Craig and his daughter’s murder quickly
spread across the county and beyond as a lynch mob gathered. Lowery, who had managed to
escape to El Paso, Texas, was discovered only through the interception of a letter he had written
and was subsequently extradited back to Arkansas. Lowery, fearing for his life if he returned to
Arkansas, was able to get word to Texas Governor Pat Morris Neff, who “secured assurances”
from Arkansas Governor McRae that Lowery would indeed receive a fair trial in Little Rock
instead of Mississippi County. Despite attempts to secure the passage of Lowery to Little Rock
without being apprehended by mobs, he was “taken” in Sardis, Mississippi, reportedly by a
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group of between “15 and 20 unmasked men” and taken back to Mississippi County.123 The
lynching had been announced in local newspapers, ensuring a large crowd to witness justice
being served at the hand of “Judge Lynch.” Lowery was burned to death in front of a crowd of
500-600 people on January 26, 1921. 124
In a rare move for a Southern Governor, Thomas McRae publicly showed his disgust at
this lynching and called it “most disgraceful and inexcusable.”125 He had assured Governor Neff
that Lowery would be safe in Arkansas and receive a fair trial. Outraged at the lynching of
Lowery, he considered passing legislation that would punish police officers who failed to protect
prisoners, thus suggesting it was they who failed to keep Lowery safe. In his statement to the
press, Governor McRae suggests that what most angered him during this episode was that his
word to Governor Neff had been broken; that Lowery had surrendered himself up to return to
Arkansas for a trial that McRae had promised would happen. While it was unlikely to result in
anything other than the death penalty for Lowery, McRae surely did not want continued media
attention about white on black murder in Arkansas under his leadership or fail to abide by an
agreement he had made with a fellow governor. This was an all-round embarrassment for the
governor, suggesting to outsiders that the state had learned nothing from Elaine. Even as the
number of lynchings declined in the 1920s, it was uncommon for a southern state politician to
so-openly oppose and show dismay at the lynching of a black man who, in this case at least, did
commit the crime. Lynching was a favored method of control in the South, Arkansas included,
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and Governor McRae’s comments put himself at odds with a large constituency of his support
base.
The lynching of Henry Lowery took place during the height of the Ku Klux Klan’s
revival, which began in 1915 when William Simmons and fifteen other men set a cross on fire on
Stone Mountain, Georgia. The Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. extended it
hatred beyond African Americans to almost anyone who did not identify as a white Anglo-Saxon
Protestant, including Jews, Catholics, and immigrants. This 100% Americanism ideal came
about during the Progressive Era when many groups like the Klan sought to remove sin and
immorality from American society. The early twentieth century had witnessed many efforts to
alter what many feared to be a rise of vice and increasing social ills that emerged as a direct
result of industrialization. For Simmons and the Klan, the increasing number of immigrants that
did not match the profile of “good” Americans helped spur his decision to re-launch the Klan and
protect white supremacy. But it was not just about the dilution of the white race, the Klan
actively participated in the enforcement of Prohibition. Klansmen feared “that alcohol
consumption endangered conventional family life,” which was the same argument that the
Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the organization behind the Eighteenth Amendment
made to protect women and families from male abuses of alcohol.126 For the Second Klan then,
membership was about much more than just violence against blacks but, “upholding community
moral standards,” to “fend off challenges to their power.”127
This broad appeal to conservative moral values made the Klan a popular organization
among middle-class white men across the country. Because the Klan of the 1920s had expanded
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its “list of enemies” beyond African Americans, the second Klan “was stronger in the North than
in the South.”128 At its peak, it is estimated that the second Klan had a membership of anywhere
between 1.5 and 4 million Americans and was considered a respectable organization and path to
into the middle class by its white contemporaries.129 Arkansas’s Klan membership reached about
40,000 at its height in 1922, with over 135 chapters across the state, suggesting much early
support for the order that precipitously dropped to just 10,000 just three years later as a result of
its own internal divisions and personal politics under the leadership of Grand Dragon J. C.
Comer.130
In Arkansas, as was true across the country, the Klan worked to influence politics to
impose its moral standards upon the state’s citizenry. As noted by historian Nancy MacLean,
“the order went about electoral politics with a zeal beyond that of other contemporary
organizations.”131 In order to ensure a morally upstanding citizenry, the Klan needed to both vote
for friendly politicians and elect their own politicians to ensure the passage of favorable
legislation. Indeed, the focus of the Klan’s efforts in Arkansas was mainly in the realm of
politics. They adhered to Imperial Wizard Hiram Evans’s “program for America” political
agenda that aimed to protect white supremacy and ensure “merciless enforcement of laws against
gambling and prostitution.”132 Arkansas was one of the most powerful states for the Klan’s
political aspirations and worked to elect Klan members and sympathizers to all levels of state
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office. The Arkansas Klan was “so politically powerful that it held its own primaries to decide
which brother to support in the regular Democratic ones.”133 This occurred in 1922, at the height
of Klan activity wherein large rallies were held just outside of Little Rock throughout the first
week of August, to decide which Klan member would run as the Democratic Party candidate for
county office elections. They provided transport to take voters to the polls and had Klansmen at
every polling station across Pulaski County, presumably to intimidate locals.134 It worked. All
Klan candidates were elected in the primary and were thus set for office as no other election
mattered in the state, or the South, at this time. Republicans had held little power in state
elections since the end of Reconstruction, leaving Arkansas as a one-party state in which
Democrats reigned supreme. Much of the political efforts of the Klan were centered in Little
Rock and they appear to have had little political influence outside of the capital and Fort Smith.
While much of the research on the Klan in Arkansas centers on political aspects, whites
across the state were attracted to the fraternal order not just because of its reputation as a white
supremacist group that targeted blacks but also as a force to protect black workers. In the Delta,
African Americans faced two classes of whites seeking to control their lives. Nightriders had
long existed in the state to drive off black sharecroppers and tenant farmers through violence.
These were typically poorer, white farmers who believed that they lost economic opportunities to
blacks who were cheaper to hire. Nightriding increased in the 1920s as landownership became a
distant dream for many, causing whites to compete with blacks for labor. Between 1920 and
1930, “white tenancy [in Mississippi County] had climbed from 30.5 percent…to 43.3 percent,”
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as nightriders and Klansmen successfully drove blacks from the land.135 However, plantation
owners resented nightriders, and often protected their black labor force from their violence and
scare tactics. Historian Nan Woodruff asserts that, by the 1920s, many plantation owners were
either members or supporters of the Klan and used the order to actually protect their labor force
against nightriders, in clear opposition to the Klan’s ideology. Instead of working to remove
blacks from the local area, these landowners desperately worked to maintain and protect blacks
in the area. White landowners, particularly those still tied to cotton, could not afford to lose the
cheapest labor force still available to them – African Americans. They needed to ensure a steady
supply of black labor for their land to ensure they might make a profit each year. Again and
again we see that economics trumped racism even in the most racist region of the state. Thus, in
1920, when three Klansmen had attempted to threaten black families in Crittenden County to
leave the land, they were arrested and sentenced to one year in prison for their efforts to drive
blacks from the land.136 These Klansmen clearly misunderstood the delicate racial situation that
existed in the region and the extent to which white landowners would go to protect their black
labor force. Black labor was critical to their success in an increasingly difficult agricultural
market that saw national cotton acreage peak in 1925 at 46 million acres that caused the price of
cotton to fall to 17.4 cents a pound by the end of the year.137 In some instances in the Delta, the
Klan participated in efforts to prevent African Americans from leaving the fields and moving
North, although this had the opposite impact and led to continued numbers of migrants leaving
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the Delta.138 For Klansmen in the Delta, they had to struggle with two competing desires – to
maintain white supremacy through violence and intimidation while also ensuring a stable and
protected black labor force for the white landholding elite.
While Klansmen in the Delta sought to find a delicate balance between violence and
protection of the black labor force, the Klan were particularly active in the Northern counties of
the Ozark mountains, despite the near homogenous white population. For these men, joining the
Klan was less about race or nationality, although that was important, and more about ridding the
region of crime, particularly makers and sellers of moonshine, illegal since the 1915 Newberry
Act that banned the production and sale of alcohol in the state.139 Across the state, Klansmen
became arbiters of justice as they threatened “bootleggers, gamblers, wild women, and other
undesirables,” that in one instance in Smackover, Southern Arkansas, ended with the death of
one saloon keeper while others were whipped, tarred and feathered.140 This was a nationwide
issue for the Klan, and chapters across the country took it upon themselves to enforce
prohibition. Michael Newton’s assessment of the Klan in Mississippi argues in part that
prohibition “offered Klansmen a perfect excuse for vigilantism.”141 They were able to
concentrate their violence and fear mongering on a group of people who were now in violation of
the Eighteenth Amendment, serving the federal government’s aims to rid the country of this
particular vice. This appealed to a broader section of America than direct violence against
African Americans and other minority groups the Klan were opposed to and was a key
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component to the identity of the second Klan. Not only did they seek to enforce their version of
justice and morality, they also served to aid their local communities in keeping with this idea of
service to Americans. Klansmen in the Ozarks often interrupted church services to deliver money
to the church leader for their work. In Fort Smith, the Klan “donated a hundred dollars to buy
free milk for poor children of the city.”142 In Pueblo, Colorado, the Klan presented a letter that
was read aloud to the church, stating that it was an order designed to defend ““strictly American”
institutions.”143 The Klan were able to appeal to many diverse issues facing white Protestants
across the country beyond race and worked with and against the political system to achieve their
larger goals of white supremacy and moral righteousness.
The Klan peaked nationally in 1924 and showed its strength during the Democratic
Convention. Not only did they avoid the passage of “anti-Klan resolutions” that would have
condemned the Klan and its participation in Democratic Party politics, they also helped to thwart
the nomination of progressive New York governor, Alfred E. Smith, a prohibition bashing
Catholic as the party’s candidate. That year also saw a sizeable number of Klan members voted
into high office. A total of sixteen Senators, perhaps as many as seventy-five Congressmen,
eleven Governors, and two Supreme Court justices were all active members of the Klan.144 This
was a national organization, with national goals and a political agenda that reached beyond its
Deep South roots by 1924. However, their political success and prominence declined by the 1928
elections where the Klan were unable to stop Smith’s nomination. This reflects the decline of the
organization that began in 1924 and was largely complete by 1930, in Arkansas and across the
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country. In Arkansas, membership reached its height of 45,000-50,000 by 1924 and they
continued to exert pressure on statewide politics. However, internal politics and divisions saw
the Klan fail to secure Lee Cazort’s Democratic nomination for Governor and turn away from its
political program back to a fraternal order, inciting fear and violence against its “enemies.” The
divisions and accusations of fraud from within the Klan and Klanswomen organizations saw a
dramatic decline in membership to just 10,000 by 1926 with national membership down to
82,000 in 1929.145 The fear the Klan evoked among African Americans, Catholics, Jews and
other groups who did not fit the order’s nativist ideology was a powerful force that undoubtedly
altered member’s behavior. However, the Klan’s focus on politics and enforcing moral values
meant that they did not behave as a purely terrorist organization working to remove these groups,
indeed, as we saw in the Delta, the Klan at times helped protect black sharecroppers from the
violence of nightriders to keep them tied to the land.
As the Klan began to decline in prominence across the country, one of Arkansas’ most
notorious lynchings took place in 1927. The lynching of John Carter in Little Rock is shaded
with rumor and vague details about the alleged victims, reminiscent of many lynchings that took
place across the country. It began with the disappearance of a young white girl, Floella
McDonald on April 12, 1927. Her body was found two weeks later in the Bell Tower of the First
Presbyterian Church and Lonnie Dixon, the son of the Church’s janitor was quickly arrested. A
mob estimated to be “between three and five thousand” crowded City Hall and the city jail in
search of Dixon on Sunday, May 1, after news spread that he had confessed, but the mob were
unable to access the jail which was protected by Police Chief Burl C. Rotenberry. In fact,
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Rotenberry, experienced at holding off mobs from taking prisoners, had secretly whisked Dixon
away to Texarkana, 300 miles away from the capital, leading mobs to search for him at major
prisons in the state.146 The Mayor, Charles Moyer, seeking to bring calm to the city, asked that
“Little Rock citizens…let the law take the speedy course it has followed so far…We allow
Lonnie’s execution to be done according to law.”147 There was no presumption of innocence, or
attempt to provide Dixon a fair trial, just the hope that his impending execution would quell the
white mobs from further violence and interference at local jails. Perhaps this was an attempt to
avoid another Elaine Massacre, or Lowery lynching, or simply to avoid negative media attention
while the state was in the midst of another crisis – the Mississippi Flood. Regardless, the
Mayor’s calls did not calm the mob. As Dixon waited for his trial set for May 19, whites in the
city continued to fume about this violation of a white girl by a black boy.
The hordes of angry whites got their opportunity to lynch someone just days later on May
4, when another black man was accused of assaulting two white women just outside Little Rock.
Kansas journalist Marcet Haldeman-Julius happened to be in Little Rock during the Carter
lynching and wrote that “the atmosphere of that beautiful Arkansas city is indeed so saturated
with [bitter dislike…toward Negroes]” and claimed two men were responsible for the lynching
and “sadistic orgies” that followed.148 Various narratives of events suggest that Mrs. B.E.
Stewart and her daughter, Glennie, were driving to Little Rock to sell produce when they
encountered said man. What happened next is not clear but there was an altercation that left
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Stewart with a broken arm and the man fled when a car approached the scene. News of this
incident spread rapidly as police officers and “volunteers” made their way to the scene to locate
the man. When a man was apprehended, he was identified as John Carter, who was believed to
be “feeble-minded” with a prior conviction for “entering a woman’s home…and beating her with
a hammer.”149 The police officers were either too few in number or simply unwilling to enforce
the law, and did not prevent the mob from lynching Carter, who they tied to a pole, hung, and
then proceeded to riddle his body with bullets. That was not enough for the mob, however, who
dragged Carter’s body to Ninth Street, the heart of Little Rock’s black community, where they
then set his body alight as the growing mob began to terrorize the neighborhood for three hours
with no attempts by police to interfere. Governor John E. Martineau was out of town for a
strawberry festival, but once he was informed, he ordered the National Guard to disperse the
mob.
Tensions remained high in the city as concerns over the lack of interference by the police
and how white vigilantes had been able to lynch and violate Carter’s body for so long. City
professionals were quick to use one of the city’s leading newspapers, the Arkansas Gazette, to
condemn the violence. On May 6, the Chamber of Commerce published its resolutions on the
front page, detailing the police officers and city officials’ failure to prevent the lynching and
following spectacle on Ninth Street. They asked the Grand Jury that was called into session, to
“investigate immediately the conduct of the sheriff, the mayor, and the Police Department”
during the lynching while also praising “the public press for the splendid stand that it has taken
with reference to the outrage that has been committed in our city.”150 The Little Rock Bar
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Association provided a resolution to the Grand Jury, stating in part that “the evidence points to
such weakness and cowardice on the part of our public officials,” for allowing such violence to
occur.151 Governor Martineau was particularly frustrated with the escalation of violence against
Carter and the impact that it would have on the image of the “fair name of our state.” 152 It is
clear that the city’s leading politicians and professionals were outraged by the Carter lynching,
but to condemn the violence so publicly was a daring decision from a state perceived to be part
of the Deep South. Yet Governor McRae had done the same following the lynching of Henry
Lowery. For Arkansas officials, lynchings were an outrage that did not reflect the reality in
Arkansas. Martineau’s outcry echoes that of future Governor Winthrop Rockefeller, who held a
public memorial for Martin Luther King., Jr after his assassination in 1968, claiming that
Arkansas could “set a pattern for the rest of the nation,” to follow in terms of race relations.153 It
seems that Arkansas Governors have, at least in the twentieth century and with the exception of
Orval Faubus, condemned the extreme racial violence and not viewed these as true examples of
Arkansas race relations.
Concerns also existed about the fate of Lonnie Dixon, who was returned to Little Rock
for his trial on May 16, surrounded by National Guardsmen to prevent his lynching. As was
becoming increasingly common in the South by the late 1920s, Dixon’s trial was short and
predetermined. As national opposition to lynching grew, Southern states took to farcical trials to
legally ensure the death of black men. While Henry Lowery had been promised his day in court
only to be lynched, by 1926, Arkansas politicians ensured the same would not happen to Dixon.
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He was appointed legal representation from a hat of attorney’s names, who failed to adequately
defend him, although they did make the claim that it was Dixon’s friend, Eugene Hudson, who
had actually committed the crime. However, Little Rock attorneys demanded that Dixon be
given a “fair trial” as the Supreme Court “may rule a trial invalid if the “substance of the trial” is
deemed unfair” if there were National Guardsmen surrounding the court to maintain order, in a
nod to Moore v. Dempsey.154 The attorneys clearly understood the need for this case to appear
fair, although it outcome was a foregone conclusion the minute Dixon had been arrested. Indeed,
the jury took just seven minutes to find Dixon guilty and he was sentenced to death, which took
place on June 24. This was the end to a tense few months in Little Rock that had seen increased
racial strife as a result of the apparent murder of a white girl by a black boy, just seventeen at the
time of his death. According to the Chicago Defender, the lynching of John Carter caused
thousands of African Americans to leave Little Rock and head North to escape this hostile
environment. They claimed that the “Missouri Pacific [railroad] is reported to have sold $2,000”
worth of tickets to black Arkansans following the lynching. They attribute this not only to the
violence that took place but also to the precipitous decline in property values.155 For middle-class
African Americans, Little Rock had just shown its racist side, and while this would be the last
lynching to take place in the city, African Americans were no longer willing to live in there if
they had an alternative. For those who could afford to leave, did so and headed North and West
to escape the racial tension and the impending struggle Arkansas was facing from its worst
natural disaster.
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A series of natural disasters hit the South between 1928 and 1932. The first was a
devastating Category 4 that hurricane hit Miami, Florida on September 18, 1926 causing at least
372 casualties and displacing thousands along the Florida coastline. At the time, there was no
national weather service that monitored weather patterns to predict or report the incoming
hurricane and ensure mass evacuations of the region. The total cost of damages was estimated to
be $105 million dollars (approximately $164 billion in 2019) and yet this was not even the worst
natural disaster of the upcoming twelve months.156 The Mississippi River flood of 1927 was
America’s worst natural disaster and the Arkansas Delta bore the brunt of the flooding and
destruction. Months of rain along the Mississippi River from summer 1926 into the following
spring caused much damage and destruction not only to Arkansas but also to Mississippi,
Louisiana, Missouri, Illinois, Tennessee, and Kentucky and Oklahoma.
The river, named by Native Americans, meaning “Father of Waters,” travels from
Minnesota to the Gulf of Mexico over 2,348 miles.157 Always prone to flooding due to the soft
soil that could not always contain the powerful river, white settlers and eventually state and
federal governments sought methods to control the Mississippi through the use of dikes and
levees to stop the river overflowing onto land and altering its changing landscape. Levees had
long been used to build up a dirt barrier between the river and property that grew more
sophisticated in the twentieth century as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers assisted in levee
construction along the Mississippi. The Delta had also seen much deforestation as the region was
turned into productive agricultural land. This destabilized the soil and limited its ability to retain
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water, causing water to run off the soil and flood the land. These efforts of control meant that in
1926, as the rain poured down along the river basin, the river had nowhere to go but South,
putting pressure on the levees that ultimately could not sustain the power of the Mississippi
River and one by one they began to break in mid-April. A total of 16,570,627 acres of land were
flooded across seven states with death toll estimates ranging between 250 and 500. 158 Around
637,000 people were displaced, over 500,000 of those were racial minorities, mostly black.159
This was a disaster the country was not ready for.
Arkansas was hit the hardest, over five million acres of land flooded, or about one-fifth of
the state. Much of this destruction hit agricultural land along the Mississippi River itself, but the
Arkansas, White, and St. Francis rivers also witnessed unprecedented flooding, affecting much
of the state as 118 levees broke.160 Around 100 Arkansans died due to the flood and 362,560
people were displaced into one of the eighty Red Cross camps erected as part of national efforts
to coordinate relief.161 Flood waters in some areas did not recede until the summer, when it was
too late to plant crops, increasing the financial losses for landowners and sharecroppers. It is
estimated that “1,111,911 acres of cotton, [and] 414,378 acres of corn” were damaged as a result
of the flood.162 Across the state, people scrambled to makeshift camps as their homes and
businesses flooded. Some, particularly in the Delta, chose to remain on their land. Oftentimes,
black sharecroppers were either stopped from leaving, or had to endure difficult conditions at
segregated Red Cross camps, known at the time as concentration camps.
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Sharecroppers felt the impact of the flood most as relief was coordinated under
segregated conditions. In its report on relief efforts, the Red Cross stated that the need for “fair
and impartial distribution of a more than $17,000,000 relief fund” required the organization to
create a “larger and more specialized operating force…in the field…since the World War.”163
And yet did this force did not operate on a fair basis. Across the South, the Red Cross bowed to
local pressure and established segregated camps, and much of the control was left in the hands of
local white planter elites. In this moment of crisis, Arkansas responded in just the same way as
did other Deep South states. It worked to keep its labor on the land and not allow the Red Cross
to provide direct relief methods in fear that African Americans would simply escape their
oppression and never return to the land they were indebted to. It was the treatment inside Red
Cross camps across the South that forced Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce and Director
of flood relief, to appoint a Colored Advisory Commission to investigate the situation. The
Commission worked with the Red Cross to assess the impact of the flood on African Americans,
predominantly sharecroppers and tenant farmers and was headed by Tuskegee President, Robert
Moton. The report concluded that for black sharecroppers who did enter Red Cross Refugee
Camps, they could not leave “unless some outside person makes application for his release with
the promise of giving him a home and seeing that he is not a Public Charity Ward.” One planter
even admitted fears that “if the government takes our Negroes and our mules they might just as
well take our land.”164 For planters along the Mississippi River, their livelihood was dependent
upon the labor of black sharecroppers and they would not let the government interfere with their
business.
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In these moments of total disaster, some Arkansans in the Delta differed little from their
Deep South neighbors. One landowner in Desha County did not allow the Corps of Engineers
from rescuing his black workforce that were stranded on a levee, claiming that “the situation
[was] no way critical,” even as the flooded river swirled just a foot beneath them. This was
common across the Delta as white landowners sought to maintain oversight of their black labor
force. Moton even acknowledged in a memorandum to Hoover, that in Jefferson County, the Red
Cross had given landowners control of aid who in some instances were accused of charging
black refugees for relief. 165 Yet, the unpublished report by the Colored Advisory Commission
was very congratulatory in tone and suggested that the National Red Cross had enacted a “policy
of exact justice” to ensure racial equality in the treatment of those in need. Clearly, members of
the Commission had to toe a very fine line as to the criticisms they leveled against either the Red
Cross or the federal government in their relief efforts to ensure there was no backlash against
them or any progress that could be made for African Americans during this time. The report
stated, in part, that while the National Red Cross did not operate on a segregated basis, its
“chapter units operating on a countywide basis…have immediate control” of local Red Cross
efforts. Thus, segregated camps were out of the hands of the philanthropic organization and in
many instances, aid was being given by local elites. They applaud themselves and the Red Cross
for employing more black workers to the Red Cross and what they argued was the “adequate
distribution of relief and needed measures of Reconstruction” that had “given the stricken
sufferers a new hope and a new vision for the future.”166 Few had much hope in the future. Most
farmers along the Mississippi could not plant cotton in 1927, which left many smaller
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landowners indebted to banks and black sharecroppers tied to unproductive land with little
chance of an income that year.167
Arkansas’ response to the Mississippi Flood matched that of all states impacted by this
disaster. The sheer levels of destruction and self-interest practically guaranteed that white
landowners would do anything to maintain the status quo, even if that meant risking the lives of
black sharecroppers. For those forced to remain on the land, they had no access to any form of
Red Cross aid. For those who made it to the segregated camps, many were under strict control of
whites who did not allow anyone to leave without the landowner’s permission.168 Yet there were
glimmers of hope in Arkansas. Black agents in Pine Bluff suggested that once the Red Cross
appeared, the “color line [was] obliterated” and blacks received equal treatment from the
organization. Yet, for the most part, in the face of absolute economic and agricultural
destruction, Arkansas showed it hand as a racist, Deeply Southern state that did not blink before
subjugating its black citizenry to dire treatment in order to preserve what was left of the
agricultural season. The dominance of Delta agriculture for the state economy and the power that
the white elites in this region held ensured that their method of control to keep their labor force
would not be challenged. However, another crisis was brewing that plunged the world into
chaos.
The stock market crash on October 29, 1929 has long been considered by economic
historians the start of the Great Depression in the United States and across the world. Just seven
months into President Hoover’s administration, the economic boom of the 1920s came to an
abrupt halt after a tumultuous couple of years. The stock market crash was not the sole cause of
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the Great Depression, but it was certainly the most visible sign of an economic disaster that
rippled across the globe. Indeed, the decade of consumption had really only ever been true for
middle-class urban dwellers who could afford to buy the latest household products on credit.
This air of wealth led to reckless spending and increased debt, but the economy appeared to be
thriving. However, for those working in the agricultural sector, they faced even more acute
economic challenges. The natural disasters that hit the agricultural heartland of the United States
had sent many states into an economic recession long before 1929 as the price of their goods
plummeted before being completely decimated by floods, droughts, and infestations of the boll
weevil. Yet, most Americans were confident in the economy. They did not see an end to this
economic boon that had let to a surplus of goods as 20,000 new manufacturing plants were
created between 1925 and 1929.169 The crash in 1929 and the federal government’s initial
response to this economic downturn led to the worst depression the United States had yet to
experience.
This situation was nothing like anything that had been seen before and it was President
Hoover’s job to rectify it. Hoover was well-known to Americans long before his presidency and
was a symbol of the American Dream. Following a remarkable career as a mining engineer,
Hoover travelled across the world and organized relief efforts during World War I.170 Becoming
the director of the U.S. Food Administration program to feed Allied troops in 1917, Hoover
proved himself skilled in administration and successfully ensured troops and civilians were fed
without the need for rationing.171 Hoover held almost hero level status in the United States for
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his work during World War I and became more entrenched in the government following the
Allied victory in 1918. In 1920 he declared himself a Republican and threw his hat into the
proverbial ring of the presidential nomination. While he did not win, President Harding named
Hoover as the Secretary of Commerce, a job for which he was praised, in part for coordinating
relief for the victims of the Mississippi Flood and his ability to take control of the situation.172 In
the 1928 election, Hoover once again ran for president, defeating Democratic nominee and
former Governor of New York, Al Smith and his running mate, Arkansas Senator Joseph T.
Robinson in a landslide presidential election. Smith, a Catholic and progressive had carefully
selected Robinson as his running mate. Hailing from Lonoke, east of Little Rock, the lawyer and
longtime Democratic politician was “a southerner, but a southerner who came from a state
located west of the Mississippi,” who could appeal to Democrats in the Deep South and across
the nation.173 Robinson was the logical choice for Smith as he appealed to Southern Democrats
who were less convinced of voting for a Northern, Catholic, Democrat. Robinson was supposed
to bring those votes into line but it was not enough to stop Hoover’s victory.
Hoover’s presidency was marked by what the public saw as inaction and unwillingness to
provide aid to the millions of Americans who increasingly suffered the impact of the crash and
ensuing Great Depression. Black Tuesday, as October 29, 1929 has come to be known, saw the
loss of fourteen billion dollars in the stock market in mere hours. These losses continued for the
next month as confidence in the market dropped and people sought to save what was left of their
investments. Despite this turbulence on the stock exchange, many experts at the time believed
that the economy would simply right itself, that this was a natural fluctuation of the stock market.
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Hoover implored industrial leaders of the nation not to panic, that they should maintain wage
rates and employment levels in hopes that Americans would continue to purchase consumer
items.174 And while he urged governors to promote public works projects to employ its citizens,
he did not wish for the federal government to more fervently interfere with what he believed, and
perhaps hoped, was simply a dip in the economy. Instead, Hoover relied upon businesses to bear
the burden of the crash which resulted in increased unemployment of millions of Americans by
1930.
The stock market crash had a limited impact upon much of the South wherein agriculture
was the mainstay of the economy. Farmers across the South had suffered economic struggles
since the end of World War I, and in many ways the rest of the country was simply experiencing
an economic depression already well entrenched in the South. Particularly for Arkansas and
other states that suffered from the flood, they were barely getting their head above the water
when the stock market crashed and shortly following another natural disaster struck the
Mississippi River Valley. The drought of 1930-31, just like the Mississippi Flood just two years
prior, hit the already embattled states of Arkansas, Mississippi, and Lousiana as temperatures
surpassed 100 degrees and little rainfall resulted in the ruination of crops. According to a Red
Cross report, the drought, “parched the fields of 1,057 counties in twenty-three States” and was
the “greatest calamity of its kind in the country’s history.”175 The lack of rainfall continued for
the Midwest and Southern states into 1931 and much of the country was reliant wholly upon the
Red Cross for relief efforts. Hoover, now President of the United States, committed to limiting
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the federal government’s role in relief efforts to coordination of philanthropic organizations and
locals to aid those directly impacted.176
In their report on the relief efforts taking place across the country during the drought, the
Red Cross detailed the typical economic situation for farmers. Most farmers lived on credit, and
would pay that credit off at the end of the year when the crops were sold. This system that
debilitated sharecroppers was how planters also funded their operations and the “combination of
drought, low prices, scarcity of money, bank failures and accumulation of debt” impacted almost
every farmer.177 They indirectly chastised farmers who relied upon one crop and hoped seed
boxes would encourage recipients to diversify their farms to avoid such reliance upon their
organization in the future. In Arkansas, the cotton crop was ruined. The yield dropped from six
bales per twenty acres in 1929 to two in 1930 and the crop sold at just 9.46 cents a pound, down
from 16.79 cents per pound a year earlier.178 The Red Cross began their relief efforts by
supplying “58,532 families in 238 counties of Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Oklahoma and Texas” with a box of seed filled with late season vegetables to survive winter. Of
those, 23,852 families were from Arkansas.179 In a fashion similar to that of the Mississippi
Flood, local landowners controlled the administration of relief to their black workers. This was
done because of the widespread belief that “blacks were shiftless and eager to obtain a dole and
that they required less to live on that whites.”180 These continued fears that blacks would leave
the land or expect more food than just subsistence level meant that whites attempted to control
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how much relief and in what forms it was given to African Americans. In many instances across
the Delta, African Americans were forced to work before they received aid for their families and
the Red Cross were reticent to intervene in local custom. Afterall, some aid is better than no aid
but by March 1931, the Red Cross formally ended its relief efforts in the state. The worst of the
drought was over, their seed boxes had made gains in restoring agricultural production and fed
180,188 Arkansas families but the country was now in the throes of the depression, creating a
new set of problems in the state.181
By the close of 1931, Hoover was increasingly unpopular. Unemployment had risen to
15.9 percent and peaked in 1933 at 24.9 percent as industry slowed.182 Average Americans bore
the brunt of the Great Depression and saw Hoover as an ineffective president who either lied to
the American public about the situation or was naïve enough to think that acting confident would
solve the crisis.183 Behind the scenes, Hoover encouraged industrial leaders to maintain
employment levels and wages despite a precipitous decline in the purchase of consumer
products, but he remained reluctant to involve the federal government. In 1931, Hoover claimed
that the federal government was not in a position to help provide relief for individuals, that that
was the role of philanthropic agencies and local and state governments. This was following a
long and celebrated career of providing humanitarian relief both through public and private
agencies as a Secretary of Commerce during the flood. Philanthropy was not enough to fix the
fundamental problems the world economy faced nor the perception among Americans that
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Hoover was ill-equipped for the job at hand as Franklin Delano Roosevelt sought to unseat him
and win the White House for the Democratic Party.
Roosevelt, an elite New Yorker with a long career in politics, was a new type of
politician that came to redefine the presidency and role of the federal government. Born in 1882,
Roosevelt earned his undergraduate degree in history from Harvard University before pursing
law school at Columbia University. In the midst of his education, Roosevelt married his fifth
cousin once removed, Eleanor Roosevelt, who would deeply influence his politics and New Deal
policies. Roosevelt’s first foray into politics was in the New York State Senate in 1910 before
serving as Woodrow Wilson’s Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1913. Following his failed run
on the Democratic ticket in 1920 for vice-president, Roosevelt fell ill with what was believed to
be polio while on vacation. He was paralyzed from the waist down, a fact that was in plain sight
as he re-learned to walk short distances and with the aid of others. It is often said that this illness
led Roosevelt to a greater understanding of suffering and the experiences of the less fortunate. It
supposedly opened his eyes to how most Americans lived, suffering in some fashion whether it
be illness, socio-economic status, race, or gender.184 The truth of this is likely less momentous,
but it certainly had an effect on his life and his desire to become president.
Roosevelt did not return to politics until 1928 when he replaced Al Smith as the
Governor of New York. There, he established himself as a progressive politician, establishing a
system for “old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and labor legislation” that would
become hallmarks of the New Deal.185 As he began to plan for his presidential campaign in 1932,
Roosevelt bought together a group of male leaders in their fields to advise him on the big issues

184

For a short discussion on this, see: Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men
who Made It, (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 420-421.
185
Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men who Made It, 424.

88

facing Americans. Known as his “Brains Trust,” this collection of men and later women would
go on to influence and coordinate Roosevelt’s grand plan to get America out of the Great
Depression. His New Deal was formally announced when he won the Democratic Party’s
nomination for president at the National Convention, whereupon he broke tradition to attend the
event to address the delegates. In his acceptance speech, Roosevelt indicated that he would be an
“honest” president who offered up a “new deal for the American people” to recreate the Republic
and emerge from the Great Depression stronger and “return America to its own people.”186
While his plan was vague at best, the American public overwhelmingly voted for Roosevelt in
November, ousting Hoover with over fifty-seven percent of the vote. This election signaled a
change in American politics and the political ideology of the two major parties as Roosevelt
worked to build a coalition of Americans that redefined the Democrats as the party for African
Americans, and Americans more broadly.
Still a stronghold for Democratic politics, the South also voted overwhelmingly in favor
of Roosevelt. 85.9 percent of the Arkansas electorate voted for Roosevelt, with many farmers
and poor workers hoping he would make good on his promise of a New Deal. It was in this
election that the state also elected a woman to represent them in the U.S. Senate. Hattie
Carraway replaced her husband following his death in 1931 but then ran to win the seat on her
own merit, becoming the first woman to be elected to the Senate. Carraway proved to be a
staunch supporter of Roosevelt’s New Deal policies and supported relief efforts in her home
state. Arkansans had reason to be hopeful about the future under Roosevelt. Crop prices
plummeted from bad to worse as farmers struggled to recover fully from the flood and drought.
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Cotton dropped to just five cents per pound, leaving farmers unable to break even let alone make
a profit.187 The economic struggles of white farmers were passed on to black farmers who were
either left unemployed or indebted with little prospects. Yet, Roosevelt had promised to help and
quickly came to the aid of the agricultural sector.
Roosevelt did not delay in bringing about change to aid Americans. While he wanted to
avoid simply handing out money to Americans, fearing they would become wardens of the state,
he instead created a slew of programs that would put men and women back to work. In his first
one hundred days in office, he passed a number of laws that did just that. For Arkansans, the
most important of these was without a doubt the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA). Intended
to keep farmers afloat, the AAA sought to reestablish the “purchasing power” of farmers through
means of price rates and decreasing acreage of overproduced products to naturally increase their
value.188 Farmers were paid to reduce their crops and leave portions of their land fallow, kill
animals, and otherwise work to decrease the surplus of crops that had aided the decline in prices.
Between 1932 and 1935, the number of cotton bales produced in Arkansas declined by almost
fifty percent while the price doubled from five cents per pound to 11.5. In addition to the
increase in prices, Arkansas farmers received over forty-four million dollars in aid from the
AAA, which largely benefited landowners.189 In a detailed study for the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration (FERA), native Arkansan Alfred E. Smith recorded the long history of
subjugation, particularly with regards to agriculture, experienced by African Americans.

187

William D. Downs, Jr., Stories of Survival: Arkansas Farmers During the Great Depression,
(Fayetteville: Phoenix International, 2011), 15.
188
Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub. L. 72-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933).
189
“Report on the Proceedings of the Statewide Coordination Meeting of Federal Agencies Operating in
Arkansas,” April 24, 1936, The National Emergency Council. United States World Projects Administration.
Arkansas Administration Files, 1933-1943m MSUn3 Box 15, Item 11, Special Collections, University of Arkansas
Libraries, Fayetteville.

90

Educated at Howard University, Smith was a schoolteacher before joining Roosevelt’s
administration and member of his ‘black cabinet,’ an unofficial group of black leaders who
advised the president on the unique situation facing African Americans during the Great
Depression. Claiming that “the Negro has been the worst victim of the depression,” Smith goes
on to account for the disproportionately high numbers of African Americans seeking relief, citing
enslavement, and the continued restrictions that undermine black economic growth and selfsufficiency by the white South. While national in scope, this report highlights that despite the
Great Migration, a majority of African Americans, thirty-seven percent, remained tied to
agriculture, most of whom worked on somebody else’s land. 190 While attempts were made to
ensure that the federal payments reached all farmers across the country, Southern racism ensured
that black tenants and sharecroppers were denied any of these benefits. Instead, white
landowners kicked their tenants off the land, claiming that they no longer needed them due to the
reduced acreage and government benefits. Landowners took advantage of the situation and began
to turn to mechanized labor for their land to increase production and profit that would soar
following World War Two.
This turn towards mechanization coincided with increased efforts to better understand
agriculture. Arkansas had been especially prone to natural disasters over the previous decade and
droughts continued to plague the state. Governmental agencies, created to ease the financial
burden of the Great Depression, also worked to understand and ease the agricultural destruction
of adverse weather patterns. Over the course of the decade, every county in Arkansas was
affected by droughts that destroyed much of the corn crop of the state. Indeed, it is estimated that
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the 1934 and 1936 droughts particularly hurt farmers in the northwest corner of the state, who
were overrepresented on relief roles. Over ninety percent of Arkansans in northwest Arkansas
claimed relief due to “crop failure” as opposed to thirty-seven percent of Delta farmers.191
Between the disastrous weather for agriculture and funding from the federal government,
landowners moved to become less reliant upon individual labor but upon a more wholesale,
scientific approach to maximize production and profit, leading to the displacement of thousands
of Arkansas tenants from the land over the course of the Great Depression.192
This displacement, as well as other unfair practices by landowners led to the creation of
an interracial union in Arkansas. The Southern Tenant Farmers Union (STFU) was established in
Poinsett County, the Northeast corner of the Delta, in 1934 by a group of tenants and
sharecroppers, black and white, who opposed their eviction from the land by Hiram Norcross.193
This was unprecedented. Just a decade earlier nightriders had attempted to remove black
sharecroppers from the land, blaming them for their unemployment. However, the Great
Depression saw these men bridge their racial animosity in the face of an economic crisis.
Together, they proved a stronger force to challenge the actions of landowners but struggled to
successfully challenge the power and authority of white landowners in the region. The STFU
was led by H.L. Mitchell and Clay East, two socialists who challenged the administration of New
Deal programs in the region that made it difficult for tenants and sharecroppers to participate.
The class unity and religious overtones of STFU members bought black and white sharecroppers
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together to collectively bargain for better rights from landowners.194 While the STFU became
beset with problems ranging from its socialist tendencies to the violent efforts by landowners to
break the union, they did succeed in at least making the AAA investigate claims of violating
their rules, albeit unsuccessfully. For the AAA, they needed to maintain the support of
landowners and while they knew that tenants and sharecroppers were being left out of the
benefits of their program, there was little they could or would do about it, fearing an end of
landowner’s cooperation. The violence levelled against STFU members led the organization to
relocate across the Mississippi to Memphis as they continued to call into question the
mistreatment and degradation of poor farm workers. By 1938, they had a membership of 35,000,
mostly Arkansas tenants and sharecroppers who continued to fight for equal benefits from New
Deal programs. As war in Europe loomed, poor farmers in the Delta sought to maintain a life that
was rapidly disappearing as technology and science altered agriculture and racial unity splintered
once again over economic opportunities.
During the economic crises of the late 1920s, Arkansas resorted to white supremacist
methods to control its black population. Having weathered the Elaine Massacre, the high-profile
lynching of John Carter and avoided the wrath of the Klan, it turned out that racial moderation
fell at the hands of white landowners when their livelihood was at stake. The on-going series of
crises that Arkansas and the nation experienced as the Depression turned into the worst the
nation had ever faced, continued to challenge Arkansas’s race relations and its path to what
Governor Winthrop Rockefeller considered Arkansas’ role in leading the nation to a path of
racial equality.195 Between 1919 and 1939, Arkansas truly deserved its reputation as a Deep
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South state but it would emerge out of the war with high hopes and expectations to modernize
and embrace all of its citizenry. Arkansas survived the Great Depression, but changes were afoot
as a new generation of black activists emerged in the state to push even harder for civil rights and
force Arkansas back onto its path of racial moderation.
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Chapter 3:
“A Sugar-Coated Integration Pill”1
Following World War II, Arkansas led the way in race relations. The former confederate
state hurtled toward racial inclusivity in education, starting in 1948 with the integration of the
University of Arkansas, almost fifteen years before Deep South state universities were forced to
do so by court orders. This chapter will show that the state willingly accepted the landmark
Brown v. Board of Education ruling in 1954 that mandated integrated education due to the high
economic cost of segregation, becoming the first Southern state to implement the order. Citing
positive race relations in the state, Arkansas Governor Francis Cherry claimed that the state
would follow the law and indicated that he would form a committee to ease the process of
integration, which he believed would not take more than a year.2 Arkansas was eschewing its
Deep South reputation and embracing racial change within its borders, if only for economic
reasons. The state was laser focused on finally realizing Henry Grady’s New South ideal and
becoming an industrial state with a diverse economic portfolio that would lift its population from
poverty. With economic growth as the main goal of post-war Arkansas, the state simultaneously
shunned its racist past and led the way in integrating education and black voter registration.
Yet, by 1955, the state was thrown back into the throes of racial antagonism as the Deep
South, and much of the country, balked at the emerging Civil Rights Movement and demands
from African Americans for equality. Having integrated a number of school districts by 1955,
national attention, not for the last time, shone on Arkansas as Life magazine depicted the calm
scenes of a Southern town peaceably integrating its black and white students. The image of
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Arkansas as a racially progressive Southern state enraged white supremacists who organized
protests but ultimately failed to undo integration in Hoxie.
Progress was the goal of post-war Arkansas. As the country emerged victorious after four
years of battle, soldiers returned with a renewed sense of patriotism and democracy. Every
Arkansas governor between 1949 and 1975 served in the military during World War II and
professed a more national and progressive outlook for the state during their administrations. For
them, progress meant economic improvement. By 1945, the state remained reliant upon a largely
agricultural economy fueled by black labor. This would change over the coming fifteen years as
the state worked to encourage industries to move to the “land of opportunity,” Arkansas’ new
nickname in 1953. And this effort was partially successful, the state could boast of increased
industry in the state by 1960, although much of the work was unskilled and low-wage and did
not equitably include black workers. As industry moved into the state, agriculture pushed people
off the land into more urban spaces as mechanization became cheaper for large landowners.
These changes bought about an increased black presence in towns and cities east of Little Rock
who became increasingly frustrated with the lack of opportunities afford to them because of the
color of their skin. Indeed, Harold Flowers began work before the war to increase black political
awareness through voter registration campaigns while others sought to receive a better education
at the white only University of Arkansas. Blacks began to more overtly challenge Jim Crow
across the nation as the Supreme Court handed down numerous decisions upholding that if
segregated facilities were to exist, they had to be equal.
Arkansas set itself upon a more progressive path during World War II as efforts began to
modernize and industrialize the state’s economy. Post-war Governor Ben Laney proposed and
ensured the passage of the Revenue Stabilization Act in 1945, which sought to improve the
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state’s finances. This act meant that the government could not run a deficit, and it centralized the
distribution of state funds to various agencies, creating a more efficient and responsive state.3
But Laney and others wanted Arkansas to become a haven for new businesses and as such in the
1944 election, Arkansans voted for the “Right to Work” amendment which passed with 105,300
votes for, and 87,652 votes against. This law was sold as “essential to protecting Arkansas
workers from radical labor organizers, curbing union power, and maintaining the color line in
labor relations,” but the reality was that it sought to break down the power of unions in the state,
which in turn would keep wages lower, making Arkansas more attractive to new business
opportunities.4 Sidney McMath, Laney’s successor as Governor in 1949, successfully persuaded
the legislature to fund the improvement and expansion of the highways across the state. Up until
this point, Arkansas was known for its terrible highway system and nonsensical roads. Twentythree hundred miles of new highway were created under McMath, and in 1952 a state highway
commission was created to coordinate road improvements, making transport around the state
easier and more reliable, facilitating increased economic output. These two governors both
sought to modernize the state through increased financial opportunities that would encourage
business and limit the outward migration the state had been experiencing since the 1920s. They
had some success, if uneven in distribution.
Under Governor Laney, the Arkansas Resources and Development Commission (ARDC)
was established to entice Northern businesses to relocate to the state. A coalition of various
agencies and businessmen worked to paint Arkansas as a progressive state with moderate and
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friendly politicians open to business interests. And it worked, a variety of manufacturing
industries expanded their presence in the state between 1945 and 1960. “The State’s
manufacturing employment rose by forty-four percent” as the type of industries began to
diversify beyond agriculture to secondary goods such as shoes and clothing. Yet, these new
factories were low-wage employment and were often located in communities with a majority
white population as planters in the Delta attempted to maintain control of the black labor force in
agricultural employment, the lowest rung of the economic ladder that was increasingly
undermined by mechanization.5
World War II precipitated a change in the nature of agricultural production across the
country. Scientific agriculture, that is the shift away from labor intensive agriculture to capital
and machine intensive agriculture, became an increasingly popular method of farming in the
United States in the second half of the twentieth century. This was a complex process of change
for Southern farmers who had, for over a century, largely relied upon the exploitation of black
labor and mules to grow, maintain, and harvest cotton. Even before the war, mechanization
techniques were available but, “labor was still cheap and the mechanical pickers being marketed
seemed an unnecessary expense.”6 Thus, many famers in Arkansas and beyond stuck to their
tried and tested techniques even as technological advancements became available. However, as
out-migration continued and land became concentrated into the hands of fewer owners,
mechanization was an inevitable consequence. Across the South, an estimated “five to eight
million people” were pushed off the land and replaced by machines and a change in agricultural
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products being grown.7 By 1960, the use of machines and chemicals was so successful that the
1960 agricultural census removed sharecroppers from the calculations. This was a slow process,
one not complete until 1970 but the devastation it caused among rural communities was
widespread. The population of the Delta declined 14.2 percent between 1940 and 1970, while the
number of farms declined from 216,674 to 60,433, and average acreage increased from 83.3 to
259.7 acres in 1969.8 Small landholders were pushed off their land to make way for larger plots
of land suitable to profit from scientific agriculture.
Geographer Charles Aiken attributes the consolidation of mechanization in the South by
1970 in part to the “inelastic” wages paid to farm workers that had not changed significantly
since the Great Depression. However, Donald Holley argues that wages in fact more than tripled
by the end of the War and in Arkansas the wage for picking one hundred pounds of cotton was
400 percent higher than prewar rates.9 While African Americans had been leaving the South
since World War I, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) forced many sharecroppers and
tenant farmers from the land, there remained a surplus of agricultural laborers who many
plantation owners by the 1940s were simply not willing to pay sufficient wages to employ. This
led to the slow incorporation of mechanization and a sustained movement of black and white
laborers to larger towns and cities, forcing landowners to even further incorporate scientific
agricultural practices.10 In the Delta, this also resulted in a shift away from cotton production to
soybeans and rice, plants much easier to grow and harvest using machinery and chemical
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controls that also created more profit for landowners. Soybean production began in Mississippi
County during the Great Depression and accelerated during World War II as the market for
soybean oil expanded. The move to mechanization further increased as the number of acres
devoted to soybeans increased from 67,479 to 277,104 acres between 1950 and 1969. During the
same time, cotton acreage in the county declined from 284,761 to 167,453 acres as large
landowners like Bob Wilson diversified their crops to benefit from the fluctuating value of these
agricultural goods. Wilson inherited the land from his father, Lee Wilson, who had amassed
about 50,000 acres of land in Mississippi County since 1870. Wilson was in control of the land
during this process of mechanization that saw thousands of African Americans leave the county
in search of alternative employment.11
This was the consequence of mechanization. As this transition to scientific agriculture
occurred, laborers had to find employment elsewhere. According to the 1960 census, the “rural
farm” population of African Americans in Arkansas declined to 18.7 percent from 46.1 percent a
decade earlier. White landowners became less dependent on black labor, resulting in “less
investment in the need to restrict the role of blacks in Southern society.”12 The loosening of ties
that had long dictated the Jim Crow South collapsed with mechanization and continued outmigration and meant that those who had long benefitted from segregation and inequality had
new, investment concerns that did not rely upon the submission of blacks. This was in addition to
the growing physical distance between white landowners and black laborers, many of whom had
moved away from the plantation to larger towns. While numerous historians and economists
have tracked the numerical data of out-migration, there is a dearth of information about the lives

11

Jeannie Whayne, Delta Empire: Lee Wilson and the Transformation of Agriculture in the New South,
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011), 213-231.
12
Holley, The Second Great Emancipation, 150-151, 195.

100

of those who left and where exactly they went.13 Certainly, larger towns and cities in Arkansas
were an obvious attraction for displaced laborers seeking higher paying employment. Charles
Bolton has outlined the growth of major towns in Arkansas between 1940 and 1950 and
suggested that war time industry that enticed them. For example, Pine Bluff’s population grew
from 21,000 in 1940 to 37,000 in 1950, 43 percent of whom were black. And they were attracted
to the thousands of jobs available at the Pine Bluff Arsenal, a wartime chemical factory that
employed all people, regardless of race or gender. 14
As African Americans became concentrated into more urban centers across the state, they
were able to use this power to agitate for change. Even before America entered World War II,
African Americans increased their fight for equality across the nation. At the national level, the
NAACP continued to take lawsuits to the U.S. Supreme Court challenging segregation and
voting restrictions. One of its earliest victories came in 1938 when the Supreme Court ruled that
each state must provide black students equal access to higher education programs. The case,
Gaines v. Canada, outlawed the practice of states providing out-of-state tuition scholarships to
African Americans to attend graduate and professional programs at a bordering state school. The
Court decreed that the state must either provide a separate facility for its black population or
integrate its white program. For Deep South states, integration was not an option as it would
have undermined the whole social and political structure that white supremacy relied upon. But
for mid-South and border states, the economic burden of dual institutions of higher education
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was a factor that at least caused some to consider their options. The University of Missouri, not
willing to even be seen as succumbing to an NAACP lawsuit, created a separate law school for a
handful of students. However, the case eventually fell apart as the plaintiff, Lloyd Gaines,
disappeared before the lower courts could determine how equal the new black law school was to
the white. This allowed universities and higher education programs to continue to offer black
students out-of-state tuition scholarships and delay the establishment of black facilities despite
the increasing number of educated African Americans, thanks to Roosevelt’s National Youth
Administration’s program of subsidized education.15
World War II interrupted the number of African Americans applying to higher education
programs, limiting the ability of the NAACP to force equalization of education. They did,
however, have some wartime successes in their battle against segregated transportation facilities
and voting restrictions. Although not an NAACP case, in 1941, eight months before the attack at
Pearl Harbor, the Supreme Court voted in favor of Congressman Arthur Mitchell, who had been
forced out of his first-class train coach to the colored section of the train while travelling from
Illinois to Hot Springs, Arkansas in 1937. Mitchell, the second black member of the House of
Representatives to be elected in the twentieth-century and early supporter of the Democratic
Party, had been heading on vacation to Hot Springs, a “favorite rest haven of Chicago
politicians.”16 As the train entered Arkansas from Tennessee, Mitchell was ordered to move to
the colored coach despite having paid for a first-class ticket and informing the conductor that he
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was a Congressman. Upon his return to Chicago, Mitchell sued the train company and detailed
the inequality he witnessed between the two train coaches. His case wound up in the Supreme
Court where Mitchell represented himself and charged that the railroad company had failed to
uphold the doctrine of “separate but equal” but did not ask the court to end segregated railroad
accommodations. Clearly fearful of the potential ramifications of this lawsuit, the Arkansas
Attorney General, along with nine other Southern Attorneys General filed an amicus curiae brief
to the Supreme Court defending their railroad segregation laws but the Supreme Court declined
to consider their constitutionality, in part because Mitchell had only requested that Plessy v.
Ferguson be upheld.17 The Supreme Court agreed with Mitchell that the railroad had failed to
afford equal facilities to the races and ordered the Interstate Commerce Committee (ICC) to
ensure interstate railroad companies provide facilities to black passengers that were truly equal to
those of white passengers.18 Following the decision, the Arkansas Gazette published an article
defending the 1891 Separate Coach Law that mandated segregation on rail travel within the state.
According to the article, it was customary that black passengers who had purchased first class
tickets would be placed in a compartment but on this particular occasion “the compartments had
been sold out” and the only remaining alternative was to move Mitchell to the colored coach.
Indeed, in anticipation of the Supreme Court’s decision, Arkansas’ Attorney General Jack Holt
attended a conference of Southern attorneys general in which they discussed the “threat” posed
by this lawsuit and worked to ensure the preservation of the segregation law regardless of the
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outcome. 19 For those seeking the maintenance of segregation, the Supreme Court’s decision was
a welcome relief and nothing changed on the railroads for almost fifteen years.
As Mitchell worked its way to the Supreme Court, William Harold Flowers sought other
means to bring about civil rights in Arkansas. As a teen, Flowers had witnessed the lynching of
John Carter, which inspired him to push for civil rights despite the lack of aid or assistance from
the national NAACP. A native of Stamps in the southwest of the state, Flowers created the
Committee of Negro Organizations (CNO) in 1940 to increase black civil rights activism and
voter registration in the state. Flowers came from the black middle-class and attended the Robert
H. Terrel Law School in Washington D.C. before establishing his law office in Pine Bluff. He
believed that political access and representation was of utmost importance to equalizing the
playing fields for blacks. Thus, one of the first campaigns of the CNO was to have African
Americans pay the state poll tax of one dollar to be able to vote in the general elections. This
campaign, and others, saw black voter registration increase from 1.5 percent in 1940 to 17.3
percent in 1947.20 Despite these gains in registered black voters, none were able to vote in the
Democratic Party primary elections as it banned black participation, and were often
unchallenged in the general election. Yet, Flowers believed that the only way to secure
meaningful change was through political participation and continued his efforts to increase voter
registration and political awareness.
The CNO had a number of early successes. Their first conference in September 1940 in
Phillips County saw Flowers tell the crowd that the CNO had “obtained the endorsement of
twenty-one organizations, with a numerical strength of approximately ten thousand Negro
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citizens.” 21 They had also overseen investigations into discrimination in New Deal public works
programs and a rise in black participation in their meetings across the state. Flowers spread his
message across the state at meetings intended to bring attention and support to the CNO. This
was a coordinated effort that sought to bring together pre-existing civic, political, and religious
organizations for the common goal of black equality through voter registration and payment of
the poll tax. This drive had huge implications for Arkansas following the 1944 Supreme Court
decision, Smith v. Allwright. This case centered of the issue of the Democratic Party as a private
entity, that for much of the twentieth century in the South barred African Americans from joining
and thus participating in Democratic Party elections. The white primary, initiated as early as
Reconstruction, was the “principal mechanism for disfranchising southern blacks,” and by 1930
almost all Southern states had barred black participation in the Democratic Party primary.22 The
justices in Smith v. Allwright opined that “the party takes its character as a state agency from the
duties imposed on it by state statutes,” and that a state could not delegate its authority to an
agency for any electoral processes. White primaries were now unconstitutional.
The overturning of white primaries and the ability of the Democratic Party to control who
voted in these essential elections had a significant impact on the number of registered black
voters across the South. According to legal historian Michael J. Klarman, “the number of blacks
registered to vote in the South rose to roughly three-quarters of a million in 1948 to a million in
1952.”23 The removal of this barrier to voting certainly aided Flowers and the CNO’s efforts to
increase black voter registration in Arkansas to 17.3 percent by 1947, a percentage not achieved
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in Mississippi or Alabama until the 1960s. Indeed, immediately following the Smith decision,
lawyers for the Arkansas Democratic State Committee reported that “every Negro in the state
who claims to be a Democrat will have the right to vote in the coming primary.”24 Questions
remained over the law that banned black participation in the party and efforts by the state
convention quickly worked to ensure that African Americans did not actually vote in any
upcoming elections in the state. Thus, while Flowers was able to register an impressive number
of black voters in Arkansas, the number of whom did actually vote following Smith is unknown
but is almost certainly more limited in scope due to the continued determination of some whites
in the state to control politics through other mechanisms.
Flowers was not simply concerned with political equality for African Americans in
Arkansas, he also sought to improve their economic and social status, chiefly through education.
In February 1942, the Little Rock Classroom Teacher’s Association (CTA) with support from
national NAACP lawyer Thurgood Marshall, sued the Little Rock School Board for teacher
salary equalization. Black teachers across the country received less pay than their white
counterparts and the NAACP had been pursuing this as one of their attempts to force meaningful
equalization of segregated facilities. The CTA elected their plaintiff as Sue Cowan-Morris, a
south Arkansas native with an impeccable education – she attended Spelman College through
high school, Talladega College and had, in 1941, attended the University of Chicago for graduate
education to teach English. By 1942, Morris was the head of English at Dunbar High School, a
segregated black school in Little Rock. Research conducted by the CTA had shown a wide
disparity in pay between white and black teachers in the city. White high school teachers for the
1941-42 school year earned an average salary of $856, while African American high school
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teachers averaged only $567.”25 The School Board argued in court hearings that the pay
differential had nothing to do with race, but was instead about the “special training, ability,
character, experiences, duties, services and accomplishments” that each teacher bought to the
classroom. Little Rock Federal Judge Thomas Trimble twice rejected the claims of the CTA and
ruled in favor of the school board’s policy toward but on appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1945, the three judges ruled that there were clear inequalities between the salary of
white and black teachers that rested solely upon the color of the teacher’s skin. While the court
ordered the school to maintain a policy of equality when determining the pay of teacher salaries,
they had in fact implemented a new system that found new means to discriminate against black
educators. This lawsuit also resulted in the firing of Morris from Dunbar High School in 1943,
the face of the challenge to the discrimination enacted by the school board.26 While this was a
legal victory for civil rights and teacher salary equalization, it simultaneously showed the
strength of white power structures to continue to find means of discriminating against black
employees.
Following World War II, there was an increased flurry of black students pursuing higher
education in Arkansas, but there were no graduate programs for them to attend in state. The first
recorded attempt of a black student applying to study at the University of Arkansas was in 1938,
the same year as Gaines v. Canada. According to Guerdon D. Nichols, former Dean of the
College of Arts and Sciences at the university, Edward W. Jacko, Jr. applied to the law school,
whose application was promptly ignored by Law School Dean, J. S. Waterman. Nothing appears
to have happened with this case but it did alert the university that there were black students who
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sought a graduate education within the state.27 It is worth noting here that there has never been a
state law that specifically calls for the segregation of the races in education. Technically,
integrated education was legally permissible in Arkansas but had clearly not been enacted since
the first few years of the University’s history. There were two or three black men who attended
the University when it first opened in 1872, but they were evidently taught on a segregated bases
by the president, Nathaniel P. Gates. 28 African American students were not present against at the
university until 1948.
The University paid close attention to the developments taking place at the Supreme
Court wherein the Gaines decision was handed down that winter, outlawing the practice of outof-state tuition scholarships, a practice that was not used in Arkansas until after it was outlawed
in 1938. In 1941, Scipio Africanus Jones, the black attorney who had represented the Elaine
Twelve during their litigation battles following the Elaine Massacre, inquired with Dean
Waterman about the possibility that the university would cover the tuition expenses for his client,
Prentice A. Hilburn, to attend law school at Howard University, the preeminent institution for
black lawyers in the country. Nichols described Jones using paternalistic sentiment common for
the time, as “a Negro of the old school, lavish in his praise and thanks” to the university officials
for acquiescing to his request, suggesting that Jones had perhaps made a veiled threat to sue to
university for violating the Gaines decision, as he was simply asking for the now
unconstitutional scholarships to be enacted to avoid possible integration at the state’s flagship
institution.29 Indeed, in 1943 the state legislature went a step further to set aside funds for
African Americans seeking graduate education outside of the state. Act 345 allocated five
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thousand dollars from the state funding to Arkansas AM&N that would now be used to deter
integration from prospective graduate students.30 This certainly worked to avoid integration in
higher education until after World War II but over one hundred students applied for this funding,
simultaneously suggesting that there was an increased desire by black students to continue their
education beyond the scope of the one state funded black institution in the state. The cost of
providing these scholarships was much cheaper than creating separate facilities, and delayed
integration of the University for a few more years.
By 1946, the new dean of the law school at the University of Arkansas, became
increasingly aware that integration could no longer be delayed. Another black student, Clifford
Davis, had applied to the law school and Dean Robert Leflar was ultimately given control of the
decision on admittance of black students. This occurred following a meeting with the board of
trustees in which Leflar presented what he considered to be the five possible options to this
request. Ultimately, he sought to follow in the footsteps of the University of Oklahoma, which
had admitted black students to the university but were segregated from within. This was in part
to avoid a lawsuit from any black student denied admission. Following World War II, black
demand for graduate and professional education once again increased. Ada Lois Sipuel, a
graduate of Arkansas’ AM&N, was denied attendance to the University of Oklahoma’s Law
School in 1946 as she was black. Herman Sweatt was similarly denied admission to the
University of Texas Law School and the NAACP was in the process of suing for admission at
the same time Davis attempted to integrate Arkansas. In making his case to the Arkansas Bar
Association that the university should admit black students on a limited and segregated basis,
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Leflar argued that this made the most economic sense for the state. They certainly could not
afford to defend themselves in a lawsuit nor afford the cost of building a separate but ostensibly
equal black law school either. Thus, the decision offered to Davis was that he could attend the
law school, but he would be subject to segregation from within. As Nichols described it, there
would be much opposition to integration, but it was “a sugar-coated integration pill that Dean
Leflar was about to persuade the state to take, based largely on its inevitability and the dim
outlook for any of the alternatives.”31 The increased rise in higher education lawsuits and African
Americans seeking further education was a clear sign that at some point in the near future,
Arkansas would have to integrate its flagship university. And Dean Leflar was clearly not
opposed to integration, perhaps believing that few African Americans would take advantage of
the opportunity or, even more radical, that integration would not be a hot-button issue in a state
with a large white majority.
Ultimately, Davis did not become the first African American to attend the University of
Arkansas but the university did integrate in 1948, thirteen years before the University of Georgia,
fourteen years before the University of Mississippi, and fifteen years before the University of
Alabama were all forced to do so, by legal decree. On February 2, 1948, with the support of
Flowers, Silas Hunt and Wiley Branton travelled to Fayetteville to register for the spring
semester. Hunt was born in 1922 in southwest Arkansas and was from what Nichols described as
a “very poor [family], living mostly on relief.”32 He graduated from high school in 1941 before
enrolling at AM&N but was drafted into the military following the attack at Pearl Harbor in
1941. Hunt served with the construction engineers and was wounded at the Battle of the Bulge in
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Belgium. He suffered serious injuries but returned to Pine Bluff and graduated in 1947. Branton
was from a more prominent black family in Pine Bluff. Like Hunt, with whom he was friends,
Branton began his undergraduate career at AM&N in 1941 before joining the army. When he
returned, he helped run his father’s taxicab company before re-entering university.33 Both young
men were jaded from military service and sought a better life for themselves than Pine Bluff and
a segregated education could afford them. Hunt had been accepted to study law at the University
of Indiana when he and Branton decided to apply to study at the University of Arkansas. Hunt
was readily accepted by Leflar but Branton was rejected as the university was not ready to accept
black students to any undergraduate program, although he would return to study law before
beginning his exceptional career as a civil rights attorney. Hunt was alerted to the fact that while
he had been admitted to the law school, it would be under separate conditions. His classes were
to be held in the basement of the law school, he was not allowed access to the law library nor
access the university’s cafeteria.34 However, for reasons unknown, white students themselves did
not comply with these segregated conditions. Some students joined Hunt in his one on one
classes in the basement while others ate lunch with him. It was believed that this was in part out
of jealousy that Hunt was receiving a more personal education with his professors than the white
law students were, although there must have been more genuine support for Hunt from these
students as well. Unfortunately, Hunt was unable to complete his law degree and withdrew from
the university before the beginning of his second semester due to health complications from the
war. He died of tuberculosis in April 1949 but ushered in a new era for the University as it
became the first Southern university to integrate. Regardless of the reasons for the complete
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integration of the law school, this episode highlights the moderate and even progressive stance of
the University of Arkansas and its law students to accept and embrace Silas Hunt in its program,
thirteen years before any Deep South state. The University of Arkansas voluntarily accepted
Hunt, with no lawsuit or threat of a lawsuit, long before its neighbors across the River reluctantly
accepted token integration of its higher educational facilities.
Despite the untimely death of Hunt, the University of Arkansas continued to accept black
students to the law school. Jackie Shropshire joined the program in the fall of 1948 and became
the first African American to graduate. Like Hunt, he was a World War II veteran and the
university attempted to maintain some method of segregation using a railing to separate
Shropshire’s seat from his fellow white classmates, which apparently did not last long and was
never replaced as a means to separate him physically from the other students.35 Shropshire was
joined by Christopher Columbus “C.C.” Mercer and George Haley in 1949, Wiley Branton in the
spring of 1950 and George Howard, Jr., was the final African American to join the Law School
in the fall.36 Known today as the “Six Pioneers,” these six black men are remembered as being
leaders in the desegregation efforts of higher education in Arkansas. Indeed, many of the barriers
that Hunt had faced upon his arrival in Fayetteville had disappeared by 1950 – there were no
restrictions on seating arrangements in the classrooms, and on-campus housing was opened to
George Howard. While all of these men would go on to become a success in their various legal
careers, their efforts to fully integrate the University of Arkansas were halted as no black student
attended the Law School between 1955 and 1968, although black undergraduate students began
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attending the university in 1955, highlighting the university’s willingness to embrace integration
beyond the scope of legal enforcement.
Even bigger change was on the horizon for education across the South. By 1950, the
Supreme Court had ruled in two higher education cases that segregation was all but a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. One of these cases was of Herman Sweatt, who had been denied
admission to the University of Texas Law School before Hunt was admitted to Arkansas. The
University of Texas had instead spent thousands of dollars to create a black law school that
Sweatt could attend that was equal to its white equivalent but in this landmark ruling, the
Supreme Court stated that, “the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree
those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a
law school.”37 These intangible factors, were, for the court, of extreme importance to the quality
of education and ruled that a black law school, created to maintain the practice of segregation
could never be fully equal to that of the white equivalent. They were not quite willing to overturn
Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal” clause in 1950, but the NAACP was already in the
process of extending these lawsuits into K-12 education.
For Arkansas, the Sweatt decision put the state on notice that change was coming. Their
flagship university was now integrated, black teachers had fought back and won a lawsuit that
was supposed to ensure equal pay, and now, by 1950, all education was about to come under
attack, and no one was sure what the Supreme Court would do. As five separate NAACP
lawsuits made their way through the court system challenging segregated education, Arkansas
finally attempted to actually equalize their schools. A document titled, “Crucible of Integration,”
found in Little Rock School Superintendent Virgil T. Blossom’s papers, outlines the state’s path
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of education since Plessy. The report claimed that between 1945 and 1954, “the physical plants
for Negro school children were improved to the point where they were actually superior to those
for white children.”38 Clearly an attempt to disparage those black students who fought for
integrated schools, the report suggests that Little Rock sought to avoid integration or at least
minimalize its potential impact by improving the state of black schools across the city. Another
report, compiled in 1951 by the Little Rock Council on Schools, compares school facilities for
black and white students, finding them “not equal” and therefore in violation of Plessy and
Sweatt. The report looked at a variety of factors, including the amount of money spent per child
at the three high schools. They found that “the state and city spent almost twice the amount of
money per student at Technical High as at Dunbar,” the black high school. Among other issues
found in this report were the number of teachers per student (25.2 at Dunbar, 21.3 at Little Rock
High School, and 17.4 at Technical), and fewer course options for black students that ultimately
denied black students equal educational opportunities. The report ends by essentially agreeing
with the Supreme Court justices in Sweatt that “certain intangibles which cannot be overcome
merely by equal appropriations and which make any real equality under segregation impossible.”
The report argues that “only by integration of Negro pupils and teachers in the white school
system can intangibles which present any real qualitative equality be overcome.”39 This is unlike
any other former Confederate state at the time. Arkansas was not only trying to pre-empt the
upcoming Brown decision, the capital actually advocated for voluntary integration of its schools
as the only means to provide equal education. In advocating integration, the report points to a
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variety of other institutions across the city and state that ended segregation of their facilities
through mediation, not through the courts, perhaps foreshadowing the threat of a lawsuit by
African Americans in the city. Indeed, by 1952, the Little Rock public library was integrated,
department stores had removed signs pointing to segregated water fountains, and other steps
toward integration had taken place with little to no fanfare or complaints. In the realm of
integration, Arkansas was far ahead of the Deep South and suggested they would lead the way in
race relations.
Despite this call for integration of the Little Rock School District, on February 20, 1952,
the Superintendent of Schools, Harry Little, responded by questioning the data in the report and
arguing that it was not in anyone’s best interests to integrate “two races with different
backgrounds and different interests” but instead called for an improvement of segregated
education to better serve the races.40 However, Little was soon replaced by a new
Superintendent, Virgil T. Blossom, who would undertake the process of integration following the
Brown decision in 1954. Blossom, a Missouri native, former high school principal and later
superintendent in Fayetteville, moved to Little Rock in 1953 and was quickly in charge of
formulating the capital’s response to the Supreme Court’s nullification of segregated education.41
Following the success of their attacks on higher education, the NAACP continued their
threat against segregated education at the primary and secondary levels. In 1952, five separate
cases reached the Supreme Court, all asking for an end to segregation in education, claiming that
Plessy was a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. This was such a momentous
decision that the Supreme Court delayed rendering an opinion for two years, during which time a
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new Chief Justice had been appointed. Chief Justice Earl Warren, former Governor of California,
worked to ensure the court issued a unanimous opinion in Brown, to show the country that they
were united in opposition to segregation, which they did on May 17, 1954.42 The landmark ruling
in Brown v. Board of Education outlawed segregation in public education stating that, “separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”43 This was a huge victory for the NAACP and
integration advocates but the Court, understanding they had just voided social policy across the
South, stated that the law would not come into effect for another year once they had decided how
best to implement the decision. Despite this attempt to appease the most ardent segregationists in
the South, there was immediate criticism of the decision. The Southern Regional Council, a
research oriented organization to bring about equality, reported, rather optimistically, that
following the 1954 decision, “with the exception of Governor Herman Talmage of Georgia, no
governor has suggested outright defiance of the decision.”44 However, the Arkansas Democrat’s
front page story on the Supreme Court decision suggested a more cautious tone and highlighted
the immediate negative responses by other state politicians. Mississippi’s Senator James O.
Eastland, however, was reported as saying that the state would “take whatever steps are
necessary to retain segregation in education,” while Governor Talmage claimed that the Supreme
Court had “usurped from Congress and the people the power to change the Constitution.”45
Arkansas’s Governor Francis Cherry claimed that the state would follow the law and indicated
that he would form a committee to ease the process of integration, which he believed would not
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take more than a year. In the same article, Cherry stated that he “considered the relationship
between the Negroes and whites in Arkansas to be better than in many Southern states.”46 The
vast difference in response from these politicians suggested that perhaps Arkansas would keep
on track with its progressive efforts following World War II and extend this beyond business into
race relations.
Cherry’s optimism appeared to be accurate when Arkansas became the first former
Confederate state to begin to integrate its schools, before the Supreme Court offered its second
ruling on Brown that established implementation guidelines. The economic reality of segregation
had been debilitating to a number of school districts outside of the Delta, who decided to begin
integration for the upcoming school year. Indeed, Fayetteville, in the Northwest corner of the
state and home to the flagship university that had integrated six years prior, immediately
announced that it would integrate its high school. This was not a huge risk for the town of
18,000, as only 2.2 percent of its population was black in 1954. Due to the small number of black
students, Fayetteville did not have a segregated high school and instead had been incurring the
costs of transport, tuition, room and board to send no more than twelve black high school
students to either Fort Smith or Hot Springs. For the 1953-54 academic year, it had cost the
school district $5,000 to send nine students to a segregated black high school, nearly bankrupting
the district.47 Thus, on May 22, the Fayetteville School District announced that it would integrate
the high school for the upcoming academic year and did so on September 10 with no incidents or
media worthy fanfare. Yet, Fayetteville had been superseded by another town south of Fort
Smith that had quietly integrated its public schools without any announcements of its plan. Over
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the summer, the Charleston school board voted to integrate all of its schools, placing eleven
black students into formerly all-white classes. This occurred on August 23, two weeks before
Fayetteville integrated its high school, but it had managed to keep the decision out of the press in
fear that white opposition might cause them to delay integration.48 Much like Fayetteville,
Charleston was at least encouraged to immediately integrate due to the economic costs of
maintaining segregated facilities and the secrecy ensured that any opposition did not prove
detrimental to its adherence to Brown. These two schools sought to use money that had
previously been spent on transporting children to segregated schools on improving the overall
status of education in their schools, a chronic problem in Arkansas.
The lack of resistance to integration in Fayetteville and Charleston is attributed to its
distance from the Delta and a small black population that posed no threat to the racial status quo.
Another school district also attempted to immediately integrate following the 1954 Supreme
Court decision but faced a much more hostile response due to its proximity to the Delta.
Sheridan, just thirty miles South of Little Rock and twenty-five miles west of Pine Bluff, was the
earliest school board to announce it would comply with Brown and move to integrate grades six
through twelve immediately. This involved the integration of twenty-one black students into the
high school of six hundred white students to save thousands of dollars to send these students to
Pine Bluff. In this instance however, local whites mounted enough opposition that the plan was
rescinded the next day, and four members of the school board quit their positions. Being so close
to the Delta, the Sheridan schools remained formally segregated until there were virtually no
African Americans left in the town, pushed out by local employers to avoid the issue
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completely.49 Signaling that perhaps some school districts in Arkansas would not readily submit
to integration, Sheridan highlighted the problem of integration in areas that had historically
contained a larger percentage of African Americans and the stronger resistance to change that the
state might encounter.
Organized opposition to the threat of integrated schools emerged out of Mississippi
shortly after the Brown decision in 1954. Perhaps the most notorious state in terms of race
relations, Mississippi was the most resistant to integrated school and even passed a law in 1954
before Brown to create a Legal Educational Advisory Committee (LEAC) that aimed to maintain
segregation regardless of the impending Supreme Court decision. In challenging the legality of
the Supreme Court’s order, Mississippi argued that the federal court had interposed a state’s right
to control their education. This legal theory of interposition claims that any state can oppose
federal law if it violates state sovereignty.50 Many Southern states, including Arkansas,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, passed interposition resolutions following Brown,
theoretically giving the states’ power to ignore the Supreme Court’s integration order, although
they would all eventually acquiesce to the power of the federal government. Challenging the
legality of the Supreme Court’s order, Mississippi Circuit Judge Thomas Brady published a
booklet called Black Monday, that essentially served as the first handbook of the White Citizens’
Council. Black Monday called upon white citizens to establish resistance organizations to
challenge federal power in state affairs through more respectful and nonviolent measures than
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the more notorious white supremacist group, the Ku Klux Klan were known for. 51 One white
Mississippian did just that just two months after Brown and birthed the first Citizen’s Council in
Indianola, heart of the Mississippi Delta. By October, Mississippi claimed twenty citizens’
councils as they organized a statewide Association of Citizens’ Councils of Mississippi. This
group worked hard to spread its message across the state and the country through speaking
events, booklets, and a newsletter “informing” whites on the dangers presented by the Supreme
Court and their decision in Brown.
Arkansas did not create it first citizens’ council until 1955, shortly before another school
board moved to integrate. Most schools in Arkansas waited for the Supreme Court to announce
its second edict on the implementation of Brown, which they did in May 1955. Known as Brown
II, the Supreme Court wavered on its prior announcement that segregated education was
unconstitutional and instead offered a weak order that schools integrate “with all deliberate
speed.”52 This feeble stance on integration allowed the South to delay plans to integrate for the
foreseeable future and suggested to white supremacists and segregationists that the Court perhaps
did not really believe integration should, or would, occur. This was a devastating blow to the
NAACP, who understood that this second order meant continued litigation to force school
integration, district by district across the South, costing millions of dollars despite the Supreme
Court outlawing segregation. Yet, shortly after this second announcement, another school board
in Arkansas voted to begin integration. Hoxie, a small town located in northeastern Arkansas and
adjacent to the Delta, voted to integrate its dual education system largely for financial reasons –
the school was thousands of dollars in debt and hoped to erase this through integration. Just like
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Fayetteville, Charleston, and Sheridan, Hoxie bused its few black high school students to a
segregated black school in Jonesboro at a cost it could not maintain. Hoxie differed from these
other places in that the schools operated like Delta schools with a split school term that allowed
students to help pick cotton in September and October.53 When the Hoxie schools opened on July
11, there was very little attention or opposition to its integrated status and it appeared that the
town had been able to successfully integrate under the radar and avoided any widespread
attention or opposition. Indeed, everything seemed to indicate that integration would be
successful until Life Magazine published a story about the peaceful integration of Hoxie on July
25. The article, “A ‘Morally Right’ Decision,” detailed the success of integration and the school
board’s argument that this was “morally right in the sight of God.” What was most striking about
the article are the photos, taken by Gordon Tenney, that documented the first day back at school,
showing black and white students sitting next to one another and even little girls, black and
white, holding hands in the playground.54 The outrage that stemmed from these images was
immediate, angering local residents and white supremacists within and outside of the state. The
story of this small town’s peaceful integration and subsequent vitriolic response to the article
garnered the attention of the New York Times, who in September published an article detailing
the situation. According to the article, following the publication of Life, Hoxie residents began to
receive pro-segregation pamphlets from various white supremacist organizations. The increasing
pressure on local whites to resist integration, with the backing of outsiders threatened by the
smallest compliance with Brown, led to a meeting of segregationists on August 3 to challenge the
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school’s integration where it was decided that the appropriate action was to boycott the school
until segregation was reinstated.55
The action in Hoxie was led by Herbert Brewer, a local soybean farmer, with much
assistance from supremacist organizations. They claimed that “up to 50 percent of the students
stayed out of classes” following the boycott announcement and urged the school board to end
integration.56 The small town became the first in Arkansas to face sustained resistance against
integration that increased as the weeks went by. In 1955, Arkansas’ first Citizens’ Council was
formed in Pine Bluff. The group, White America, Inc., “waged a noisy but ineffective campaign”
to stop integration from occurring in Hoxie.57 During the Hoxie debacle, James D. Johnson,
staunch segregationist, state senator and future governor hopeful from Crossett, assembled a new
organization, called the White Citizens’ Council of Arkansas. This group sought to exert even
more pressure on the school board in Hoxie, using what the Southern Regional Council called
Johnson’s “emotionalism and advocacy of extreme measures,” that ultimately failed to alter
integration there.58 These groups held little power or sway over Arkansas desegregation or other
white supremacist actions and were not a particularly visible group until the 1957 Central High
School Crisis.
Members of White America, Inc., and White Citizens’ Councils of Arkansas descended
upon Hoxie on August 13 to join the growing pressure on the school board to reverse its
decision. While the school board refused to capitulate to the demands of segregationists, it did
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close the schools two weeks before the end of the semester “to let the situation cool off.”59 On
September 7, the school board reaffirmed its stance on integration and “invited the antiintegration forces to file suit,” which they did on October 3. Filed by White America, Inc.’s
attorney, Amis Guthridge, the lawsuit was nothing but a bullying tactic that mentioned nothing
about race but instead alleged that Howard Vance, a member of the school board, had sold
building materials to the school district in violation of state laws. It is unclear what happened in
this case but the school board responded with a lawsuit of their own, filed in federal court
requesting a restraining order to stop the segregationist agitators from interfering with integration
in Hoxie, which was granted.60 In a further blow to segregationists, in January 1956, the federal
court ruled that Brown had “nullified Arkansas’s school segregation laws” and the Hoxie school
board was obeying the law in its initiation of integration. Despite some continued resistance in
Hoxie, black and white children continued their education together and the town fell out of the
national news cycle.61
These initial efforts at integration in Arkansas took place as Arkansas continued its
attempts to become a more progressive state. In 1954, Governor Francis Cherry was challenged
by Orval E. Faubus, the relatively unknown former highway commissioner from the Ozark
Mountains for the governorship. The child of poor, white, socialist parents, Faubus held a
number of jobs until 1942 when he served in the army during World War II as an Army
Intelligence Officer in Europe. Following his return to Arkansas, he joined former Governor
Sidney McMath’s administration as highway commissioner, a sought after position that served as
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his entrance into statewide politics. When he challenged Governor Cherry in 1954, he was an
unexpected candidate, yet Faubus “had an instinct for speaking the mind of his listeners.” He
was able to counter socialist attacks by Cherry and avoid declaring a position either way on the
Brown decision to win the election and become one of the most-renowned Southern Governors
of the twentieth century.62 Widely expected to be a progressive governor, Faubus began his
governorship seeking to continuing the legacy of his recent forbearers and entice new industries
to the state. Indeed, the state legislature in 1955 created the Arkansas Industrial Development
Commission (AIDC) to centralize efforts to improve the economy and transition Arkansas into a
more diverse and varied economy. To head this commission, Faubus appointed elite outsider and
Republican, Winthrop Rockefeller.
Grandson of oil magnate John D. Rockefeller, Winthrop was born in 1912 and raised in
New York into one of the most elite families in America. Seemingly with no career plan,
Rockefeller skipped around various family businesses before signing up for the army during
World War II. He served in the Pacific and returned to New York where he became “a fixture on
the New York social scene,” as a young wealthy bachelor. He soon married Barbara Sears with
whom he had a son, Winthrop Paul, in 1948. A messy divorce, a “playboy” reputation, and a
desire to separate himself from his family name and renown all drove Rockefeller to leave the
glitz and glamor of New York and move to Petit Jean Mountain, northwest of Little Rock. 63
According to Faubus biographer Roy Reed, Faubus persuaded Rockefeller to run the AIDC,
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knowing that industries would pay attention to his last name and give Arkansas’s reputation a
boost as industries began to move South.64 For his part, Rockefeller relished the opportunity to
prove his worth and worked hard over the next nine years to create a new image and reputation
for himself the state.
The most pressing issue for Governor Faubus to fulfil his progressive agenda was
economic improvement and he used Rockefeller’s name and the AIDC, in coordination with
local industrial development corporations, set about enticing new businesses to stem the tide of
out migration and bring about economic change to the state. The state needed to move away
from its reliance upon notoriously unreliable agricultural pursuits and bring in more consistent
industrial employment and dollars. The business-friendly measures had an immediate impact as a
paper mill was bought to Pine Bluff and Magnolia, in the southwest corner of the state got a tire
plant.65 The AIDC, under Rockefeller’s command, was successful at attracting new industries to
the state. Between 1955 and 1964, “six hundred new industrial plants opened in Arkansas,
creating ninety thousand new jobs and adding $270 million to the annual payroll.”66 This was a
success as Arkansas continued to move away from a largely agrarian economy but most of the
industries that moved to the state did so to avoid the higher wages and unionized North, meaning
that most of these jobs were unskilled and low wage employment that did little to uplift
Arkansans.
These jobs typically benefited whites, much to the chagrin of Nat Griswold, director of
the Arkansas Council on Human Relations (ACHR). A reformist organization and affiliate of the
Southern Regional Council, the ACHR was established in 1954 following Brown, for
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“Arkansawyers of both races, and of all creeds who seek “to attain through research and action
the ideals and practices of equal opportunities” in Arkansas.”67 While they are most well-known
for their contributions to school integration, they also challenged the AIDC and the growth of
industry in the state that they believed disproportionately aided white more than black
Arkansans. Indeed, in a letter to the AIDC, Griswold stated that “significant lifting of the
economic level of Arkansas can be done only by raising the income of all her wage earners
including non-whites.”68 In a following meeting between ACHR and AIDC leadership, the latter
reinforced typical Southern racism and the supposed difficulties in pursuing a progressive
industrial agenda. The AIDC argued that black employment would be sufficient “after the white
labor supply [was] exhausted” and that “if open employment of Negros was publicized and
pushed, there would be serious difficulties.” The ACHR fired back at these statements,
suggesting that if the state waits until all whites are gainfully employed, “colored employees
would have migrated” leaving only the destitute and unemployable left, a certain hindrance to
continued industrial growth in the state.69 The ACHR called upon the AIDC to encourage local
industrial development corporations to include African Americans on their committees to create
a more inclusive effort to entice industry and encourage integrated employment opportunities.
However, most of the industrialization that did occur in Arkansas by 1966 was in areas of “white
surplus labor” due to “the reluctance of eastern planters to see their remaining farm workers
siphoned off into other occupations.”70 Agriculturists clung on to the past even as mechanization
altered the landscape of the Delta, taking jobs and future job opportunities away from African

67
“An Introduction to the Arkansas Council on Human Relations,” Box 2, Folder 16, ACHR Papers,
Special Collections Division, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
68
Letter from Nat Griswold to William Ewald, June 11, 1958, Box 2, Folder 20. ACHR Papers.
69
“Notes on Conference with Mr. Ewald, July 25, 1958. Box 2, Folder 20. ACHR Papers.
70
Johnson, Arkansas in Modern America, 113.

126

Americans, further fueling out-migration. While the ACHR continued its efforts to ensure black
Arkansans were included in the industrial growth of the state, black activism on matters of
integration continued to grow across the South.
As Arkansas continued along its path of steady, if fractured, integration of schools,
national attention moved to the Deep South where two events sparked the social and political
Civil Rights Movement that would eventually thrust Arkansas into the throes of massive
resistance. In the summer of 1955, Mamie Till held an open casket funeral for her murdered son.
Emmett Till, a fourteen-year-old boy from Chicago had been spending the summer in the
Mississippi Delta town of Money with his great-uncle, Moses Wright. On August 24, an incident
occurred between Till and Carolyn Bryant, a white women and wife of Roy Bryant, owners of
the Bryant Grocery Store. The details are murky, but the incident resulted in the murder of Till
by Bryant and his brother in law, J.W. Milam, who had taken the child to teach him a lesson.71
Till’s body was found in the Tallahatchie River so disfigured he was only identified by his
father’s signet ring and Bryant and Milam were arrested shortly after. The gruesome murder of
Till, the all-white jury’s verdict of not-guilty, and the efforts of his mother, Mamie to not let her
child have died in vain all led to outrage across the country.72
Not only were local black residents of Money and beyond responding to the murder of
Till with an effective economic boycott, the decisions made by Till’s mother, Mamie, turned
national and international attention on the South and its treatment of African Americans. Till
demanded that her son’s body be bought back to Chicago so that he could be buried in his
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hometown, much to the frustration of Mississippi officials who wanted to bury the body as
quickly as possible. Till went a step further and held an open casket funeral for her son and
thousands of mourners passed by his disfigured body in early September. Media outlets were
also present to photograph and film the funeral of this young boy. The footage and images that
they produced were seen over the world, and the television “ignited the national interest in the
story” as “civil rights stories would not be confined to a minority of Americans or a particular
region” anymore, they could spread the reality of other people’s lives and experiences in a way
that newspapers and print could not.73 This was a critical point in the 1950s: the Supreme Court
had just ordered its second decision in Brown calling for “all deliberate speed” and then this
high-profile murder of a black child hit the news, allowing people who have never lived in the
South to get a glimpse into life there and how a small transgression could cost you your life if
you were black. This was the Deep South. The most resistance to change was to be found at its
center in Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia as African Americans began to increasingly assert
themselves following Brown and the brutal truth that Emmett Till’s murder had unleashed for all
to see. The country was beginning to really pay attention to the racial violence of the South,
aided by media, showing just how bad it could be to live in the Deep South. Arkansas was not
yet a part of this narrative, having highlighted its willingness to accept racial progression within
its borders.
Just a few months after the murder of Till, Alabama, another Deep South state,
experienced what is largely considered to be the first major event of the Civil Rights Movement.
The Montgomery Bus Boycott began on December 5, to protest the arrest of Rosa Parks four
days earlier. A black seamstress and secretary for the local NAACP, Parks was a respected
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member of the black community who had allowed herself to be arrested for refusing to give up
her segregated seat on a city bus for a white man.74 The black community rallied around Parks’
arrest with the NAACP, the Women’s Political Council (WPC), and many black religious leaders
coming together to organize the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA). To head this
organization, local black leaders called on relative newcomer Martin Luther King, Jr. to be the
president. The twenty-six-year-old Atlanta native had been in Montgomery for a little over
eighteen months. Minister at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church, King was seen as a safe choice,
one that could unite the city’s blacks and whose family could not be punished for civil rights
activism.75 The bus boycott was adhered to by about ninety percent of the city’s black population
for the entire year it was on-going. Black working-class men and women found alternate means
of travel, car owners would carpool blacks around the city to allow them to continue working.
The unity of the black community to refuse to ride the bus until it adopted a fairer segregation
policy, not even integration, saw the bus company lose most of its ridership and two-thirds of its
income. This was an untenable business practice, but the company refused to change its policy,
leading to a lawsuit to challenge segregated busing.
The boycott lasted for a total of 381 days, ending only after segregated busing was
deemed unconstitutional and the city was forced, by federal order, to integrate. The case,
Browder v. Gayle, much like Brown, challenged the legality of segregation but this time on
public transportation. It would take the better part of 1956 for the Supreme Court to affirm the
unconstitutionality of Montgomery’s segregated buses, which it did on November 13. And it was
in Montgomery that King first shone as the shining light of civil rights leadership. Throughout
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the year, he accepted his role and sought tactics that would have the most impact, and publicity,
while uplifting African American’s resolve. It was here that he honed his belief in nonviolent
direct action, based in Christian principles of love and the experiences and beliefs of Mahatma
Gandhi.76 Yet, by 1960, these civil rights leaders would be seen as out of touch with what the
younger generation of blacks saw as the path to true equality. Protests and boycotts and legal
challenges were not enough for the new generation, who would go on to challenge the leadership
of King and the NAACP in this movement.
Arkansas had worked hard during and after World War II to present itself as a moderate,
industrializing state. As the preeminence of agriculture waned and the AIDC encouraged lowwage, unskilled industry to move into the state, African Americans moved to increasingly urban
centers in the state, seeking out better employment opportunities. At the same time, African
Americans leaders in Arkansas, following many of the examples set by the national NAACP,
began making strides towards a more inclusive state. Harold Flowers worked to ensure that
blacks registered to vote and rapidly increased the percentage of blacks able to vote by 1950. He
and others, including Scipio Africanus Jones, sought to attain better educational opportunities for
African Americans. With the pressure of a lawsuit and lacking funds to provide any form of
black graduate education, the University of Arkansas quietly integrated its Law School in 1948,
suggesting that the state would not resist racial integration when so ordered in 1954. Indeed, a
number of communities with few black students rapidly worked to integrate their education
system in part because it was the law of the land but also because it was the fiscally responsible
thing to do. Despite early attempts by segregationists in Hoxie to undermine integration, it
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appeared that Arkansas would uphold the premise of Brown, if taking advantage of their “all
deliberate speed” message to slow the pace of desegregation. As events in the Deep South
suggested a growing wave of unrest and a rise in protests about racial inequality, Arkansas
avoided the limelight and in many ways sought to avoid the national spotlight. The murder of
Emmett Till and the Montgomery Bus Boycott made international headlines as blacks challenged
the racial status quo in the heart of Dixie. But with this rise in black activism came a rise in white
resistance. Couched in terms of state’s right and black inferiority, white supremacist
organizations such as the White Citizens’ Councils sprang up to protect their rights as white
citizens and protest the threat of integration as so ordered by the Supreme Court. These two
groups would come head to head many times over the next decade, but it was in Little Rock
where white resistance reared its ugly head to prevent nine black students from nominally
integrating a high school.
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Chapter 4:
“The Brightest Prospect” Turned Sour
Arkansas’ reputation as a Deep South state, and perhaps one of the few reasons why
Arkansas is known to people outside of the United States, came from events in 1957 as African
Americans fought to exercise their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Central High School
crisis dominates Arkansas’ narrative as historians try to place this incident within the state and
national context of the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement. Yet, this very public fight between
the state and federal governments was not supposed to happen in Arkansas. Arkansas had
worked hard to shake its racist and backwards reputation following World War II and become
more economically diverse and progressive. Faubus worked throughout his governorship to
professionalize the state government, bring about economic change, and bring tourists and their
dollars to the state. Aside from the Central High School Crisis, Faubus was a progressive
governor who forever altered the state.
Yet, in 1956, pressure mounted on Faubus to take a stand against integration, particularly
as tensions built in the 1956 election, which saw him pitted against staunch segregationist James
D. Johnson. Faubus won that battle, showing that Arkansans did not want an outspoken racist as
their Governor, but Faubus remained under pressure to acquiesce to his white supremacist base,
leading to the 1957 Central High School Crisis. Faubus was not a committed segregationist but
simply a politician pandering to his base by denouncing integration, while hiring Winthrop
Rockefeller to head a new economic commission to entice industry to the state, as was his real
administrative goal. Faubus’, and to a lesser extent the state’s, rise to infamy would not have
happened had Arkansas continued on its steady path to compliance following Brown.
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Arkansas eased out of the national spotlight after the crisis just as Martin Luther King, Jr.
consolidated his leadership over the Civil Rights Movement. Yet, by 1960 he was thwarted by a
new, young, generation of black students who refused to wait for King’s leadership to actually
change black lives. These students became known as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC) and their emergence on the frontlines of the Civil Rights Movement put
them at odds with the older generation of black leaders. This was especially true in Little Rock
where they had little taste for more racial incidents and many established middle-class African
Americans simply wanted things to go back to how they were before the Central High School
Crisis. In Pine Bluff however, this older generation, still dismissive of the students, capitalized
on the renewed energy of the Civil Rights Movement and instead proceeded with a boycott of
white department stores to highlight their disapproval, not only of the inability to eat at their
lunch counters, but also the lack of job opportunities afforded to African Americans. Arkansas
set itself apart from the Deep South in once again showing that the major problem concerning
most Arkansans, white and black, was economic progress and stability.
The three years following the Brown decision saw a flurry of change in Arkansas that
meant the state became the face of massive resistance. Governor Faubus was elected, Virgil
Blossom was promoted to Superintendent of the Little Rock School District, and all Arkansas
Representatives in Congress signed the infamous Southern Manifesto in 1956, signaling their
disapproval of Brown and what they saw as federal overreach.77 This meaningless piece of paper
served as a symbolic gesture to all those in the South who opposed integrated schools and
empowered them to increase their efforts to maintain the status quo. Just as importantly, African
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Americans saw that they themselves would have to ensure that Brown was enforced as avoidance
became the tactic of many state and local officials seeking to ignore the problem entirely. This
was certainly true in Arkansas wherein many school districts sought to simply replicate Little
Rock’s integration plan, which furiously attempted to deter African American students from
integration. Thus, much of the state simply failed to act before 1960 once the situation in Little
Rock had finally quieted to a new sense of normal and token integration.
Little Rock was seen as the leader of integration in part because it was the capital but
also because it had the highest percentage of black students that needed to be integrated.
Blossom was inundated with queries and requests for information from white and black citizens
following the Brown decision. Blossom moved to Little Rock in 1953 and was quickly in charge
of formulating the capital’s response to the Supreme Court’s nullification of segregated
education.78 He, alongside president of the Little Rock School Board, William G. Cooper, were
sent numerous letters from Arkansans and interested persons across the country, mostly to
persuade them not to integrate the school district. One such letter from T. A. Lusinger stated that
he “holds no malice against” black people but he opposed integration because it would lead to
the “mongrelization” of the white race, proceeding to list of a number of so-called “facts” about
African Americans. Lusinger claimed that he had seen African Americans over the previous ten
years “change” and had begun to “[push] the whites around” and generally challenged their
status in society.79 This was a common sentiment at the time. Indeed, Lusinger, a Mississippi
Delta native, claims Arkansas as the Deep South in his attempt to persuade Cooper to stop any
integration plans the Little Rock School district had. This fear that black and white children
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would grow up and have mixed race children was a real concern among many whites and the
base of their opposition to integration, so much so that the Southern Regional Council cited it as
one of the “most common arguments against integrated schools,” in its pamphlet about Brown.
The Council not-so subtly suggested that this was an “irrational” argument as marriage is a
“personal choice” and that school integration was unlikely to change this Southern social taboo
of inter-racial relationships.80 Yet Lusinger also suggests that even before Brown, the attitude of
blacks had begun to change, at least in his experience, and that they were already beginning to
stand up to whites. These were the dual issues being faced by whites – that of integration of
schools but also the slow decay of control that they had over the economic affairs of blacks. And
much of this concern was thrust into the hands of the Little Rock School Board as they
considered their options and made plans to integrate their school system in accordance with
Brown.
Little Rock’s response to forced integration was reflective of its status as a mid-South
state in its goal of minimal compliance. There was no indication until 1957 that the city, or state,
would outright defy the highest court’s order, but Blossom did seek to lessen the impact of
integration on the city’s schools. Much like numerous other superintendents across the South, he
came up against significant opposition by the local NAACP who, even before Brown, had asked
the School Board for limited integration of schools to expand class options for black students
that were not offered in their schools.81 This plan never came to fruition and immediately after
the Supreme Court decision in 1954, Blossom indicated that the school district would not
desegregate until the Brown II decision was handed down. Even so, many were hopeful that
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Arkansas would be the example for other Southern states to follow in peaceful compliance with
Brown. Indeed, Vernon McDaniels, field worker for the Legal Defense Fund, the legal arm of the
NAACP, spoke at a Little Rock NAACP meeting in April 1955 and suggested that Arkansas
represented the “brightest prospect among the southern states for integration,” in part due to the
fact that thirty-seven of the seventy-five counties in the state had either no black students or so
few as to render integration ineffectual for white resistance.82 That Little Rock would become the
face of massive resistance seemed impossible until it happened in 1957.
Blossom’s integration plan, in accordance with “all deliberate speed” and his personal
ethos of minimal compliance, saw him adopt a gradualist approach to delay meaningful
integration for as long as possible without angering either side to the point of violent retribution.
The “Blossom Plan,” as it became known, was the Superintendent’s proposal that school
integration would begin following the construction of two new high schools, Horace Mann and
Hall High that would be ready for the 1957-1958 academic year. These schools would be open
with no racial designation, but only Central High School would be actively integrated, and only
on a token basis. Thus, it would be older students who were to begin the process of integration
and it would entail black students entering white schools, ensuring a white majority that, it was
hoped, would continue to dominate. Following integration at high schools, the process would
follow down to elementary education, according to Blossom’s initial plan, after 1960. However,
this plan did not last long. Following the 1955 Brown II Supreme Court decision, Blossom
amended his plan to allow students of the minority race at their designated school to transfer to a
school in which they were a majority, thus effectively nullifying the possibility of any
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meaningful integration.83 This frustrated state leaders of the NAACP, who clearly saw that
Blossom was attempting to evade the Brown decision. To challenge this, the state NAACP filed
a lawsuit against the Little Rock School District in 1956, demanding that the original integration
plan be honored. This was just the beginning of litigation surrounding the integration of Little
Rock’s schools and disputes between the state and federal authorities that did not end until 2014
and continues to mire the school district in serious problems that only serves to undermine
student’s education.84
The case, Aaron v. Cooper, was one of the early cases in the career of Wiley Branton,
and key to the burgeoning Central High School Crisis. Branton, having graduated from the
University of Arkansas School of Law, had moved back to Pine Bluff to start his legal career
before being hired by the Little Rock NAACP in one of the most important cases to test exactly
what “with all deliberate speed” meant for school integration plans. While certainly not the first
NAACP branch to sue a school district to actually begin integration, the case in Little Rock was
the first to reach the Supreme Court and came to highlight the Court’s waning impatience with
which integration was taking place, perhaps showing their own unhappiness with Brown II. The
case began in 1956 when thirty-three African American students registered to attend white high
schools in the city and were promptly denied. They sued William G. Cooper, president of the
Little Rock School District, and Blossom in federal court for the eastern district of Arkansas. In
some twist of fate Judge John Miller heard the case. Miller, in his former life as a prosecutor, had
worked to condemn the black sharecroppers caught up in the 1919 Elaine Massacre. As a federal
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judge, he held a reputation as a no-nonsense man who followed and upheld the Supreme Court’s
decision, no matter his personal feelings.85 Following depositions and oral arguments, Judge
Miller opined in August 1956 that the school district was acting in “good faith” to comply with
Brown, that itself had not proscribed a timeline for integration to take place. This was a blow for
the NAACP who had hoped that Judge Miller would be favorable to their case, but he did retain
oversight of Aaron v. Cooper to ensure that the school district did not adopt other measures to
evade integration.86
As the case waited for its appeal in the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals, progressive
politics in the state faced a fresh attack from rabid segregationist James D. Johnson. Like many
politicians serving in Arkansas in the 1950s, he had served in the military during World War II
but returned with his racism intact and a zeal to maintain the power of whites in the state. Born
and raised in Crossett, in the southeast corner of the state, Johnson’s family owned a grocery
store in which he enjoyed a middle-class life. Following the war, he completed his law degree in
Tennessee before moving to back to Crossett to open his own law firm. Increasingly concerned
by the changes he saw happening in the Democratic Party, he joined the Dixiecrats in 1948
hoping to remind the national Democratic Party that Southern whites were a crucial voting bloc.
In 1950, at just twenty-five, he formally entered politics as a state senator where he sought to
ensure white supremacy across the state.87 Ardently opposed to Brown, Johnson channeled his
anger into a speaking tour of the state denouncing the Supreme Court and even Faubus for
appearing to accept court-ordered integration. In 1955, he established the White Citizen’s
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Council in his hometown and picketed the Hoxie school that had not-so secretly integrated that
summer. By 1956, Johnson had placed himself as the candidate for white supremacists and
painted Faubus as weak and ineffectual in maintaining the racial status quo.
The gubernatorial election that year was a referendum on Brown and test for how
Arkansans understood race relations, was fought between Johnson and Faubus. For his part,
Faubus simply wanted to avoid the issue of race and integration. Raised in the northwest corner
of the state, Faubus held socialist tendencies from his parents and the few months he spent at
Commonwealth College and had not really had much meaningful interaction with African
Americans, good or bad, until he entered politics. In his 1954 campaign, Faubus tried and to
some extent succeeded in appeasing both sides of the Brown issue, stating that “Arkansas is not
ready for complete and sudden mixing of the races in public schools,” suggesting that he was
open to some integration but more in line with what the Supreme Court came to rule in 1955,
“with all deliberate speed.”88 Faubus, until 1957, had actually gone further than any Arkansas, or
Southern governor, to bring African Americans more formally into the political system. African
Americans served in his administration, albeit in minor roles, he worked to ensure black voters
could vote in Democratic Party Primaries, and he had not openly opposed school integration
even as schools across the state began to desegregate.89 While this drew the ire of some whites in
the state, on the whole it was not even seen as newsworthy until Jim Johnson entered the
gubernatorial race in spring 1956 and made integration the major issue.
While there were other candidates for the governorship in 1956, it came down to a battle
between these two men and their stance on segregation and race relations. Faubus represented
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the moderate position while Johnson sought to take Arkansas back in time and used fear and
common stereotypes to denigrate African Americans. As president of the White Citizen’s
Council in Arkansas, Johnson was able to harness white anger at the Brown decision to fuel his
campaign against Faubus, using the popular rhetoric of states’ rights to claim the illegitimacy of
the Supreme Court’s decision.90 And his efforts worked to push Faubus to their side of the issue
and publicly side with segregationists in order to win. Early in the election Faubus supported
strident measures in the legislature to more forthrightly maintain segregation and discouraged
African Americans from pursuing anything that might alter the status quo. He even went so far
as to send a delegation to Virginia to assess their measures of massive resistance to Brown and
advise the state on how it might follow a similar path. All of this was done to appease the
hardliners in the Democratic Party, not out of a real sense of white supremacy on the part of
Faubus. He never truly felt comfortable among politicians and the elites of Arkansas, he had
grown up poor on a farm in the Ozarks and he simply did not relate to the segregationist sectors
of the population he desperately needed to remain Governor and continue his progressive plan of
uplift for the state. Faubus became a segregationist out of political necessity. He realized that he
needed to pander to the small but loud voices of white supremacy, located primarily in the Delta,
to secure their votes, but he did not actually believe in the expediency of continued segregation.
In all likelihood, Faubus did not care one way or another about segregation, but his hand was
forced if he wanted to win re-election, which he desperately did.
The 1956 campaign was fraught from the beginning. In April, Mississippi Senator and
rabble rouser James O. Eastland called Faubus out for allowing integration to occur in the state
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and referred to Arkansas as a “border state.”91 In trying to berate Arkansas for its successful
integration of just a few schools, Eastland highlighted the increasing tension that emerged
following Brown among whites in the South. People like Senator Eastland and Johnson saw this
as either an opportunity to challenge the power of the federal government or truly as a need to
double-down on the concept of black inferiority to pressure the South to retain its racist cultural
identity in fear that whites would lose power as segregation crumbled. Yet, even before this,
Faubus had sent a delegation of segregationists, all from Eastern Arkansas, to Virginia to study
their methods of massive resistance. The Bird Committee wanted to see if it would be possible to
copy Virginia’s strident efforts to delay and evade Brown. Virginia had adopted a number of
laws that effectively nullified the possibility of integration and outrightly denied the authority of
the federal government to interfere with a state’s education policies. On April 25, the Bird
Committee reported back to Faubus and efforts to put a pupil placement law and interposition
resolution on the upcoming ballot began.92 Interposition, the somewhat controversial legal theory
that states can refuse to obey a federal law if they believe it is unconstitutional and violates their
rights and governance as a state, became a hugely popular tool among southern states following
Brown. Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and
Virginia all passed interposition resolutions claiming that the federal government could not
dictate how a state administers education.93 The second law, pupil placement, was designed to
ensure that school districts could move students to different schools to ensure that integration did
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not occur. Support for these acts was strongest in the Delta, whose white students were most
likely to become minorities in their classrooms if meaningful integration occurred, but support
was weak in the rest of the rest and neither proved to be landslide victories in the November
election. Clearly, a majority of Arkansans were in favor of maintaining segregated schools, and
did not approve of the federal court order, but these were fairly mild and meaningless acts.
Interposition was not a measure that could actually oppose and stop the enactment of federal law
and the pupil placement law simply formalized methods of evasion that were already taking
place.
The strength of the Democratic Party in Arkansas politics meant that the real election for
governor actually took place at the end of July between Faubus and Johnson. Only fifty-five
percent of poll tax holders participated in the primary that re-elected Faubus.94 The state’s major
black newspaper at the time, The Arkansas State Press, rankled at the way in which the “racial
issue” was “revived” for the election as both Faubus and Johnson used racial fear to promote
their own campaigns. According to their reporting, Faubus had a near double lead over Johnson
in the primary race.95 While they do not appear to distinguish much between these two men,
Johnson was the far more dangerous candidate for African Americans had he been elected. He
had been more outspoken in his opposition to racial change of any kind, whereas Faubus spoke
about race to keep himself in the election and appear to be on the side of segregationists. The
people of Arkansas overwhelmingly chose to elect an otherwise progressive as their governor, a
clear indication that the state was not tied to white supremacy and resistance to Brown in the
same way that the Deep South proved itself to be.
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Faubus easily beat Republican nominee Roy Mitchell in the November elections but there
were signs that the strength of the Democratic Party was diminishing among white voters. For
the presidential election, Arkansas voters narrowly elected Democrat Adlai Stevenson over
popular Republican incumbent Dwight D. Eisenhower with 213, 277 to 186,276 votes.96
Eisenhower, the former Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force during World
War II was popular among much of the voting population in the United States, having been
courted by both political parties to run on their ticket for president in 1952. Little Rock voters
supported his campaign in both elections, defeating Democrat Stevenson by over 2,000 votes in
1956.97 The slow transition of white voters leaving the Democratic Party had finally begun in
Arkansas, if only for national politics and on a small scale but this would continue until the
election of Winthrop Rockefeller in 1968 after Faubus’ long gubernational career finally came to
an end.
Despite a clear victory in the election, Faubus continued to support the segregationist
platform, in part to ensure his own economic agenda was passed in the legislature. Faubus,
painted by Johnson as a traitor to the Southern way of life, continued to appease those more
ardent segregationists in state politics, leading to three successive legislative sessions that found
colorful methods to maintain segregation without ever mentioning the issue of race. Pressure
from Delta legislators led to a flurry of laws that, on the whole copied the deepest of Deep South
states, Mississippi, in its approach to evasion of Brown. The first laws, passed in the 1957
General Assembly, were introduced by Representative Lucien C. Rogers of Crittenden County
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and supported by other Delta representatives, created the Arkansas State Sovereignty
Commission (ASSC), removed truancy laws for students who refused to attend integrated
schools, limited the freedom of the NAACP in its litigation efforts to enforce Brown, and
provided schools with funds to hire lawyers in the event of an integration lawsuit.98 The goal of
the ASSC was to investigate “people, firms and corporations” that were a possible threat to the
sovereignty of the state. This incredibly vague language would have allowed the ASSC broad
powers to investigate and intimidate civil rights organizations, such as the NAACP, had Faubus
ever formalized the group. They met once, in August, 1957, following a court order to do so,
shortly before he ordered the National Guard to deny entry of the Little Rock Nine to Central
High School, but it was a highly ineffective organization that, it appears, Faubus did not want to
have any meaningful power.99 Despite Faubus’ unwillingness to use the ASSC, it set the tone for
the rest of the decade for race relations in Arkansas.
While attention focused on the legislative session, decisions about the integration process
were taking place behind closed doors. It was clear that the NAACP, under the state leadership
of Daisy Bates, would not stop until the Blossom Plan was enacted. Bates became one of the, if
not the most prominent female of the Civil Rights Movement. She challenged segregation,
protected and spoke for the Little Rock Nine during the crisis, and became a national figure for
the NAACP. Born and raised by foster parents in Huttig, in the South of the state, Bates met her
husband, L.C. Bates in her teenage years. Having spent time in Memphis, L.C. and Daisy moved
to Little Rock in 1941 when they established the Arkansas State Press, the premier black
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newspaper in the state. While L.C. focused much of his attention on the newspaper, Daisy
concentrated on civil rights activism. She was friends with Harold Flowers, whose Committee on
Negro Organizations had worked to increase voter registration and increased activism in the
state, and who had been the first president of the Arkansas State Conference of NAACP branches
(ASC) in 1948.100 As the NAACP grew in strength across the state, so did the divide between
African Americans within the organization. Little Rock was home to the most conservative of
black Arkansans, many of whom were professionals with some wealth. They did not seek to rock
the boat and challenge the racial status quo in the same way that Flowers and Bates did. This
division would rip the NAACP apart until 1952 when Bates was elected as president of the
ASC.101 As president, Bates pressured the city and state to adhere to the Brown decision and
begin integration. She had been deposed in the Aaron v. Cooper case that would be the legal crux
of the Central High School Crisis and was involved in many other lawsuits following the
legislature’s attacks on the NAACP and school integration.
On April 26, 1957, Bates and the state NAACP were delivered another blow in their
attempts to enforce the original integration plan for the Little Rock School District. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals sided with Blossom and Cooper and allowed their amended integration
plan to continue, believing that it complied with Brown II’s “with all deliberate speed” order.102
Thus, integration of Central High School was set to begin in September with only a few black
students. The application list of black high school students wishing to enroll at Central High
School was reported to be as high as 190 but slowly dwindled to nine by the eve of integration.
This decline was due to a number of factors, including pressure to drop their request by various
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school officials and citizens, as well as screening by Blossom on an applicant’s IQ, “personality
traits, and social skills.”103 Blossom worked hard to dissuade black students from enrolling at
Central High, arguing to the NAACP that only the best and brightest students should attend to
undermine any criticism of the students themselves. Thus it was left to just nine students:
Minnijean Brown, Elizabeth Eckford, Ernest Green, Thelma Mothershed, Melba Pattillo, Gloria
Ray, Terrance Roberts, Jefferson Thomas, and Carlotta Walls, under the tutelage of Daisy Bates,
were set to integrate Central High School on September 3.104
Pressure from the Citizen’s Council and the Mother’s League once again put Faubus in a
position where he had to stake out his future career on the issue of segregation. While this is
probably not how he planned to create his legacy, he appeased these reactionary groups for the
remainder of his administration in 1968. The Citizen’s Councils, of which there were two in the
state – Johnson’s White Citizen’s Council and Guthridge’s Little Rock Capital Citizen’s Council
copied the original councils’ established in Mississippi and were effectively used to draw
attention to the one issue they cared about – segregation. The Councils argued that Faubus
should use the 1957 legislative package to overrule the federal government’s integration order,
claiming that Arkansas was a sovereign state. This largely male organization had ties to the
Mother’s League, who established themselves in August 1957 to interrupt the integration
process. These mothers had children at Central High School, and proved to be a strong force
against its integration. They castigated Faubus for his dithering over the impending integration

103
Colbert S. Cartwright, “Failure in Little Rock,” The Progressive June 1958, 12-15. Daisy Bates Papers,
Box 4, Folder 6, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, Arkansas; Kirk, Redefining the
Color Line, 106-107.
104
Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 106-109.

146

and sought to build pressure to force his hand.105 This supposedly respectable group of women
challenged the legality of integration through Christian rhetoric and using their traditional gender
roles of women and mothers to protect the children at Central High school.106 Faubus was
enthralled by these women and saw an opportunity to use them to delay integration through
Thomason’s lawsuit that did successfully stop integration, if only for a couple of days. In having
the women play a role in the legal aspect to the integration issue, Faubus was able to create an
image of scared mothers, fearful for their children that could evoke even the most hardened
hearts and use that sympathy to delay integration.
With the date set, white supremacists and segregationists worked hard to undermine the
actual integration of Central High. Relying upon litigation and the passage of the four
segregation laws in the legislative session earlier in the spring, Amis Guthridge, who had first
entered the fray during Hoxie’s integration troubles, sued to enforce the ability of white students
to transfer out of integrated schools. Attorney General Bruce Bennett also filed a number of
lawsuits to intimidate and limit the actions of the NAACP in the state, but it was the lawsuit by
Mrs. Clyde Thomason that truly forced Faubus’ hand to delay integration. Thomason, a member
of the Mother’s League of Central High, argued that integration could not continue safely due to
all of the confusion and mess surrounding the last-minute lawsuits, not including hers.
Depositions by Thomason and Faubus suggested that while the city was ready to proceed with
the integration of Central High School, he had noticed a “swift change” in the tide of public
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opinion against integration that could lead to violence. Much to the chagrin of Blossom, on
August 29, the Pulaski County Chancery Court issued an injunction against the Little Rock
School Board, preventing them from integrating any schools.107 This order was immediately
invalidated by Judge Ronald Davies at the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, who ordered the
school district to continue with its plan to integrate Central on September 3. These lawsuits and
appeals panicked Blossom and the school board who quickly realized the situation was
escalating beyond their control and appealed to Faubus for guidance and leadership.
As segregationist resistance increased over August, Superintendent Blossom was left in a
perplexing situation. Not a fan of integration, his plan had been to limit the impact of any racial
mixing in schools and Central High School was set to open with just nine black students amongst
a sea of white. The most diluted plan he could have come up with was now in serious jeopardy,
and public sentiment was becoming hostile to his efforts to simply obey the Eighth Circuit
Appeals Court in the Aaron v. Cooper case. In his rather rosy review of the Crisis, Blossom
recalls the progress that had been made in Little Rock and Arkansas until 1957, highlighting the
growth of industry and infrastructure that served as the progressive backdrop to the “bigotry and
intimidation” that occurred as the Little Rock Nine sought to integrate Central High.108 Having
appealed the Thomason case in federal court, Blossom was on a collision course with Faubus,
who had sided firmly with the segregationists in opposing integration. As Blossom and the
School Board scrambled to ensure they followed their legal obligation, Faubus worked on
alternative means to evade the law.
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Governor Faubus set his legacy in stone on the evening of September 2, 1957 when he
went on live television and announced that he had called out the National Guard to stop the
integration of Central High School to “preserve peace and order.” Faubus claimed that he had
received reports of armed militias en route to Little Rock to violently challenge integration and
thus he had decided it was for the safety of the city that integration be stopped. He called on the
school to be closed on September 3 and to open on September 4 with no integration.109 This was
the first Blossom or the School Board were made aware of Faubus’ plan. According to his FBI
interview, Blossom realized Faubus was “peeved” at him for testifying that there was no threat of
violence that could have prevented integration and perhaps decided at that point to keep him
unaware of his plan to claim this threat of violence and stop integration.110
In opposition to Blossom’s pleas to make a statement reassuring the public of their safety
and that integration would occur with his support, Faubus instead went on television on Monday
evening with his announcement that the National Guard would be stationed outside Central High
School to prevent the Little Rock Nine. Faubus claimed there were threats of violence at the
school from mothers who planned to picket as well as “caravans” of whites from beyond Little
Rock who opposed integration and were heading to the city to cause trouble. These, and other socalled threats of violence proved to be untrue, but it was enough to spread fear among the city,
particularly for parents of students who attended Central High School.111
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The Central High School Crisis is well-documented as one of the most visible displays of
massive resistance in the United States. The images of Elizabeth Eckford being met by a white
mob on September 4, as the school reopened, garnered national attention. Yet, despite these
scenes, most of the decisions and maneuvering to end this crisis happened behind closed doors
between state and federal politicians. As Faubus sought to prove the theory of interposition and a
state’s rights to control its own educational policies, President Eisenhower challenged this and
tried to get Faubus to change his mind.112 This failed, in part because while Eisenhower openly
disagreed with Faubus’ authority in the matter, privately he did not agree with the Brown
decision and did not want to interfere. On September 20, Judge Davis ruled that Faubus and
others involved in refusing to admit the Little Rock Nine must stop their interference, at which
point Faubus finally acquiesced and removed the National Guard from the school premises.
Buckling under pressure from the federal government was a boon to Faubus supporters who were
reinvigorated in their anger over the federal government’s treatment of them in what they saw as
interference in state business. This only served to enrage the mob mentality of white
segregationists even further as the Little Rock Nine finally integrated Central High School on
September 23.113 Greeted at the entrance with yet another mob and only the city police to protect
them, the Little Rock Nine scrambled to enter the school before leaving at just eleven a.m. to
protect them from the growing mob outside. This incensed President Eisenhower, who believed
this matter to have been solved by Judge Davies order. Frustrated at this seemingly passive
aggressive acceptance of the order and Faubus’ inability to protect the students, Eisenhower
issued an Executive Order federalizing the National Guard and ordering the 101st Airborne
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Division of the military to ensure the law was obeyed and the students were protected from angry
mobs.114 This only served to memorialize Faubus in the eyes of segregationists. The federal
government had forced integration upon the school and Faubus had been seemingly emasculated
by the power of federal authority. This was all Faubus needed for this block of weary Democrats
to stick by his side for the remainder of his administration, no matter how he proceeded on racial
matters.
As integration continued into the spring semester, Aaron v. Cooper travelled through the
court system as Blossom and the School Board sought to stop continued integration for the
following years. Citing “extreme public hostility,” the lawsuit asked that the Little Rock Nine be
removed from Central High School and integration be delayed a further two-to-three years. The
District Court agreed with the School Board in June, too late for the students to be removed from
the school, but the case was immediately appealed by the NAACP to ensure that integration did
continue, regardless of the “turmoil” of 1957.115 The Supreme Court, in a special session finally
heard the case on September 11 and ruled the next day that the schools must obey Brown and
continue with integrated education. The justices issued a scathing attack against the “actions of
legislators and executive officials…that have brought about violent resistance” to the integration
of Central High School.116 Ruling that the violence was initiated by state politicians to evade a
federal court order, the Supreme Court justices rule that that was not enough to delay integration
and deny these, and other students, their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal education simply
to avoid violence.
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On the same day that the Supreme Court handed down their decision, Governor Faubus
continued his attack on federal authority. Over the summer, the Governor called the legislature
together for a special session that sought to essentially eliminate the public school system in
Little Rock and target the NAACP, claiming that the legislature needed to “face up to some
problems that have been forced upon us, by the unwise actions of others.”117 The special General
Assembly went all-out of their assault of both the state of education in the Little Rock School
District but also in its attempts to silence the NAACP. On September 12, 1958, Governor Faubus
signed fourteen acts into law, the most egregious of which was Act 4 that allowed the governor
to close any school district that was at risk of being integrated and demanded an election to
determine if integration or segregation would follow.118 Three days after its passage, Faubus
closed all four high schools in the Little Rock School District to prevent any integration, or
education, from taking place at all. 3,665 students were prevented from going to high school in
Little Rock for the 1958-1959 academic year, furthering this perception that Arkansas was as
racist as the Deep South states and willing to sacrifice student’s education to make a stand on
segregation and states’ rights.119 There is certainly some truth to this but it also seems possible
that this was simply another ploy by Faubus to remain Governor. He pandered to his base of
white supremacists and segregationists and perhaps hoped that enough people were disaffected
by the whole situation they would not vote in the upcoming election at all.
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With Faubus having adopted the strong stance of segregation following the 1956
gubernatorial election, Johnson opted not to run against him in 1958. While he successfully ran
for the State Supreme Court where he would go on to uphold all of the pro-segregation
legislation passed between 1957 and 1959, Faubus handily beat his Democratic rival, Chris
Finkbeiner. The meat packing business man from Little Rock, and Lee Ward from Paragould
both challenged Faubus for the Democratic nomination and were both resoundly beaten by
Faubus in a clear victory that saw him win every county and over 255,000 votes.120 Faubus, in
taking his defiant action in the Central High School Crisis, saw him elected by Democrats that
were hesitant to support him just two years earlier. Delta planters and businessmen saw Faubus’
stance as a clear sign that he would not make radical changes to the racial situation in Arkansas,
and was willing to stand up to the federal government on their behalf, when necessary. This
earned Faubus financial support to continue his administration on the implicit understanding that
he would work to protect their interests, racial and economic. In the November elections,
Faubus’ victory was such a foregone conclusion that it barely made front page news in either of
the state’s two major newspapers, the Arkansas Democrat and the Arkansas Gazette. Indeed,
Faubus delivered the “Arkansas Republican Party its worst thrashing in years,” as he beat
attorney George Johnson by 166,236 to just 33,218 votes.121 On its face, this appears like a
resounding victory for Faubus and the segregationist platform but voter turnout was incredibly
low for this non-presidential election year, with just fifteen percent of registered Arkansas voters
taking the time to go to the polls.122 Midterm elections have historically received lower voter
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turnout that presidential elections but Arkansas voters might also have been weary from its
September special election to decide the fate of closed schools in Little Rock.
Following Faubus’ announcement on September 12 that the four high schools in Little
Rock would close, he also revealed that there would be a special election to be held on
September 27 to allow the citizens of the capital to decide whether the schools should be open or
closed. The election formalized the closure of the high schools with a clear majority of voters
wanting the schools to close rather than accept “federal intervention and forcible integration.”123
With this decision, a new group of women, the Women’s Emergency Committee to Open Our
Schools (WEC), sprang into action to challenge the legality of Faubus’ actions. This group of
fifty-eight middle-and-upper class white women were not in favor of complete integration of the
schools and had not protested when Central High School was integrated in 1957, but the total
closure of the schools was a step to far for them. The WEC successfully launched a campaign
challenging segregation and attempted to have the schools reopened through school board
elections. As the campaign ramped up in the spring of 1959 to oust segregationist school board
members, another group emerged to support the WEC. Stop This Outrageous Purge (STOP) was
formed after moderate members of the school board left a meeting in protest, whereby the
segregationist members proceeded to fire forty-four teachers. Made up of businessmen, many of
whom were married or related to the women in the WEC, STOP led a campaign to have the
segregationist members of the school board removed.124 In reaction to STOP, yet another group
was organized by the white community, this time to maintain segregation – the Committee to
Retain Our Segregated Schools (CROSS) – who ultimately failed in their efforts to fill the school
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board with segregationists.125 As these groups fought over control of the school board, the actual
legality of Faubus’ decision to close the schools was challenged in state and federal court. The
State Supreme Court did not find that the closure denied students their rights to education but the
District Court ruled that it was a violation of all students Fourteenth Amendment rights and so by
June 1959, Faubus was once again overruled by the federal government and the schools were set
to reopen for the upcoming school year.126
Not one to give up, the 1959 legislative session passed a final slew of pro-segregation
legislation in January. These laws went above and beyond the issue of integrated education and
even included a rather regressive measure to label blood donations by race and permitting only
the use of same-race blood for transfusions. This was a measure that had been passed in other
states much earlier but was introduced in this legislative session by Delta politician N. B.
Murphy. Citing this as a health measure, it was quickly dismissed by doctors, one of whom
stated that “there was no difference between white and Negro blood” and that this law would
simply burden blood banks with additional and unnecessary work to label and use the blood.127
This was almost too much, even for Faubus. However reluctant, Faubus signed the bill into law,
although it is not clear if the measure was enforced. Another law was passed that sought to limit
the use of sit-ins as a method of protest. Act 14 prohibited people from staying in a business
having been asked to leave by employers. This act came about due to a sit-in protest in
neighboring Oklahoma in which black students sat-in at a lunch counter in a department store

125
Brent Riffel, “Stop This Outrageous Purge (STOP),” The Encyclopedia of Arkansas History and
Culture, http://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?search=1&entryID=715 (accessed May
14, 2012).
126
Riva, Acting Up and Courting Controversy, 55-63.
127
“Racial Label Proposed for Transfusions,” Arkansas Gazette, February 11, 1959, 17.

155

and refused to leave despite being denied service.128 Foreshadowing the explosion of sit-ins that
began in 1960 by four black students in Greensboro, North Carolina, Act 14 sought to avoid
something similar from occurring in Arkansas. The deluge of pro-segregation legislation and
measures to limit integration can be seen as a show of force against the federal government. It
certainly helped to empower Faubus and cement his popularity to his base of segregationists and
apathetic moderates. But there were serious economic consequences to his actions between 1957
and 1959 that Winthrop Rockefeller, as head of the Arkansas Industrial Development
Commission (AIDC), worked to overcome and reinstate Arkansas as “the land of opportunity.”
Rockefeller faced an uphill battle to reinvigorate industry in the state. As the school crisis
erupted in 1957, he warned Faubus that his actions would negatively impact the AIDC and his
efforts to build industry in the state, but Faubus had made up his mind to evade Brown.129
Business leaders in Little Rock simply worked to limit the crisis’ impact on their profits. They
did, however, balk in 1958 when Faubus closed the schools and joined their wives in actively
protesting against this decision. Businessmen sought to join the School Board to overtake the
segregationist majority and re-open the schools and were helped by a general consensus from the
Little Rock Chamber of Commerce that this would help ease any financial downturn the city
faced. While bankers opted not to involve themselves in this fight in fear that they might lose
valuable business from Delta planters, three businessmen won seats on the School Board that
would eventually decide that the high schools should be re-opened.130 While this certainly eased
the pressure on businesses in the state, the WEC published a report in September 1959 that
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highlighted just how damaging the crisis had been. No new industries had moved to Little Rock
since the crisis erupted, “real estate business and home building ha[d] declined by 20 percent,”
retail profits were down, and “more families [were] leaving Little Rock than moving to it.”131
This was incredibly problematic for Faubus and Rockefeller who saw progress in terms of
economic success that did not rely on the ever unreliable agricultural sector. As Faubus
maintained his strong stance against integration, it was left to Rockefeller and other leading
businessmen to ease the crisis’ economic impact.
Figured released by the AIDC suggested that up to $1 million of new industry was lost
due to the crisis. Little Rock had seen a steady increase in the number of plants over the 1950s
that provided hundreds of jobs to locals, mostly white but since 1957, there was a dearth of
businesses wanting to move to a city that was on the front page of newspapers for all the wrong
reasons. Even companies that had essentially told the AIDC that they were relocating their
factories to Little Rock, like Harry W. Dietert’s tool company, changed their minds following the
“adverse publicity” the city had received. Despite this steep decline in new business, Everett
Tucker, manager of the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce and newly elected School Board
President, claimed that it had not been felt by the city itself as “business was good” but he
expected that to change in 1960 when contracts expired and workers saw a decrease in
employment.132 This interruption to business placed men, and women, at odds with Governor
Faubus. Unwilling to publicly criticize him during the crisis, the economic ramifications
certainly made them weary of any more interference by Faubus. Putting their economic interests
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first, businessmen would support civil rights activism in the city in the 1960s, largely in fear of
continued economic reprisals but also a growing sense of morality that it was the right thing to
do, especially in the face of Governor Faubus’ actions in the fifties.
As racial tensions died down in Little Rock and business leaders desperately sought to
reinstate the good name of Arkansas to entice new industry, Martin Luther King, Jr. sought to
capitalize on the success of the Montgomery Bus Boycott and the anger of Emmett Till’s
lynching in 1955, Martin Luther King, Jr. and a number of other black religious leaders
established an organization dedicated to civil rights activism. The Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC), led by King until his assassination in 1968, was an extension of the man
himself. Using the ideology of nonviolent direct action that had worked so well in Montgomery,
the SCLC sought to copy this success in other cities across the South to protest segregation and
racial inequality more broadly. This was an organization founded by church leaders and used the
church to facilitate respectable civil rights activism because it was the only place with no white
oversight or control. This was a moderate organization, they were not radical by any means and
relied upon the NAACP to continue their litigation efforts to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson.133
Between 1957 and 1960, the SCLC were rather limited as King attempted to cement himself as a
leader of the burgeoning movement and the SCLC struggled to replicate Montgomery. It was
Ella Baker, SCLC executive secretary, who really established much of the groundwork for the
organization. The North Carolina native and Shaw graduate had worked for Montgomery’s
NAACP before joining King’s organization. She opened the headquarters in Atlanta and sought
to establish its voter registration program and manage the general operations all by herself, an
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effort that had seen little victory by 1960.134 This lackluster start from the SCLC was
compounded in February 1960 when the media rushed to follow the story of four students
sitting-in at a department store lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina.
It was these four young, black, male students who reinvigorated the Civil Rights
Movement that had not been seen since Montgomery. Joseph McNeil, Franklin McCain, Ezell
Blair Jr., and David Richmond were all students at North Carolina Agricultural and Technical
State University (A&T) when they decided to protest segregated public facilities on February 1,
1960. McNeil, like many African Americans, had frequently been denied service at public
facilities and this denial the day before at the Greensboro bus terminal was the final straw of
indignity for him. It was at this moment that McNeil gathered his friends and planned how to
protest such discrimination.135 In frustration of how he had been denied service at a lunch
counter, McNeil decided that should be the focus of their protest. The four men decided to go to
the local Woolworths in Greensboro and ask to be served at the all-white lunch counter.
Knowing that they would be denied service, the students planned to remain at the lunch counter
until it closed for the day and return in the following days and weeks to attract local and media
attention to their cause.
To no-one’s surprise, the four men were refused service and the manager of the lunch
counter told them that, “you know this is just not the way we do business,” while a black
dishwasher called them “rabble-rousers [and] troublemakers.”136 But as afraid as the dishwasher
might have been to lose his job in the face of direct protests, it was already too late to stem the
tide of the student movement. News of the sit-ins spread across campus and indeed, across
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Greensboro, and an increasing number of students joined the Greensboro Four, as they quickly
became known. By Friday, February 5, over three hundred students protested segregated lunch
counters across department stores in Greensboro, bringing Greensboro city officials to the table
to negotiate a deal.
While Greensboro began the long and arduous process of negotiation, other students
across the South saw the power of the sit-in protest and began to copy the Greensboro Four in
their towns and cities. By April 1960, almost eighty cities across the South experienced some
form of lunch counter sit-ins. Many cities responded with violence and arrests. According to the
Southern Regional Council, by the end of 1960 there were over 70,000 sit-in protesters of both
races and around 3,000 had been arrested for their involvement.137 Many of these protesters were
white students who sought an allegiance with their black brethren to highlight the injustices
faced by members of their age group. As the number of students protesting segregation in public
facilities grew, they faced increasing violence. Hot coffee was poured down their backs,
cigarettes extinguished on their bodies, and food thrown at them as they protested their inability
to be served a cup of coffee at lunch counters across the South. And these were the more
restrained forms of violence they faced, showing how determined many white Southerners were
to maintain white supremacy and deny African Americans access to basic facilities.
Students at Philander Smith College, inspired by the Greensboro Four, initiated their own
lunch counter sit-in on March 10. One of Little Rock’s private black colleges, Philander Smith
was home to about seven hundred students, many of whom participated in or supported the
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student sit-ins at lunch counters across the city’s department stores.138 On March 10, about fifty
students asked for service at Woolworth’s lunch counter. They were refused service and the
police were notified of their presence. These students were in violation of Act 14 of the 1959
General Assembly that been passed amidst the Central High School Crisis and general attack
against African Americans in the state. Five students refused to leave the premises when asked
by the chief of police Eugene Smith and were subsequently arrested and charged with violating
Act 14 and another, Act 226, from the 1959 General Assembly. This act of protest created new
tensions in the city. Little Rock was just beginning to recover from the crisis, and there was little
appetite for a new rise of black activism that might set Governor Faubus on another rampage and
impact the very slow beginnings of school integration taking place. Only the NAACP were in
support of the students during the 1960 protest, with Daisy Bates still at the helm of the state
organization. Student protests divided the local African American community. Still recovering
from the Central High School Crisis of 1957, many in Little Rock were not ready or willing to
start another protest, especially given that school integration was still token compliance with
Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Even the president of Philander Smith College, M.
Lafayette Harris, was not in favor of the sit-ins, stating that he did not “subscribe to mass action
in dealing with difficult problems,” although he did not go so far as to suspend or expel the
participating students.139 This rush of student sit-ins was seen as a more militant method of black
activism that would disrupt the achievements local blacks had made toward desegregation and
peaceful race relations.
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Following the trial and guilty verdicts of the first five students arrested on March 17,
students left the courthouse and staged a series of sit-ins at various lunch counters in downtown
Little Rock. No students were arrested following these sit-ins and the NAACP’s attempts to
launch a boycott of stores that operated white-only lunch counters found little support. Philander
Smith College students continued to sit-in at lunch counters through the spring semester but they
had no success in changing local policy or even really getting the support of anyone, black or
white, behind them. This was a wholly unpopular form of activism in the city that barely
survived the summer break.140 The divide among African Americans became clear as the more
entrenched older generation of activists and leaders refused to endorse the students protests. For
this generation, change would not come from the ability to eat at a department store lunch
counter. It would only come from continued, meaningful school integration, and economic
change that improved the lives of African Americans.
By the fall of 1960, students at Philander Smith College, despite local denouncements,
formally organized as branch members of SNCC. Reverend William E. Bush of Toledo, Ohio
served as the chairman of the organization and claimed that they “would work for “equal rights
on the job and in the schools”…[to breakdown] segregation.”141 They held a few more sit-ins
that yielded no change to the segregated lunch counters. Most black leadership remained
opposed to the organization partially because it was a student run group. Dr. J. M. Robinson, an
influential African American doctor in Little Rock who was a founding member of the Little
Rock NAACP, went so far as to say that the “youth should be guided by sober thinking and
advice from their seniors,” insulting the intelligence of the youth and their understanding of
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current issues.142 The only local group seemingly in line with SNCC was the Arkansas Council
on Human Relations (ACHR). They were frustrated by the lack of local support for sit-ins and
student involvement in civil rights and director Nat Griswold glumly noted in November 1960
that, “Pfeifer’s Little Rock store has discontinued its lunch counter. The space where it was is
now filled with lighted Christmas Trees and Baubles.”143 No more explanation was needed. For
the time being, there would be no integration of public facilities in Little Rock; the student
protests had had no effect on desegregation.
The popularity of the sit-ins showed that young adults were tired of the slow pace at
which other efforts towards equality were taking. Many African American students noted their
frustration and “impatience” with the fact that they had been denied first class citizenship in the
United States despite the 1954 ruling of Brown v. Board of Education, which should have
ensured they at least received an integrated and equal education.144 And these students did not
just seek to integrate lunch counters – they wanted the whole system of segregation to be
eradicated. This was simply the first step toward that goal. They were tired of the pace at which
the SCLC and NAACP were working towards equality and wanted to show that they were not
afraid to force change and were disgruntled with following the pace set by older African
Americans.
As black and white students across the South copied the efforts of the Greensboro Four,
King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) attempted to tap into the new energy
and media frenzy that accompanied them. Baker saw these sit-in protests as a new wave of
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potential for the Civil Rights Movement and wanted the students to form their own organization
outside the purview of the SCLC or even older organizations such as the NAACP. She believed
that the burgeoning youth movement should not be restrained by the pace SCLC and NAACP
moved, nor be burdened by their organizational hierarchies. Baker convinced the SCLC to
provide $800 to host a Youth Leadership Movement at her alma mater, Shaw University during
Easter 1960 to bring student protesters together to decide their future.145
Around 200 students attended the meeting at Shaw on April 15. Baker opened the
meeting and focused her speech on her beliefs that the students needed to become an
independent organization that broadened their goals beyond lunch counter integration to full
social equality. She hoped that they would form a more decentralized organization instead of the
top, leader heavy groups like the SCLC and NAACP.146 King, meanwhile, hoped that the
students would organize under the purview of the SCLC and his leadership, but he also
advocated that they expand their goals beyond lunch counters to include economic boycotts of
segregated stores. In his speech to the students, King decried the older generation of blacks who
had become complacent with the status quo, especially those in the middle class who did not
want to risk their position in society and called upon the students to continue their efforts to fight
segregation and inequality through nonviolent methods.147
By May, fifteen of the delegates from the meeting met in Atlanta to continue discussions
regarding the new organization. The organization was renamed the Temporary Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and was led by Marion Berry, a member of the Nashville
sit-ins. It was at this meeting that they created their Statement of Purpose, outlined their goals
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and tactics of the organizations. It began, “We affirm the philosophical or religious ideal of
nonviolence as the foundation of our purpose, the presupposition of our belief, and the manner of
our action. Nonviolence, as it grows from the Judeo-Christian tradition, seeks a social order of
justice permeated by love. Integration of human endeavor represents the crucial first step towards
such a society.”148 Central to the goal of SNCC in 1960 was integration through peaceful,
nonviolent methods but both integration and adherence to nonviolent direct action would be
challenged throughout SNCC’s existence.
Unlike students in Little Rock, black students at Arkansas AM&N in Pine Bluff were
thwarted from the outset in any impulses they might have had to sit-in. In March, students were
warned by then acting President, E. E. Evans to “refrain” from joining the sit-ins. Evans
preempted possible student participation and stated that arbitration was the more “reason[able]”
method to address issues in Pine Bluff.149 While it is unclear how the students felt about this
request by the University’s president, students did not sit-in until 1963. While students might not
have participated in Pine Bluff, the local branch of the NAACP called for a boycott of a number
of department stores that did not allow African Americans to eat at their lunch counters. This
more radical branch of the NAACP, formerly run by Flowers, saw an opportunity to act upon the
sit-ins and create even more of an economic downturn for white-owned businesses. Perhaps as
an attempt to avoid student-led protests, Dr. David Parker, dentist and president of the Pine Bluff
Branch of the NAACP announced the boycott of two of the main department stores in Pine
Bluff, F. W. Woolworth Co. and J. J. Newberry on March 24.150 [Kress, another major
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department store in Pine Bluff was not part of this boycott because it did not have a lunch
counter.151] However, by the third day of the boycott, Woolworths and Newberry reported that
the boycott had had little impact on their business, leading Parker to call for a mass meeting to
gain more support for the movement.152 It was estimated that over 700 African Americans
attended the meeting on Sunday, March 27 to hear Parker and others encourage participation in
the boycott. “This will go on as long as two days, two months or a lifetime if necessary,” Parker
said of the boycott. “This boycott…will determine whether or not we deserve what we are asking
for – services of all kinds at the stores.” The Arkansas Gazette article noted that the majority of
those in attendance were middle-aged, unlike most who were participating in sit-in efforts across
the country, and that Parker and the NAACP were not willing to commit to picketing these stores
in addition to the boycott.153 Like Little Rock, this older generation of black leaders did not see
the value in protesting for a cup of coffee. In Pine Bluff at least, they instead capitalized on the
moment to highlight their own economic power to undermine white businesses that, they hoped,
would enforce change.
Upon announcement of the boycott, W.M. Phillips, a sociology professor at AM&N used
the boycott as a research project for his “Introduction to Social Research Class” for the Spring
1960 semester. Phillips and his twenty-six students compiled a report on the NAACP boycott
that gathered data on the number of African Americans entering the three department stores on
Saturday, April 9, 1960. Their report found that 96.8 percent of African Americans going to
department stores went to Kress, the only one that was not being boycotted by the NAACP. 2.7
percent entered Newberry, while just 0.5 percent entered Woolworth’s. Of the 156 African
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Americans who entered either Woolworths or Newberry, the students found that upon
questioning, most of these residents were unaware of the boycott, with less than one percent of
the people knew about the boycott but did not agree with the NAACP.154 This project concluded
with an analysis of the data to argue that by and large, black residents of Pine Bluff were
supportive of the NAACP’s boycott and the NAACP in a larger sense. There was little dissent
within the city’s other black organizations but ultimately, the boycott did not achieve its goal of
economically harming these two department stores. Neither Woolworth’s or Newberry’s
changed their policies regarding their segregated lunch counters and it would take the arrival of
Bill Hansen and SNCC in 1963 to complete this work.
While the NAACP’s boycott proved unable to integrate the lunch counters, by the end of
March 1960 it was reported that the Negro Ministerial Alliance contacted the white Ministerial
Alliance to establish a commission to “work toward agreement of Racial problems.”155 Fourteen
white business and professional leaders agreed to join the commission as well as three African
Americans. By the following day, ten black business leaders had agreed to join the commission.
Reverend Clint Burleson, pastor of the Wesley Methodist Church believed that the ministers felt
a “duty under God to help maintain peace and goodwill.”156 Despite this being an effort of the
ministerial community in Pine Bluff, Burleson claimed that once the commission was
established, the ministers would step back, presumably to let business and community leaders
assess how best to address the increasing racial tensions in the city. By April 3, Burleson noted
that he wanted the commission to “have roots spread broadly” and that there was no need to rush
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a meeting when it was not yet ready.157 However, there were some were opposed the creation of
the commission, in particular, L. D. Poynter, president of the Pine Bluff White Citizens Council.
He claimed that the commission appeared to be “designed to give away our rights,” presumably
referring to the mostly white power structure that existed in the city. However, only 15 people
were present at the Council’s meeting where Poynter made this claim.158 Although the actions of
the ministers were applauded by many in Arkansas, the interracial committee never formally met
as disagreements over everything seemingly doomed its success.159
While the commission was being created, the NAACP continued to call for a boycott of
the two department stores. Dr. Parker said on April 13 that they were 95 percent effective,
although it is less clear how much financial damage this had on the two stores.160 But some in the
NAACP were not happy about the lack of sit-ins taking place in Pine Bluff. L.C. Bates, owner of
the by-then defunct Arkansas State Press, civil rights activist, and longtime NAACP field
representative, expressed disappointment at students of Arkansas AM&N for not participating in
the national sit-in movement spreading across the South. He compared the students in Pine Bluff
to those in Little Rock who had sat-in and many of whom had been arrested while students at the
state college for blacks made no such attempt.161 In response, the acting president of AM&N,
E.E. Evans, noted that his students were “lovers of freedom” but that he had advised them not to
participate in sit-ins as they were not in the “best interest of the college and against the law,”
referring to the fact that AM&N was a state university whose funding was dependent upon the
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legislature.162 Any student protest could harm the university’s funding and put the school at risk
of being defunded at the whim of the upcoming legislative session. This reference did not sit
well with Bates, who accused Evans of being more interested in the “monetary value of AM and
N” than in the “constitutional rights” of his students and subsequently encouraged students to
transfer to the University of Arkansas where they did have the right to protest.163
As the student sit-in protests across the South continued into the fall, it became evident
that this organization was not temporary, and in October it dropped that from its title to become
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and elected Charles McDew as its new
chairman. McDew stated that SNCC would not rest until “every vestige of racial segregation and
discrimination are erased from the face of the earth.”164 With incorrigible faith that they would
succeed, and that America was indeed righteous, the students saw themselves as revolutionary
forces within the Civil Rights Movement. Many students genuinely believed that they would be
the ones to ensure equality for future generations of African Americans. They worried not that
their measly budget of $14,000 would not stretch far or that they would suffer due to the lack of
professional experience among their ranks. Their purpose was clear – end racial discrimination in
the United States – and they were determined to see it realized in their lifetimes through
nonviolent methods.
From the outset, SNCC was a very hands-off organization. It intentionally sought to
differentiate itself from the likes of the SCLC and the NAACP and created a decentralized power
structure that allowed local SNCC activists unprecedented control over its civil rights efforts.
The Committee had one delegate from each of the sixteen Southern states plus one from the
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District of Columbia as well as a few other voting members to outline their plan and strategy. Its
headquarters in Atlanta was in many ways a clearinghouse for information and volunteers before
being assigned to various SNCC projects across the South. By 1961, the headquarters was
manned by two full time workers whose role in part was to maintain communication with
various SNCC efforts across the South.165 At the August 1961 meeting at Highlander Folk
School in Tennessee, a compromise was made between those who wanted to continue sit-ins and
other nonviolent protests and those who sought political change through voter registration.
Marion Barry and Diane Nash argued that direct action needed to remain a central part of
SNCC’s efforts as they did not want to cower to pressure by the federal government for a cooling
off period from direct action following the Freedom Rides. They had become members of SNCC
because of the power of direct action and did not want to lose this core aspect of SNCC’s identity
and take away from the media attention these protests received. During these discussions,
Lawrence Guyot argued that the cooling off period requested by Attorney General Robert
Kennedy was really just an attempt “to stop public demonstrations” and to “get the niggers off
the streets,” losing any momentum they had.166 However, other members of SNCC such as
Charles Jones, Charles McDew, and Charles Sherrod, felt that voter registration held the key to
long-term equality and Southern states would have to make concessions towards black voters
once they represented a significant portion of the electorate. In the long term, they argued,
increased numbers of black voters would mean black politicians who would be able to “correct
injustice themselves” and begin a revolution within the political system that would impact social
and economic repression as well.167

165

Zinn, SNCC, 37-40.
Sitkoff, Search for Black Equality, 104.
167
Sitkoff, Search for Black Equality, 105.
166

170

James Forman, executive director and a decade older than most members of SNCC, was
able to bring these two differing sides together. Forman argued that neither option was possible
without the other. In many parts of the South, he believed, it was not possible for African
Americans to achieve equality without both direct action protests and voter registration drives.
White oppression was such that violence would be faced by blacks trying to register to vote but
direct action be a method used to highlight this blockade of constitutional rights. There would be
two parts of SNCC – Diane Nash would lead the direct-action protests while Charles Jones
would focus efforts toward voter registration.168
Arkansas had largely escaped the sit-in movement and momentum created by SNCC.
Still recovering from the Central High School Crisis of 1957, black and white resistance to sit-ins
in Little Rock successfully outmaneuvered the few sit-ins that did occur and lunch counters
remained out of reach for black customers. This did not sit well with the ACHR who believed
that Arkansas was missing the moment to force change. Thus, in early 1962, Nat Griswold,
director of the ACHR begged SNCC to send a leader of the movement to the city to reinvigorate
sit-ins and increase pressure on city business leaders to do the right thing in the face of yet
another negative media campaign.
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Chapter 5:
The Delta Differential
The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee sent a seasoned activist to Little Rock
in 1962 that saw segregation fall in just three months. Following the success and ease of
integration that took place in Little Rock, the Arkansas Project made its way to the one region of
Arkansas in which white supremacy remained entrenched in society: the Delta. It was here that
even black resistance grew as older established leadership balked at SNCC’s relentless assault on
segregated facilities. SNCC diverged from the national narrative in Arkansas through this black
resistance. This chapter will show that although there had always been tensions between SNCC
and other national civil rights organizations such as the NAACP and SCLC, this was
compounded in Arkansas by the opposition of Lawrence Davis, president of the only state
funded black university. Davis, from as early as sit-ins began across the nation in 1960,
vocalized his opposition to the student protest movement. This stems from the very nature of
Arkansas AM&N and its total reliance upon the state legislature to fund the institution.
Elsewhere in the South, historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) such as North
Carolina A&T and Tennessee Agricultural and Industrial College, supported and endorsed their
students’ right to protest, regardless of their own reliance upon state funding. But Davis, aware
of the willingness of Faubus to placate his base and completely close the schools down in Little
Rock for the 1958-1959 school year, was not willing to risk the school’s future on student
activism.
SNCC’s move into the Delta focused initially on Pine Bluff, the region’s largest city and
where resistance was most concentrated. Yet, SNCC not only succeeded in integrating public
facilities in Pine Bluff before the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it also helped register thousands of
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black voters in the region. Unlike Georgia and Mississippi, where resistance to SNCC was fierce,
this chapter will reveal that Arkansans did not oppose the activists in the same manner and there
were no known deaths of civil rights activists during their presence in the state. Indeed, much of
the resistance to SNCC came from the Governor’s office and other state politicians who had
gained political strength from their support of segregation during the Central High School Crisis.
Governor Orval Faubus had a reputation to maintain as an opponent of integration and thus any
and all activists who worked to integrate the state, and he used the state police to continually
monitor and intimidate SNCC volunteers, to little avail. The civil rights organization diverged
from the national platform of sit-ins and voter registration to adapt to the local needs of black
Arkansans in a way that was not matched elsewhere.
The Arkansas Project traces its roots in Albany, where events unfolded and eventually
conspired to bring Bill Hansen to Arkansas. Hansen was born in Cincinnati, Ohio in 1939, and
raised in a working class, Catholic family. He first became involved in the Civil Rights
Movement in 1957 when he entered Xavier University and co-founded the Xavier Interracial
Council, which Hansen has described as more “a venue for getting to know people” than an
activist group. During his brief time at university he also became a member of the local branch of
the NAACP and helped to establish a chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in the
city.1 CORE worked to test U.S. Supreme Court rulings that called for the integration of
interstate travel. In 1961, SNCC joined CORE to test Boynton v. Virginia (1960) that ordered the
desegregation of interstate bus terminal facilities. 2 When CORE called a halt to the Freedom
Rides after encountering violence in Anniston and Birmingham, Alabama, in May 1961, SNCC
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vowed to continue what CORE had begun. SNCC members from Nashville, Tennessee, travelled
from Nashville to Birmingham and on to Montgomery, Alabama, where they were attacked and
beaten as they exited the bus.3
In July 1961, Hansen took part in one of the most dangerous Freedom Rides from
Montgomery, Alabama to Jackson, Mississippi. He was arrested and spent two months in a
Mississippi jail before briefly returning home and then heading to New York to play a more
active role in CORE.4 Hansen travelled to various universities in the North describing the role he
played in the nascent civil rights movement and his experiences as a Freedom Rider. It was
during this time that he encountered other student activists, including Reggie Robinson, a
member of SNCC, who introduced Hansen to the workings of the student-oriented organization.
In spring 1962, Hansen and Robinson became “campus traveler[s],” visiting universities across
the southeastern states and informing students about their work and trying to recruit more SNCC
workers.5 They then headed to SNCC’s headquarters in Atlanta where Hansen was sent to join
the Albany Movement.
Hansen’s field reports from the Albany campaign reveal the conflict between SNCC and
the SCLC. He lamented that it felt like “Christmas” when, in July 1962, Martin Luther King was
sentenced to forty-five days in jail and the city was angered into protesting. Hansen noted that
everything stopped following King’s trial and that “as much as we may disagree with MLK
about the way he and SCLC do things one has to admit that he can cause more hell to be raised
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by being in jail one night than anyone else could if they bombed city hall.”6 Hansen understood
the power of King and his growing cult of personality that aroused much enthusiasm and anger
for the movement that SNCC did not have, in part because they did not center around the role of
one person. Just a week later, King, Hansen and about twenty-six protesters were arrested on
July 27 and charged with “disturbing the peace.” Hansen, as a white Northerner, particularly
irked the jail officers who promised to “straighten him out” and presumably make him wish he
had never joined the movement. They made good on this promise the next day when Hansen was
beaten by a jail trusty that, when he was finally admitted to hospital, resulted in “a broken jaw,
two broken ribs, and four stitches to close the cut in [his] mouth.” And this event did nearly
break Hansen who stated that his “nerves were shot.” He returned to his hometown of Cincinnati
and then headed East to New York to convalesce until mid-September.7
When Hansen arrived back at SNCC headquarters in Atlanta quite literally willing to take
another beating in Albany, he was instead informed by Executive Secretary James Forman that
he was to travel to Little Rock, Arkansas. Nat Griswold, Director of the Arkansas Council on
Human Relations (ACHR), had sent a letter to Forman requesting aide from SNCC to pressure
Little Rock’s businessmen to integrate public facilities. Little Rock’s engagement with the 1960
sit-in movement and the 1961 Freedom Rides produced few concrete results and Griswold and
Associate Director Ozell Sutton were convinced that outside help was necessary to enable the
local African American population to take a stand against ongoing racial injustice in the city.8
After all, Little Rock’s businesses could ill afford any more bad press. While that ACHR had
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played only a minor role in the 1957 School Crisis, Griswold used the embarrassment of that
time and decline in business to help push the city towards integrated public facilities in 1962,
alongside the Council on Community Affairs (COCA).9 COCA was an amalgamation of leaders
from the many civil rights organizations in Little Rock that sought unification and to formulate a
method to black activism. Dismayed by the lack of cooperation with the white community,
COCA filed a lawsuit on March 8, 1962 against the city board of directors, demanding that they
integrate public facilities in accordance with the law.10 Yet Griswold was not too pleased with
COCA’s move towards litigation. He realized that the city would prolong the case in the court
system and removed the chance of voluntary desegregation, as they had done in 1957. He
believed that this caused more agitation toward civil rights as it “caused ill will.”11 The lack of
progress on the court case and disappearance of student sit-in protestors led Griswold to request
help from SNCC’s national office. The ACHR was one of the few organizations of older, more
established black leaders who saw the benefits of SNCC sit-ins and this effort by young activists
to push for change. Thus, on October 24, 1962, Bill Hansen arrived in Little Rock to assist the
ACHR in their desegregation efforts to oversee the rapid downfall of segregated eating
facilities.12
The ACHR was acutely aware of the power of protests in Little Rock and the arrival of a
seasoned SNCC veteran reenergized the sit-in movement and quickly put businesses on the
defensive. Despite the failed sit-ins in 1960, the ACHR acknowledged that students would be the
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driving force of integration of public facilities in the city if Hansen could engage students at any
of the three black colleges in the area. Hansen did not waste any time in reaching out to students
at Philander Smith College, where a contingent of SNCC activists still met irregularly. William
Bush, the chairman of what became the Student Freedom Movement, Bert Strauss, and Hansen
initiated a small sit-in on October 25 at a lunch counter. Hansen noted that there was an
“absolute lack of tension at the counter,” even after a white woman realized she was sitting next
to a black man. It was clear that Little Rock was no Albany, or even Greensboro where these sitins began. This white woman, who did not seem to care that she was seated next to a black man,
was supposedly just one of these “vulnerable” white women who segregationists sought to
protect from these violent and hyper-sexual men who sought to ravish her. She paid absolutely
no attention to the situation before her, not even to question something that had almost definitely
never happened to her before. Hansen correctly asserted that there was likely to be little
resistance to lunch counter integration in Little Rock, a far cry from his previous posting in
Albany.13
Following disagreements about the path SNCC were to take in Little Rock, Bush resigned
as chairman and was replaced by Worth Long. Another student at Philander Smith College, Long
had not only participated in the 1960 sit-ins, he had also travelled to national SNCC meetings
and was heavily involved in SNCC and its ethos. Hansen and Long were confident that Little
Rock business owners were afraid of any negative publicity that would come from sit-ins that
they could bypass the process and simply persuade them to integrate. The first sit-in took place
on November 7 at the Woolworth’s lunch counter after discussions with the manager, George
Slaton, failed to integrate peaceably. Eleven students sat at the lunch counter, which was
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immediately closed, and there was no violence or even real interest from other patrons.14 This
was a wholly different experience than most other sit-ins that took place across the South. There
were no arrests, no white supremacist retaliatory action, and the story did not even make front
page news coverage. Indeed, the Arkansas Democrat simply noted that the event had taken place
and while the police were called, they did not “interfere” with the sit-in itself. The article did
indicate that there were talks taking place with city business leaders on a plan to integrate.15
While this may have been an exaggeration, the sit-in on November 7 did lead to discussions
between the Downtown Negotiating Committee (DNC) and African Americans about how and
when to integrate with minimal press involvement.
The DNC, under the leadership of James Penick, were a group of businessmen who
sought to minimize any continued civil rights activism in the city that would negatively impact
their business. Unlike 1957 when they only got involved following the closure of the city’s
schools in 1958 and worked to remove segregationists from the school board, city businessmen
this time worked to preempt any economic backlash from perceived racism in Little Rock. They
saw the resurgence of the sit-ins as a threat to the gains they had made since the Crisis and were
quick to talk with Worth Long and leading African Americans in the city to negotiate the terms
of integration. Little is known of these meetings, which remained hidden from the press, but
Hansen reports that by the end of November, it appeared that the DNC were stalling on actual
implementation of integrated lunch counters and thus sit-ins were planned to pressure the white
businessmen and show that the students were serious and wanted integration to occur as soon as
reasonably possible.16 At a sit-in at the Walgreen’s lunch counter on November 1962, Hansen
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and Long were arrested for refusing to leave the premises. This sent shockwaves among students
and members of the DNC who had not anticipated the arrests and who knew that this would be
reported on. Not only did the Arkansas Gazette write an article on the incident, they also
included a photo of Long and Hansen at the city jail where they were held.17 This arrest led to
students marching from Philander Smith College to downtown and plans for more sit-ins as a
wave of enthusiasm for protest spread among black students.
This was enough for the DNC to act. On November 30, 1962, it was agreed that the
dining services at Walgreen’s, Woolworth’s, McLellen’s, and Blass would integrate on January
2, 1963.18 All it took was the arrest and increased frustrations of the students to push the DNC to
integrate, in fear of negative press and becoming another hotspot of long-term SNCC activity
like in Albany. Business leaders wanted minimal media attention on yet more civil rights
violations and so had agreed to desegregate on the condition and Hansen and the students
immediately ceased sit-ins, to which they agreed. To ease the transition to integrated eating
facilities, the DNC even arranged for there to be a media black-out of the situation to avoid
another Hoxie or Central High. In June, 1963, the Pine Bluff Commercial reported that
integration in Little Rock was occurring “on a comparatively peaceful basis” as city parks,
auditoriums, and more were in the process of desegregation.19 By May 1964, almost all public
facilities in downtown Little Rock had been successfully integrated, including a rise in
employment and jobs available for African Americans. The only notable exceptions were the
continued segregation of the local swimming pool, and three businesses (Canton Tea Garden,
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Coachman’s Inn, and Breier’s) that had failed to integrate. There had been very little violence or
agitation following integration and it is claimed that the only factor that limited access to these
facilities was that African Americans could not afford to attend certain establishments.20 The
integration of most of Little Rock’s public facilities occurred at such a rapid pace once SNCC
and the DNC coordinated their efforts that was not seen elsewhere. The sit-ins had begun in 1960
and few cities across the South had seen such a quick move to integration as Little Rock.
Although Hansen had been sent to Arkansas for the sole purpose of desegregating Little
Rock’s lunch counters and other public facilities, he decided that there was more work for SNCC
to do in the state. While in Little Rock, he travelled to Pine Bluff to get a sense of how race
relations appeared in other parts of the state. Hansen was particularly interested in the Delta as
that is where most of the state’s black population lived, and where resistance to civil rights was
strongest. When he first traveled to Pine Bluff in November, he met students at Arkansas AM&N
who were interested in SNCC and the sit-ins but were afraid of the retaliation they might face for
participating.21 Following the successful integration of Little Rock public facilities, Hansen,
instead of returning to Atlanta to be reassigned to a major center of SNCC activity, moved to
Pine Bluff on December 4 to work on integration efforts there. In his field reports, Hansen states
that there had not been a “movement there of any significance,” partly, it seems because the
president of Arkansas AM&N, Lawrence Davis, “expelled the three ringleaders” of a planned
sit-in protest in 1960.22 The lack of support from university officials and the older generation of
black leaders hindered SNCC and student activism across the Delta in a way did not happen
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across the South. Hansen’s arrival in the Delta challenged this lack of support and highlighted
the determination of young adults to act on their beliefs.
Hansen arrived in Pine Bluff in December and was ready to begin SNCC’s third major
project after Southeast Georgia and Mississippi.23 Hansen was the second white man in SNCC to
be made a project director, in part because of his long participation with the organization and his
dedication to their ideals. Hansen followed in the footsteps of Robert “Bob” Zellner, a white
Alabamian whose work as SNCC field secretary in Mississippi saw him brutally arrested and
attacked numerous times. Although an interracial organization from its inception, many in SNCC
believed that it was important for leadership roles to go to black men, but exceptions were made
for these two experienced within the movement. Zellner evoked particular hatred among white
supremacists in the South, because he was the son of a Methodist minister and both his father
and grandfather had been members of the Ku Klux Klan. While his father turned away from the
Klan and supported his son’s civil rights activism, Zellner put himself in grave danger as a field
secretary in Mississippi.24 While Zellner worked in the most racist Deep South state, across the
river, Hansen set up the Arkansas Project under much different circumstances. SNCC in the
Arkansas Delta faced much evasion of integration orders that elongated the time SNCC spent in
the region, but it was much less resistant and hostile than the Deep South to their efforts.
Continuing the legacy set by Harold Flowers, SNCC tapped into the long history of black
activism in Pine Bluff. By 1960, it was estimated that Jefferson City had a population of 80,546,
with 44,037 living in Pine Bluff. Of those living in Pine Bluff, 17,456 were identified as black,
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making up 39 percent of the city’s population.25 Home to Arkansas’ only state-funded black
college, Arkansas Agricultural, Mechanical, and Normal school, (AM&N) Pine Bluff was home
to many affluent black families who had found means to survive and thrive under Jim Crow
segregation. And the city’s black population had grown since the end of World War II following
the increasing displacement of sharecroppers from the fields. Scientific agriculture exploded
across the South after 1945 as science and technology reduced the need for as many people to
work the land. As landowners across the Arkansas Delta diversified their farms to produce
cotton, soybeans, and eventually rice, machinery and chemicals became the mainstay of farming,
not sharecroppers and tenants.26 And it was these sharecroppers and tenants who moved to the
closest urban centers looking for alternative employment, making Pine Bluff the largest city in
the Delta and a prime location for SNCC to establish their movement.
Hansen and Rev. Ben Grinage quickly assembled a group of students from AM&N to
begin sit-ins at local lunch counters, and they quickly organized the Pine Bluff Movement. On
February 1, 1963 the first sit-in took place at Woolworths, whose manager responded by simply
closing the lunch counter. White resistance was minimal at this point. Although the store refused
to integrate the lunch counter, there was no violence and minimal reaction by whites. This
continued every day for about a month when on February 28 the store resorted to closing its
lunch counter down and removing the stools.27 This policy of complete avoidance was copied at
the local Walgreen’s lunch counter and it was clear that Pine Bluff would put up more resistance
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than Little Rock had. Indeed, the demonstrations were peaceful until the second week of
February, when a group of white youths “threw sticks and stones” at one groups of protestors on
February 9. Hansen also complained of violence on February 13, when a number of protesters
were attacked as they left Woolworth’s. According to Hansen, a group of white teenagers kicked
Hansen and used belts to beat the black participants.28 In response to a request by Hansen to
protect the demonstrators, the local police department claimed they were too understaffed and so
Charles McDew, chairman of the national SNCC office, sent a telegram to Faubus requesting
that he provide police protection against the “lawless attack” upon SNCC field workers.29 There
is no evidence of such support being provided to the protestors, nor it is likely given Faubus’
stance on segregation.
In late February, Hansen, alongside Reverend James Bevel, field secretary for the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), spoke at a local black church about their
aims for these sit-in protests. They told the attendees that demonstrations would halt when white
businesses owners “indicated a measure of sincerity and willingness to solve problems,”
reiterating that this is what happened in other cities across the country. Bevel also asked the
audience to unite behind the movement as one group “for a common purpose” to achieve racial
equality.30 This was rather hopeful. The racial demographics of Pine Bluff and its location in the
Delta determined that white supremacy and segregation were perceived by whites as key to
maintaining their dominance and control over society. Whites in Pine Bluff were far more
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resistant to integration than their counterparts in Little Rock and the situation in the city soon
escalated as the protestors faced violence from both white civilians and the police.
Like many of the sit-ins that had taken place across the South, most of the participants in
these first sit-ins were students at AM&N. Yet, these students untowardly suffered the
consequences of their decision to join the movement in a way most college students did not. The
president of AM&N, Laurence E. Davis, was decidedly against the student sit-in movement. He
threatened to suspend any students who participated in the movement, citing “the college-student
contract which says that any student not in harmony with the ideals of the college may be asked
to withdraw.”31 On February 11, Davis, followed through and indefinitely suspended seven male
and four female students for participating in a sit-in at Woolworths. His decision was supported
by James Dorsey, president of the student government, who claimed that most of the student
body “stood behind” Davis’ decision.32 By March 1, fifteen students had been suspended from
the university but Davis allowed five to re-join on the “condition that they would not take part”
in further sit-in demonstrations. Robert Whitfield, chairman of the Pine Bluff Movement said
that nine other suspended students had no intention to return to AM&N until their First
Amendment rights were guaranteed.33
The unwillingness of Davis to support his students suggests just how fragile his situation
was. The resurgence of sit-ins in Pine Bluff occurred during the legislative session where funds
to state-supported educational institutions would be appropriated. Not willing to jeopardize the
financial stability of AM&N, Davis had little alternative but to denounce the sit-ins and the
students involved but it highlighted a split in the black community over civil rights and the
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appropriate action to take.34 This set Davis apart from other leaders of HBCUs who supported
the student led protests and were a hub of activism. Privately funded HBCUs, such as Tougaloo
and Fisk more easily supported black student protests as they were not reliant upon state funding,
but even public institutions such as Tennessee Agricultural and Industrial College and North
Carolina A&T supported their students. Davis’ decisions and at least public disapproval of the
student sit-ins shows once again how economic survival was the driving force for Arkansas.
While businessmen in Little Rock had seen the need to integrate dining facilities to not
jeopardize their economic standing, in Pine Bluff, race relations there dictated that black leaders
dissuade civil rights activism if they did not want to experience an economic downturn. These
differences in approach all rely upon economics and the almost desperate situation Arkansans
felt about their economic situation, as individuals, institutions, and as a state.
The Pine Bluff Movement continued its quest to integrate lunch counters, and on March
5, the Holiday Inn restaurant quietly desegregated and served four sit-in protestors. Bruce Hugo,
manager of the restaurant, declined to comment on his decision to let the African Americans eat
there, in all likelihood knowing that his was not a popular view.35 However, two other restaurants
in Pine Bluff quietly followed suit and served the sit-in protestors. On March 15, the Pine Bluff
Movement had a double success when one group of students was served at the Keese Restaurant
and another group successfully at Magnolia Cafeteria.36
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Despite these early victories, there was still much resistance to the desegregation of
public facilities. The Pine Bluff Movement quickly expanded their integration efforts beyond
lunch counters, which was met with stiff opposition. The first arrests began on March 25 when
six protestors sat-in at the historic Hotel Pines for three hours following the manager’s refusal to
honor their single room bookings. They were arrested charged with loitering and Act 169 passed
by the state in 1961 that required people to leave when requested to do so; prosecution of which
came with a fine of up to $500 and a six month jail term.37 George Howard, president of the
State Council of Branches for the NAACP, claimed that Act 169 denied the protestors their
Fourteenth Amendment rights as the law was “only used against Negroes, not against whites, and
denied Negroes against equal opportunity under the law.”38 All six pled not-guilty at the
Municipal Court and all but one refused bail and planned to remain in jail until the trial or their
charge of loitering was dropped.39 This began a wave of arrests by the Pine Bluff police as
demonstrators continued to push for integrated facilities.
Students in the Pine Bluff Movement were fearless in the face of resistance. A week
before protesters were arrested at the Pines Hotel, a group of African American students sought
to purchase tickets on the main floor of the Saenger Theater but were refused by the attendant.
The theater, owned by a larger company, stated that it was their policy to uphold the “customs of
the community” and segregated seating would remain.40 On March 27, a larger group of college
and high school students protested outside of Saenger Theater. They blocked the entrance and
exit as well as the sidewalks for about an hour and when they refused to leave, twenty-seven of
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them were arrested.41 More students gathered the following night to continue the protest and all
sixteen were arrested. By the end of March forty-nine protestors were sitting in the city jail,
many of them under the age of eighteen.42 They all pleaded innocent of the charges and all but
four of them refused bail and returned to the City Jail to await trial.43 On April 4, they were
released from jail as they waited for their trial, scheduled to being on May 7. It had been delayed
by over a month due to appeals from George Holmes, the prosecuting attorney, who claimed that
“white and Negro leaders were trying to work out problems in the city” and the trial might
interfere with those efforts.44
The ‘problems in the city’ were in fact being handled by no-one. There was
communication taking place between the Pine Bluff Movement and white city leaders and
business owners but little came of these discussions.45 Communication between black and white
committees began on April 3 to try and end the sit-ins and move towards a peaceful agreement.
According to Reverend Arthur A. Robinson, on temporary assignment to the St. James African
Methodist Episcopal Church, the committee was made up of five white and five black members
but remained anonymous in an attempt to minimize interference of agitated citizens, both white
and black. Robinson also claimed that the Pine Bluff Movement had agreed to end all
demonstrations while the committee continued to agree on a plan towards integration.46
However, the following day, Robert Whitfield, chairman of the Pine Bluff Movement, stated that
Robinson was not a member of SNCC and did not speak on their behalf, and the movement was
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unaware of any plans to hold a door-to-door campaign to encourage blacks to pay the poll tax
and register to vote. The generational and leadership divisions in Pine Bluff were clear. Those
outside of SNCC did not appreciate the “in your face” attitude and tactics of SNCC, nor their
initial focus on lunch counter integration instead of voter registration. Whitfield did acknowledge
that the Pine Bluff Movement had agreed to halt demonstrations until the committee came back
with an acceptable plan of desegregation.47
Not all were pleased with the emergence of SNCC in Pine Bluff or the creation of the
committee that sought to end segregation. Lloyd D. Lawson, former Klansmen, spoke at a City
Council meeting on April 16, to request “stern police measures” in the face of desegregation
protests. Lawson spoke on behalf of an unknown segregationist group who did not want to see
Pine Bluff become a national focus point of the Civil Rights Movement and warned that he did
not “want to see the day of the night riders come again and I know the chief (of police) doesn’t.”
This thinly veiled threat did not convince the city council, who refused Lawson’s request on the
basis that “the city government represented all residents of Pine Bluff and could not pass a law
against any one group” as it would be discriminatory.48
The dedication of students to sit-in at lunch counters in Pine Bluff did not go unnoticed,
and they garnered both support and consternation, further highlighting just how divided the black
community were to the flurry of civil rights activism by students outside of their influence. Just
two weeks into the sit-ins, Reverend Robinson, a supporter of SNCC’s aims, criticized Davis’
decision to suspend students for protesting and even called upon Governor Faubus to reinstate
the students. Somehow believing that Faubus would be responsive, his letter was signed by
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fourteen local black organizations and included a plea to contact Woolworth’s to influence their
segregation policy.49 He claimed that a citizens group would support this effort and help ensure
that the suspended students had food and shelter until the matter was resolved. Robinson drew
immediate attention from those opposed to SNCC and the protests taking place. On February 15,
the windows of St. James Church were broken and a home-made bomb was disabled in the yard
as a protest meeting was taking place.50 Two days later, another homemade bomb set fire to the
church but thankfully no one was inside and it did little damage.51 The police refused to
comment to the incident and it is unclear if anyone was ever charged with these crimes. While it
can be assumed that the perpetrators of these attacks intended to instill fear in the minds of the
protestors, this did not slow down nor deter SNCC from continuing its daily sit-in protest.
Indeed, Reverend Ben Grinage stated just the next day that SNCC would expand its efforts
“across the state to wherever there were “racial inequities.”52 Pine Bluff would not be as simple
at Little Rock had. As the heart of the Delta, whites here responded in much the same way as
they did across the Deep South, although these violent incidents remained less frequent on this
side of the Mississippi River. Whites here perceived the threat of equality more acutely, which
was compounded by SNCC’s voter registration drives that might upend the political status quo
since Reconstruction.
Just as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) began its 1963
Birmingham Campaign in Alabama, James Farmer, national director of the Congress of Racial
Equality (CORE) led a rally in Pine Bluff to support the sit-in movement there. This was part of
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the Pine Bluff Movement’s Sunday rallies that they held at various churches across the city each
week to maintain and grow momentum for their movement. Farmer and Hansen had known each
other since 1961, when they both participated in the Freedom Rides and were subsequently
arrested and spent time at the notorious Parchman Penitentiary in Mississippi. At the rally held
on April 7, Farmer told the roughly 500 black attendees to “stick together” and unite behind the
student’s integration efforts. He also told the audience that they should continue to boycott stores
that did not serve them or hire them. Much like the Birmingham Campaign, economic protests
became increasingly valuable to civil rights organizations as “the pocketbook is the one book
universally understood.” 53 White businesses struggled to survive without black shoppers and
boycotts often led to quicker change than sit-in protests, and it did not take long for this to occur
in Pine Bluff. Farmer similarly encouraged blacks to vote as that would lead to a change in the
power structure, toeing the national SNCC agenda that went beyond his own organization’s
aims.
This all occurred as images from the SCLC’s Birmingham Campaign renewed national
calls for action from the otherwise reluctant President John F. Kennedy. Front page stories
accompanied by images of children being attacked by police dogs and fire hoses wrought outrage
among Americans across the country. Kennedy, who had narrowly won the 1960 election against
Republican Richard Nixon with the help of the growing black vote, had largely avoided speaking
out on civil rights issues. However, the growing Civil Rights Movement and conversation around
black equality led Kennedy to finally, and publicly, speak out in favor of civil rights legislation.
“The events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so increased cries for equality that no city or
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state or legislative body can prudently choose to ignore them.”54 On June 11, Kennedy presented
his hope that Congress would enact civil rights legislation ensuring the rights of all Americans to
“be served in facilities which are open to the public” as well as “protection for the right to vote”
and federal assistance with lawsuits to ensure school integration.55 However, many within SNCC
were not swayed by this late declaration for civil rights legislation by Kennedy, whose
administration had continually ignored calls by SNCC to protect their volunteers in the face of
white supremacy in the Deep South.56 While Kennedy presented his legislation to Congress for
consideration, civil rights leaders planned a March on Washington D.C. to protest for civil rights.
As national events coalesced around Kennedy’s call for civil rights legislation, sit-ins in
Pine Bluff continued with uneven success. In May, the Magnolia Café once again refused to
serve black students but Walgreens and Woolworths had capitulated to the protests and
integrated their lunch counters.57 Efforts to integrate saw even more success when on June 12,
Oakland Park was integrated with the consent of the city’s “all-white Park Commission.”58 This
victory was marred by the murder of Medgar Evers on the same day across the river in Jackson,
Mississippi. Evers, just thirty-seven years old, served as the first Mississippi field secretary for
the NAACP and worked in the city and region to bring about an end to segregation. One of the
most influential men in Mississippi’s Civil Rights Movement, he was neither the first nor the last
to be killed for his activism and local whites correctly claimed that they did not believe that his
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assassination would “change the pattern of segregation” in the city.59 Evers’ death served to
increase calls for national action for civil rights, putting even more pressure on Kennedy to act. 60
In Arkansas, the Pine Bluff Movement continued to agitate for change in the Delta town
throughout 1963. In July, an editorial on the Pine Bluff Movement saw it following in similar
fashion to Little Rock and “steadily and responsibly, if reluctantly,” integrating public
facilities.61 There was confidence that Arkansas, even in the Delta, would not succumb to white
supremacy and massive resistance and students of the Pine Bluff Movement certainly pushed
through any fear they had. As a contingent of students and activists travelled to Washington for
the March, protests in the city ramped up as interest moved to the local McDonald’s hamburger
restaurant. As the McDonald’s was a drive-through restaurant with no seating, protestors ‘stood
in’ to protest the store’s refusal to serve black customers through the main entrance, that by the
end of July had turned violent. Protestors were assaulted as whites threw various items at them,
including drinks bottles, cups, and on one occasion ammonia, which resulted in four protestors
needing medical attention.62 McDonald’s became a focal point to the integration fight in Pine
Bluff, and the stand-ins continued through August. Arrests here were frequent as the manager,
Robert Knight, refused to serve the students and closed the drive-through down. The situation
escalated to the point that on August 13, Knight successfully got the local court to issue an
injunction prohibiting the protestors from picketing his drive through, yet Hansen remained
defiant and more protests continued, leading to the arrest of seventy-two people over the course
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of a month.63 These arrests and court hearings were very much in line with national SNCC policy
to fill local jails to capacity and in many ways, create a media frenzy. However, while these
scenes were reported on, they did not evoke the same reaction across the state or nation that other
SNCC activities did simply because they were often without violence. White opponents
seemingly just stood there watching the protesters, jeering, but not acting violently. Nor did the
police create scenes that were by now a part of the common image of civil rights protests.
Arkansas quietly watched on as the fight over integration took place in the Delta, and it appeared
that the passion and determination of SNCC activists would succeed in dismantling Jim Crow.
Reverend Ben Grinage, a Kentuckian and former student at Philander Smith College,
became chairman of the Pine Bluff Movement in September.64 Grinage had participated in the
desegregation of Little Rock alongside Hansen and dropped out of Philander Smith to become
the second SNCC organizer in Arkansas.65 In Pine Bluff, Grinage participated in sit-ins, worked
at a Freedom School, and worked towards increasing voter registration. As Grinage focused on
the efforts in Pine Bluff, Hansen and SNCC field secretary, James “Jim” Jones, spent the better
part of 1963 increasing voter registration across the Delta, with emphasis placed on neighboring
Lincoln County.66 This quickly lead to a rise in SNCC activities as field workers travelled to
various Delta towns to figure out the situation and plan methods to register black voters. Jones
and James Travis, who earlier in the year had been shot at for trying to register black voters in
Greenwood, Mississippi, attended a meeting of the Lincoln Better Citizen Civics Club in Star
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City to discuss their program. In what appear to be field reports, it is noted that some members of
the Club did not think Lincoln County was “ready for action” and wanted to wait until all were
ready for this push towards the Voter Education Project (VEP).67 The VEP was a collaboration
between SNCC, the SCLC, the NAACP, CORE, and the National Urban League to increase
black voter registration, enabling them to vote in future elections that was established in 1962.
And it was run by Arkansan Wiley Branton, who had become a national figure for his role as
NAACP attorney during the Central High School Crisis in 1957. SNCC served as the local
organization for the VEP in the Arkansas Delta, with the NAACP, the NUL and the ACHR
working together to register voters in Little Rock.68 By the end of July, Roy Reed, journalist for
the Arkansas Gazette, snidely reported that “Arkansas Negroes have been voting freely, barred
only by their own lethargy, since the white primary was outlawed by the Supreme Court in
1944.69 Reed totally misunderstood the social and economic pressures that had long prevented
African Americans from otherwise exercising their Fifteenth Amendment right to vote,
particularly in the Delta. As the racial majority in Chicot, Crittenden, Lee, Phillips, and St.
Francis Delta counties, Reed correctly suggested that they could control politics in these
counties, and this drive by the VEP to increase black voter registration sought to make this a
reality for the first time since Reconstruction.
To increase voter registration Jones and Travis sought first to create more awareness
about the importance of suffrage. They established workshops for education about politics and
the voting process, set up stations to sell poll tax records, and created an executive committee
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from people across the county to help sell poll taxes in each town. The project was not just to
register African American voters. They sought to “enlighten their knowledge on the situation so
as to when they vote they will know what they are voting for.”70 Gaining the trust of these
citizens was essential if voter registration was to turn into voting in elections.
While SNCC sought to enact change in the Delta, it was not able to do this on its own.
The organization relied upon the cooperation of local groups and organizations not only to
protest but also to help with voter registrations and direct the path that SNCC would take in each
town. It was quickly decided in Lincoln County, for example, that the Civics Club would take
primary responsibility for voting problems, but an associated group of youths would canvass
towns and cities to increase awareness of voter registration drives. High School students were a
valuable source of volunteers and activism for SNCC, especially in the Delta where there were
few black college students outside of Pine Bluff. In trying to recruit high school students, Jones
faced much criticism from whites and African Americans. In one instance he was accused of
“brain washing the student[s]” from Lincoln County High School, whose president stated that
“any student who chooses to follow the leadership of Jim Jones rather than the teaching of his
faculty staff is a fool and he had no use for that kind of student to attend his school.71 Despite
such vitriolic words, local students participated en masse in protests, voter registration drives,
and canvassing of other local SNCC initiatives, that saw them oppose their parents and teachers.
The generational divide between black communities across the state proved to be a limiting
factor for SNCC that drove young students to their organization to challenge what they perceived
to be an outdated understanding of race relations and the need to push for change. These efforts
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at voter education and registration worked. According to Hansen, nearly 2,000 African
Americans were registered to vote in Jefferson county, with another 428 registered in Lincoln
county.72
Hansen, Grinage, and Jones used Pine Bluff as a base for their movements into the Delta.
Before the end of 1963, they had travelled to other towns, trying to establish connections with
local African Americans and get a sense of their willingness to participate in activism. SNCC
workers and volunteers held weekly meetings in various towns across the Delta to increase
awareness and voter registration. They travelled to Gould, Yorktown, Grady, Dumas, Dermott,
and Lake Village throughout the summer and fall but their aims were made more difficult as few
of them owned cars and so they continuously had to rely on the generosity of others to lend them
a car or drive them places.73 In October, SNCC sought to open up a base of activity in Helena,
Phillips County. The city, thirty minutes from the site of the 1919 Elaine Massacre, proved to be
one of the most difficult places for SNCC and where violence was not uncommon for the
activists. SNCC evoked memories of Elaine and the racial violence that had occurred forty years
earlier, and the town was already in decline following the mechanization of agriculture and the
loss of its timber industry.
On their first travels to Helena, SNCC struggled to find support from the black
community to participate in any form of activism. This was especially true of the religious
leaders, many of whom “urged their congregations to stay away from the protests.”74 However,
they did find significant support among black business owners, most notably George Howard
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and Frank Jordan, and younger African Americans who saw few prospects in the town. Once
again, it was the economic situation that faced individuals and the state that drove acceptance of
civil rights activism. At a bar, Bill Hansen and Noah Washington talked to Bobby O’Neal, an
unemployed young man who told them that it was “time that something happens in Helena that
will change the way that people have to live around here.” He spoke of the police brutality he
had faced and wanted to participate in future SNCC protests in the area.75 There was much
anticipation of SNCC’s arrival in Helena among the black population, who had to wait until
November 16 for efforts to desegregate lunch counters in Helena to begin. That day, seven
protestors were arrested at Henry’s Drug Store following a failed attempt to sit-in at the lunch
counter as well as another twenty-four who failed to integrate Habib’s Cafeteria. Those arrested
included Hansen, John Bradford, and Noah Washington, all paid employees of SNCC. Bruce
Jordan would also later be arrested for his participation in the sit-ins and they would all be
charged with “inciting to riot.”76
Following the arrest of the demonstrators and their interrogation, the local police, with
the help of officers from the Arkansas State Police, began to maintain surveillance of a number
of locations across Helena that were thought to be housing civil rights activists and businesses
that might be targeted for sit-ins. Local Chief of Police Roy Ross claimed that the majority of the
local African Americans who had participated in the sit-ins immediately regretted their decision
and that they had been deceived by SNCC leadership. He also argued that the majority of the
black community were opposed to the sit-ins and the general pretense of SNCC in their town as
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it had led to them being threatened and a decline in business for them.77 The extent to which any
of this is true is limited as the interview in which this discussion took place is clearly an attempt
to valorize the efforts of the police and maintaining peace and calm with the backing of the black
community. In fact, in a Western Union telegram to Faubus, Hansen requests that he protect
SNCC volunteers in Helena from Ross, who had apparently threatened to “put a bullet through
[our heads].”78
As field director, Hansen spent much of 1963 finding willing activists and local leaders
for the movement. Ben Grinage was elected chairman of the Pine Bluff Movement and a coterie
of black students sat-in and participated in voter registration drives. One such woman was Ruthie
Buffington, who had been arrested for her participation at Hotel Pines in March, had been
expelled from AM& for her continued participation in sit-ins, and had taken the trip to
Washington for the March. Much of this had gone unnoticed until November 11, when Hansen
announced that he and Buffington had married a month earlier. It is unclear when they began
their relationship, but they traveled to Cincinnati, his hometown, in order to legally marry.
Interracial marriages were illegal in Arkansas at the time, although they had an uneven history of
implementation.79 Following the Civil War, Arkansas, as with many Southern states,
implemented anti-miscegenation laws to try and stop interracial relationships, largely between
white women and black men as this would ‘dilute’ the white race and undermine white
supremacy. Arkansas, however, failed to outlaw interracial marriages in its first Reconstruction
Constitution, but did so in 1866. At its third Constitutional Convention in 1868, Arkansas
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delegates, which included African American men, failed to agree of the issue of interracial sex or
marriage, and it was thus left out of the Constitution once more. Interracial relationships
remained legal in Arkansas until 1911 when an anti-miscegenation law was once again added to
the Constitution.80 This method of control over black bodies persisted until 1968, when the
Supreme Court ruled interracial marriages legal in Loving v. Virginia.81 However, the law was
not consistently enforced as there seemed to be little desire to interfere in personal relationships.
Indeed, while the announcement of marriage between Hansen and Buffington incensed Attorney
General Bruce Bennett, a staunch segregationist, he verbally disapproved of the marriage but did
not use his position to indict them for violating the law. Bennett called their marriage “a
deliberate, direct disservice to the white and colored people of our state,” and was simply part of
their “troublemaking” activities, suggesting perhaps he believed this was part of Hansen’s role as
SNCC field director.82
Hansen’s provocative marriage announcement and SNCC’s increased presence in the
Arkansas Delta highlighted the work that still needed to be done in the state. And there was hope
that the federal government was on the side of the activists. Following Kennedy’s assassination
in Dallas, Texas on November 22, his Vice President, Lyndon Johnson, was sworn into office.
Johnson, a Texas native with Roosevelt’s New Deal ideological roots, was one of the most senior
Senators in office and wielded much power. A man of the South with a good record on civil
rights, Johnson understood his position as the most powerful man in the country during the Civil
Rights Movement, and he was determined to be more active on the issue than his predecessor. In

80
Charles F. Robinson, “‘Most Shamefully Common:’ Arkansas and Miscegenation,” Arkansas Historical
Quarterly 60:3 (Autumn 2001): 267-276.
81
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
82
“The Student Voice,” November 18, 1963. Box 538, File 7, Faubus Papers.

199

his first address to Congress following his inauguration, Johnson linked civil rights to Kennedy’s
legacy, stating that:
“no memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President
Kennedy’s memory than the earliest possible passage of the civil rights
bill for which he fought so long. We have talked long enough in this
country about equal rights. We have talked for one hundred years or
more. It is time now to write the next chapter, and to write it in the
books of law.”83
Johnson staked his presidency on civil rights. He had suggested that he would ensure the
passage of civil rights legislation and that he was the man for activists. This was a daring move
by Johnson, who had to be elected in less than a year from this pronouncement. Johnson
appeared confident that he could win the Southern white Democratic vote and the increasingly
important black vote in 1964 and deliver results for the Civil Rights Movement.
As 1964 began, the Arkansas Project was present in Jefferson, Lincoln, and Phillips
County and they quickly expanded their efforts to St. Francis county as well. They had already
succeeded at integrating much of Pine Bluff, and in February, the stubborn McDonald’s
restaurant finally began serving black customers on an equal basis.84 However, as SNCC
branched further into the Delta, they faced increased resistance and a very different set of
circumstances that they worked to overcome. Outside of Pine Bluff, much of the region was
small towns dealing with the continued mechanization of agriculture and displacement of
workers, both black and white. These poor workers were more reluctant to work with SNCC to
bring about social and political equality as they were primarily concerned with their own
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declining economic well-being. And it was in these towns that resistance to SNCC more closely
reflected white resistance in the Deep South but was in fact, less violent or cohesive, allowing
SNCC to eventually succeed in integration and voter registration.
While much of the focus for 1964 was on Mississippi Freedom Summer and the passage
of civil rights legislation, Arkansas similarly geared up for its own Freedom Summer.
Emphasizing the importance of the state to SNCC, a national executive committee had been
scheduled to meet in Pine Bluff in February but was cancelled for unknown reasons. However,
SNCC’s chairman, John Lewis travelled to Pine Bluff to celebrate the first anniversary of the
Pine Bluff Movement on January 26. To a crowd of approximately 350 people, Lewis suggested
that African Americans would need to “call on people to engage in all-out war before we get
freedom,” stating that “not one person is going to give us anything” but that they would have to
fight for their constitutional rights to be enforced.85 This highly emotive speech was a peaceful
war cry to SNCC supporters and activists who understood that African Americans would have to
pry their rights from the hands of white supremacists who sought to cling to the past.
SNCC’s entrance was fraught with mixed messages and reactions from white Arkansans.
Faubus maintained his perception of a segregationist politician through surveillance of SNCC
activists all the while leading businessmen in Little Rock ensured a smooth transition to
integrated public facilities. Once in Pine Bluff, SNCC certainly faced more hostility but much of
that came from an older generation of black men and women who did not like to see their
leadership being undermined by the shock troops of student activists. The continued pressure
executed by SNCC workers and volunteers saw a number of facilities integrate in Pine Bluff
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over the proceeding twelve months and the organization continued to spread it reach across the
Delta and encounter increased hostilities.
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Chapter 6:
Learning to Listen
The Arkansas Project undertook its most difficult work between 1964 and 1966. SNCC
expanded its work in the Delta, seeking to transform society and the economic opportunities for
its black residents. Violent resistance increased in this time period and reflected white responses
to SNCC in the Deep South. Yet, Arkansas continued to pursue its own path on race relations
and economics that did not follow its neighbors across the River. Freedom Summer, held in
Arkansas in 1965, was a celebration of Arkansas’ rich history and worked to educate and
entertain black children and adults in the Delta. Intentionally seeking white students from the
University of Arkansas to participate in Freedom Summer, SNCC worked to create bonds within
the state between black and white Arkansas youth to forge the future of the state beyond the
organization’s existence.
The passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act led to much change in
Arkansas as the state largely complied with the two laws and opened up many public facilities to
integrated patrons. This chapter will show that while resistance continued in the Delta, much of
the focus turned back to the endemic problem of school segregation that had changed little since
1960. SNCC worked to address the needs of local communities, which for Forrest City was
school segregation. Black high School students were frustrated that they remained segregated
with inferior resources than their white counterparts and SNCC worked with the students to
demand integration. Their focus on local issues saw the Arkansas Project come into direct
opposition with the national organization in 1966 when the new chairman, Stokely Carmichael,
sought to expel white activists and move SNCC to a more black nationalist outlook. Ben
Grinage, by then the Arkansas Project Director, was outraged at this call from the national office
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and refused to comply, resulting in his resignation and the formal demise of SNCC in Arkansas.
Local SNCC activists continued to work in the state with no affiliation to the national
organization to fulfill the goals of the Civil Rights Movement.
Having failed to gain a foothold in Helena in 1963, the Arkansas Project set their sights
on the town in 1964. To date, it had been the most resistant to SNCC efforts due to fear of white
violence against anyone who had any interaction with SNCC volunteers. The Helena Chief of
Police, Roy Ross, was even reported to have threatened SNCC workers saying, “take that station
wagon, that literature and all that ‘snick’ stuff and get out of here if you know what’s good for
you.”1 Undeterred, in January, James Jones, Pearlie Sneed, and Bruce Jordan went once again to
Helena to try and establish a base there, gain the people’s trust, and create a black organization
there, of which there was none by 1964. The memory of the Elaine Massacre was alive and well
and well-known black citizens of Helena went out of their way to avoid the SNCC workers.2
By March it appeared that local black women would take up the cause of integration and
voter registration in the town. On March 10, the Women Voters League of West Helena met and
agreed that they would begin sit-ins at local restaurants and would bring their complaints to the
City Council. The remarkable thing about this group was that it was mostly made up of older
women, who did not wait for the younger generation to test the boundaries of integration but
instead took it upon themselves to sit-in and risked violent retribution for their efforts.3 Women,
who had always had to bear the double burden of their race and gender, were the source of
strength in Helena’s black community. It is not clear that these demonstrations ever took place
but it is clear that SNCC were more interested in gaining the trust of local African Americans
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and assessing what their needs were. By April, SNCC still had no office or formal organization
in Helena but through sitting in bars and social clubs, they had gained the trust of a number of
African Americans who were less concerned with integrating lunch facilities but “living
conditions, factory and industry work with Negro employment.”4 What they wanted was
economic power, which had yet to be addressed by the Civil Rights Movement but had always
been at the forefront of Arkansas politics and society.
While Helena proved to resistant to SNCC advances, Pine Bluff was once again hit with
sit-ins. On February 1, it emerged that the Ku Klux Klan had organized in the city and were to
join the White Citizen’s Council in boycotting stores that hired black clerical workers. The
Arkansas Gazette reported that the Klan was not known to have existed in Pine Bluff before this
point, but a deal between the Pine Bluff Movement and about fourteen local stores to hire black
employees, had irked white supremacists to the point of organization.5 As they threatened an
economic boycott, the Pine Bluff Movement re-started sit-ins after Bill Hansen and black
comedian Dick Gregory, were arrested for failing to leave Ray’s Truck Stop and Café on
February 17. The famous stand-up comic from St. Louis, Missouri had become involved in the
Civil Rights Movement and used his fame to attract large crowds of African Americans. On
Sunday, February 16, Gregory was the main feature at a rally in Pine Bluff, where he called on
the crowd of over 500 to become more active in the Civil Rights Movement taking place in the
Delta. After his performance, he and Hansen went to the Café as it was one of the few places still
open late into the night. Upon entering, the waitress, Miss Nugent, told Gregory that he had to go
to the rear if he wanted to be served. Hansen reportedly told Miss Nugent that “He’s mine. If he
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can’t eat up here with me, then he ain’t gonna eat.” Shortly after the two men were arrested for
failing to leave the property upon being asked and refused bail. This caused outrage in the city
and immediately led to a wave of protests outside Ray’s Truck Stop and Café for the rest of the
week, which was ‘closed for repairs’ until Wednesday when it reopened on a segregated basis.6
The sit-ins resulted in the arrest of an additional forty protestors who had been refused service at
the Café and refused to leave. They joined Hansen and Gregory in jail.7
This was the most volatile racial situation in Arkansas since the 1957 School Crisis that
was exacerbated when Governor Faubus called the protest “threatening” and that “he was ready
to take countermeasures.” Calling the protests outside the Café staged, Faubus further suggested
that the activists simply sought to create a “riotous” situation and had thus directed the State
Police to send additional police officers to Pine Bluff in case of an escalation of violence.8 As
tension mounted, Gregory was bailed out of jail and left the city in an attempt to defuse the
situation. A seventy-two hour moratorium was also established as the picketing was paused to try
and negotiate and put an end to this episode, as the remaining protesters were also released from
jail.9 This attempt to ease the tensions did not solve the larger problem of segregated eating
facilities, and Grinage, chairman of the Pine Bluff Movement, called on the city to pass an
ordinance to integrate public accommodations.10 On February 25, Hansen and Gregory were both
found guilty for their refusal to leave the café and the owner of the truck stop, Ray Watson, filed
an injunction to stop protestors from picketing his store in the future, which was granted the next

“Gregory Held At Pine Bluff After ‘Sit-in’,” Arkansas Gazette, February 18, 1964.
“40 Negroes Taken to Jail As Café Near Pine Bluff Reopens on White-only Basis,” Arkansas Gazette,
February 20, 1964.
8
“Faubus Sees ‘Threat’ In Pine Bluff Friction,” Arkansas Gazette, February 22, 1964.
9
“Gregory Criticizes Faubus and Leaves,” Arkansas Gazette, February 23, 1964.
10
“Negroes to Seek Pine Bluff Law,” Arkansas Gazette, February 24, 1964.
6
7

206

day.11 One of the few remaining segregated eating facilities in Pine Bluff refused service to
African Americans until after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, as the Pine Bluff Movement
instead moved on to voter registration and economic concerns of the city’s black population.12
On April 12, 1964, SNCC and local activists met in Pine Bluff to discuss the issue of
voter registration in Jefferson and Lincoln counties. Hansen spent the first part of the meeting
explaining the voter registration process and laws in Arkansas to help locals understand how to
register to vote in the local and general elections. Although the Voting Rights Act had not yet
been passed by Congress, the poll tax had been abolished by the passage of the 24th Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. This was explained by Hansen, highlighting the rights of African
Americans to be able to vote without any economic hindrance. The two counties split into
committees to work on increasing voter registration in their areas. Hansen offered the support of
SNCC volunteers to help drive voters to the courthouse and help spread the relevant information
about the voter registration process.13 SNCC worked closely with local communities to increase
voter registration of African Americans but also to educate them about changes in the law and
process to vote. They wanted to ensure that people who wanted to were able to vote but at the
same time not impose their beliefs and desires upon people who were not were not ready for this
form of activism and confrontation with local whites. And 1964 was an important election year.
Not only would the country decide on its next president, Arkansans had the opportunity to defeat
Governor Faubus and elect a progressive Republican, Winthrop Rockefeller, to replace him.
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While the Arkansas Project geared up for an increase in activities over the summer,
neighboring Mississippi was preparing for the largest, coordinated civil rights effort to date.
Mississippi had thus far resisted every integration and voter registration effort that the various
civil rights groups had attempted in the state. Together, SNCC, the NAACP, SCLC, and CORE
created the Mississippi Summer Project, although SNCC were largely in control of the event.
The plan was to bring 1,000 activists, primarily white northern college students, to Mississippi
over the summer of 1964. Even before Freedom Summer officially began, violence erupted
across the state. Buildings that housed SNCC, COFO, and CORE were subject to bombs,
churches believed to be working with activists were set alight, and white on black crime
increased.14 In the midst of this, President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law
on July 2. The Act provided sweeping measures to finally, legally, lay Jim Crow to rest. Johnson
used his pull as the former Senate majority leader to push for the passage of the law, far from
guaranteed, but he succeeded in passing what was considered the toughest bill on civil rights to
date.15 Plessy v. Ferguson was finally invalidated in all manners of public life as the Civil Rights
Act banned segregation of public facilities and more broadly banned discriminated based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin empowered the federal government to withhold funds
from programs that did not abide by the law, especially in regards to school desegregation, and
created the Equal Economic Opportunity Commission to protect workers faced with
discrimination. No longer could African Americans be barred from lunch counters or buses
because of their race and the federal government would now fully enforce the Supreme Court’s
contentious Brown v. Board of Education 1954 decision that ordered school integration. This Act
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did not immediately end discrimination in the United States, but it was a step forward and
empowered civil rights organizations, including SNCC, to continue their work to make sure
public accommodations abided by this new law. The Attorney General was given unprecedented
powers to enforce the law, much to the chagrin of Southern Democrats, who almost universally
voted against the bill. Even favorite son Senator William J. Fulbright opposed the Civil Rights
Act, who glumly noted, “now that the bill is law it is time for calmness, reflection and
adjustment.”16 Most prominent white Arkansans opposed the Bill. Governor Faubus, now
seeking his sixth term in office, called the bill “an added expense” for the government, while
Attorney General Bruce Bennett claimed that it “would affect every facet of our lives,” and that
it was unnecessary. Even Amis Guthridge, attorney for Arkansas’ Capital Citizen’s Council,
went so far as to call the law unconstitutional. But for black Arkansans, this hailed the start of a
new era. Their rights as citizens were once again reinforced by the federal government, with L.C.
Bates claiming that Arkansas could now use this to “improve its image to the world.”17
The Arkansas Project prepared to test the Civil Rights Act and ensure facilities were
operating to the letter of the law. Efforts to maintain a presence and create an indigenous
movement in Helena remained doubtful. SNCC staffer James Jones blamed this on the continued
fears that African Americans felt about the Elaine Massacre and white supremacy in the area.
This prevented many from even talking to those identified as SNCC workers, but they had
garnered enough supporters that in July there were a number of sit-ins to test if the Civil Rights
Act would be upheld in the town. Following those sit ins, the homes where known SNCC
workers were staying were treated to a caravan of white cars passing by at night, armed white
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men barging into the homes in search of the activists, and even threats by the police that no
activists would be protected.18 However, this rise of white resistance actually served to
invigorate activism among local African Americans. Joseph Wright, SNCC field representative,
wrote that three men had lost their jobs for their affiliation with SNCC but instead of being
intimidated into leaving Helena, they remained. Wright felt that there was a new militancy
emerging that reignited sit-in efforts and the vocal outcry over conditions for African Americans
in the county.19
They did have more success with voter registration as local African Americans began to
see the real possibilities of increased activism and the potential to finally have a voice in politics.
However, this infuriated some members of the white community who subsequently shot at and
firebombed homes of African American activists in the local area. As violence began to increase,
an interracial movement, somewhat outside the purview of SNCC, formed. The Helena Good
Will Movement was an interracial group of businesses owners and religious leaders who sought
to ensure an improvement in race relations and sought to pressure the local government to hire
more African American police officers, firemen, and general staff as a good will gesture that the
town was working towards equality.20
As the Arkansas Project ramped up its efforts in the Delta, Hansen decided that it was
time for him to resign as director. On August 25, Hansen announced his resignation, pre-empting
calls for whites to leave leadership positions within SNCC that would occur in 1966. According
to Hansen, he believed that the Arkansas Project should be run by black Arkansans who were
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better versed in the local situation. He understood that as a white man, particularly one from
Ohio, he was not necessarily best positioned to advocate for integration and black equality in the
Delta. Black Arkansans and even whites were more likely to listen to a fellow Arkansan than an
outsider. James Jones was appointed as interim director, but Ben Grinage would ultimately come
to run the organization. Hansen remained in the state as a field representative, and unofficially he
wielded a lot of influence due to his experience at the national level, but he was committed to the
group’s need for local black leadership. At the time of his resignation, Hansen was just one of
three white SNCC workers in the state. The others, Arlene Wilgoren and Larry Siegel both
served as field secretaries in Pine Bluff and Helena, respectively.21 The Arkansas Project was
largely a black organization, run by black Arkansas students, working towards equality and black
empowerment through social, political, and economic reforms.
SNCC continued to pursue voter registration and integration across the Delta in 1964,
particularly as the election year ramped up. While President Johnson sought to win the White
House on his own merit and solidify the black vote for the Democratic Party, Faubus sought his
sixth term as Governor. Faubus’ support had been waning since 1960 but there had been few
challengers to replace him. That changed in 1964, and it was not a Democrat who threatened to
unseat him but instead Republican Winthrop Rockefeller. The man that Faubus had convinced to
run the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission in 1955 now sought formal political office
in his adopted state and almost cost Faubus the November election. No Republican had seriously
been considered in the Democratic stronghold since Reconstruction, but Rockefeller was
different. He was a New York elite, he was linked to the economic growth of the state, and
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simply offered a different vision for Arkansas that Faubus could not. But Rockefeller was still an
outsider to many, and Faubus was able to use his family’s wealth and corruption to his
advantage. Despite Rockefeller’s best efforts, Faubus won reelection, but it was not an
overwhelming victory for the long-term Governor. With fifty-seven percent of the vote, Faubus
attracted a large black contingent of voters, in part due to the national trend toward the
Democratic Party but also because of growing state employment that Faubus had quietly
expanded over the past few years.22 Rockefeller was not done, however. He would spend the
next two years making connections and re-energizing the Republican Party to secure the
governorship in 1966.
Problems began to plague national SNCC by the end of 1964 but they would not impact
Arkansas until 1966. Members began to split into various factions varying from advocates of a
strong, centralized SNCC that mirrored the SCLC and the NAACP, while others saw black
militancy as the only path left open to them.23 It was decided that in November 1964, SNCC
would meet in Waveland, Mississippi for a one-week “reassessment” conference. Discussions
lasted into the early hours of the morning about what role, if any, whites should continue to play
in SNCC. Some black leaders felt that college-educated whites undermined the ability of
Southern blacks to develop their own leadership and influence. There was a broad sense that
whites came in and took charge of the movement with little regard or acknowledgement that
local African Americans understood the racial dynamics of the region and how best to proceed.24
This was certainly not the case in Arkansas. Although Hansen had recently resigned as project
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director, he stridently ensured that African Americans chose the direction the organization would
follow, to the point of taking on projects that the national organization did not participate in.
Hansen was acutely aware not only of the image that SNCC needed to portray, but also the need
to have black leadership to voice changes that needed to made for the state and country.
As 1964 closed out, L.C. Bates commended white state businessmen for
“generally…complying with the public accommodations section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”
He believed that following the passage of the law, most businesses that had before held out on
integration, had desegregated when confronted by black customers despite silence from
Governor Faubus and the active “discouragement from the attorney general.”25 Arkansas was
clearly not Mississippi nor Alabama. There had been much progress in 1964 for the state but
SNCC wanted to see racism and inequality completely eradicated. While the Arkansas Project
was fully entrenched in the Delta by 1965, a decision was made to move the headquarters of
SNCC back to Little Rock in the hopes of turning the project into a statewide organization.
James Jones, project director and field secretary Arlene Wilgoren took over office space in Little
Rock in January 1965 to increase the reach of the civil rights group. Their main goal was voter
registration that would establish “a strong, large, well-organized electorate.”26 In order to achieve
this, they planned on recreating the Mississippi Freedom Summer in Arkansas, albeit on a much
smaller and much less violent scale. The Arkansas Project spent 1965 organizing for the summer,
bringing activists from out of state to help, and pushing for change across the state. SNCC’s new
headquarters in Little Rock was located on Ninth Street, the heart of the black community and
where John Carter was lynched in 1927. Wilgoren, a white student from Boston, had arrived in

“Bates: Arkansans Complying With Public Facility Section Despite Official Opposition,” Arkansas
Gazette, December 16, 1964.
26
“SNCC Plans to Step Up It’s Work in Arkansas,” Arkansas Gazette, December 11, 1964.
25

213

Arkansas the previous summer where she had been based in Pine Bluff. In Little Rock, Wilgoren
took over much of the day-to-day administration of the Arkansas Project, coordinating
volunteers and communicating with the national office in Atlanta. She was joined by Nancy
Stoller and together they helped organize SNCC over 1965.
While national attention was focused on Selma and the push for voting rights legislation,
civil rights activism in Little Rock erupted into violence over segregation at the State Capitol’s
privately-run cafeteria. The issue had begun almost a year prior when Ozell Sutton, associate
director of the Arkansas Council on Human Relations (ACHR) and head of Arkansas’ voter
registration program, sought to eat there on July 15, 1964. This was after the passage of the Civil
Rights Act that should have ensured the dining facility was open to all people. However, Sutton
was refused service and on July 21, the cafeteria changed hands and was turned into a private
club, that could in theory dictate who ate at the restaurant, despite it being on state property. By
September, nothing had changed and Sutton, with the help of the NAACP, sued the Capitol Club
and demanded that it be integrated according to the law.27
By March 1965, nothing had changed at the cafeteria as the lawsuit was still waiting to be
heard by the U.S District Court. Thus, as part of SNCC’s efforts as a statewide organization, they
organized a protest to reignite the issue. To test the waters, two white SNCC workers, Wilgoren
and Stoller, successfully gained admittance to, and ate at, the Capitol Club with no membership.
Then, on March 11, a group of thirty-two students tried to enter to the cafeteria. Having been
denied, they were pushed up the stairs by the state police, causing minor injuries to the
protesters. When the students returned that afternoon, they were greeted on the capitol steps by
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police officers, who stood and watched the protests, but did not interfere.28 These protests and
attempts to enter the Capitol Club continued over the next few weeks, and state policemen were
called to remove the activists, which they did with force, causing a number of injuries to the
activists. On March 19, protestors were “thrown to the floor and kicked and beaten before they
could get up,” mustard gas was used against them and eight students had to go to hospital for
treatment of their injuries.29
Undeterred, students continued to show up to the Capitol Club almost daily for the
duration of the March, to highlight the hypocrisy of the state government to allow their cafeteria
to be privatized. According to an Arkansas Democrat editorial, he protests at the state capitol had
completely upended a rather sinister ploy by the Democratic Party to help them win the 1964
elections. Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Ozell Sutton’s innocent attempt to
eat at the cafeteria, Democrats had apparently turned it to a private, segregationist facility in
order for Sutton to sue. They wanted to appear strong for their segregationist base and have the
court system to blame when the cafeteria was inevitably ordered to integrate.30 They simply
wanted this as an election issue. Thus, when SNCC moved back to Little Rock, capitol officials
felt the wrath of that political decision as images and stories covered the state’s newspapers, once
again suggesting Arkansas’ poor civil rights record. While this might have scuppered the quiet
integration plans of Democrats, these protests were at the crux of SNCC’s goals as an
organization and they worked. On April 12, the District Court ordered the integration of the
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Capitol cafeteria, stating that it was a public eating facility that could not violate the Civil Rights
Act nor deny any one their Fourteenth Amendment rights.31 This was just one of many victories
for SNCC as they continued to push for integration of all public facilities across the state.
Shortly after the integration of the Capitol Cafeteria, the Arkansas Project held its first
statewide conference over the weekend of May 22-23. To signal the importance of the state to
the national organization, James Forman, SNCC’s executive secretary, travelled to Little Rock to
help advertise the Arkansas Project and the work they were doing for African Americans. The
conference was a space for African Americans to detail their grievances and issues that they
wanted the state, and national organization to address. Afterall, this was a grassroots organization
whose purpose it was to aid local communities and needs, even if that diverged somewhat from
the national agenda. At the initial press conference announcing star of the conference, SNCC
presented a report it had collated, The General Condition of the Arkansas Negro.32 This twentysix page document provided much data on the status of African Americans in Arkansas, and
served “as a refence source for SNCC staff” and a point of comparison to two similar documents
compiled for Mississippi and Alabama, the two major states of SNCC activity. Compiled by state
SNCC workers, the report highlighted various census data information concerning the population
decline of black Arkansans, various health statistics including birth and death rates, education,
employment, voting data, and other indicators that provided a snapshot of the general well-being
of both races but the clear disparities that African Americans faced. In all respects, and to noone’s surprise, African Americans were worse off than whites in Arkansas, with a higher death
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rate, poorer education levels, and low economic status.33 And it was these issues that SNCC
sought to change as it began its largest project in the state to date.
As the statewide conference progressed, it was clear from the fifty or so attendees that
what most black Arkansans were concerned with was voting rights and meaningful school
integration. SNCC had always focused on voter registration in the state, but the impending
passage of the Voting Rights Act had perhaps spurred otherwise hesitant African Americans to
register and exercise one of the most fundamental rights of American citizenship. In addition,
school integration was at the forefront of many, with SNCC asserting that they would denounce
the “freedom of choice” desegregation plans, favored by many school districts that discouraged
any integration and continued to force black students into an inferior education system.34 While
not typically a place of SNCC activity, the slow pace of school integration was clearly a
frustration of many who wanted to see their children receive an equal education to whites and an
end to various methods that had successfully limited integration for over a decade since Brown v.
Board.35 The Arkansas Project would take up this concern in the fall in Forrest City where
students continued to attend completely segregated schools.
In the meantime, another controversial place of integration fell thanks to the work of
SNCC and other frustrated citizens. The War Memorial swimming pool and the pool at Gillam
Park had been closed since 1964 when efforts to integrate them failed. Since then, a postcard
petition had been conducted by the ACHR and was picked up by SNCC in June 1965, wherein
students gathered over 1,000 signatures asking for the pools to reopen.36 By June 3, 1965,
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however, the City Manager Board decided that the pools should be reopened on an integrated
basis. This was the final public space to formally integrate in Little Rock, although, initially at
least, few whites opted to use the swimming pools following this decision.37
On June 21, the Arkansas Project officially launched it Summer Program as fifty students
descended upon the state to work on integration, voter registration, and community centers in
thirty-one counties, predominantly in the Delta. SNCC focused their efforts on Forrest City,
Gould, and West Helena where they worked to provide an array of services for African
Americans to learn, play, and feel safe.38 To celebrate the start of Arkansas’ drive for increased
activism and aid to local African Americans, John Lewis, chairman of SNCC, and Julian Bond,
founder of SNCC and recently elected to the Georgia House of Representatives, came to
Arkansas to rally for voter registration in the Delta. Attending rallies in Helena, Forrest City, and
Pine Bluff during the first week of July, these two national leaders sought to “spark interest
among Negroes in registering to vote, now the principal goal of SNCC in Arkansas and
elsewhere.”39 At the rallies, Bond stated that African Americans were afraid to vote in parts of
the Delta, in fear of “economic reprisal,” that local officials strongly denied. The Mayor of West
Helena, Jess Porter, went so far as to suggest that the town had “always afforded the Negro an
opportunity to vote,” and there had been no “intimidation or restriction of the right to vote.”40
While much evidence to the contrary exists to show the near negligent levels of black voters in
the Delta before World War II, local officials wanted to appear open to the growing numbers of
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black voters to avoid any violence or national media attention suggesting otherwise. Arkansans
had learned their lesson in 1957 not to attract negative media attention on civil rights in order to
avoid the vitriol of the nation and heat from civil rights organizations. They had thus far
succeeded but Freedom Summer would put that to the test as SNCC ramped up their activities.
Arkansas’ Freedom Summer was only possible with the help of the national SNCC office
and countless donations from Northern liberal organizations and individuals. SNCC established
schools across the Delta in Pine Bluff, Helena, Forrest City, and Gould to provide black youth
with an additional form of education that catered to their history, heritage, and potential. Part of
the aim was to show “that Negroes had a part in just about everything that happened,” they were
not just a source of labor and a nuisance to American society and culture as many were being
told in their traditional classrooms.41 Nancy Stoller spent much of the spring communicating
with prospective SNCC volunteers, friends of SNCC groups, and other interested persons. She
procured copies of the Citizen’s Guide to the 1964 Civil Rights Act to hand out at Freedom
Centers, books on black history, and even asked newly formed African nations for information
about their countries and any magazines with pictures to be able to show visitors who could not
read.42 SNCC was wholly reliant upon the donation of goods and people’s time for much of their
work across the South but Freedom Summer highlights the extent to which they ran on economic
fumes. In order to establish the Freedom Centers in the Delta, Nancy Stoller also asked for
donations of basic items such as mimeograph machines, paper, staplers, and other office and
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craft supplies to stock the centers.43 They even encouraged outside supporters to “adopt” a
Freedom Center or summer volunteer. One such woman, Judith Fielder, and a group of women
in Urbana, Illinois, had five hundred dollars to donate to SNCC, a group she apparently found “a
bit radical…but freedom schools seem nice and apolitical.” For some white sympathizers of the
black plight, education was a safe, if possibly paternalistic, method of support for which they
could overlook the fact that it was being supported by the more radical of civil rights
organizations.44 And these women enthusiastically supported the Freedom Center in Forrest City,
in which they sent numerous supplies, including a typewriter, a record player, and various school
supplies.45 This support of material goods for the Freedom Centers was essential for their success
and ability to serve the community but the Arkansas Project also needed a cadre of volunteers to
work in these centers and in other areas of SNCC activity for Freedom Summer.
Unlike Mississippi Freedom Summer, Arkansas’ program sought to support as many
Arkansans to “develop local leaders” instead of the shock troops of Mississippi. They sought
local black leaders as well as white students from the University of Arkansas to build longlasting relationships that could presumably grow as these students did.46 But they still needed
additional volunteers to aid their efforts. In the application to join Arkansas’ Freedom Summer,
they stressed a number of guidelines and regulations for outsiders to succeed as a volunteer in the
South. The most important was “learn to listen,” which they emphasized as a means for students
to learn from others, and to hear the lived experiences of those who they were coming to help.
They also warned of the danger that they might be walking into and advised the volunteers to
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“always let people know where” they were going, so that they could be tracked somewhat if
something happened.47 If these warnings did not deter hopeful activists, financial concerns
certainly did. Volunteers had to fund their participation in the program, estimated at $165 for
three months, and were similarly encouraged to have $500 ready to be used as bond money if
they were arrested. This was no mean feat that certainly limited the number of applicants to the
program but the Arkansas Project also sought outside organizations to fund volunteers to help
with this process.48 This was particularly true for Arkansas natives or willing black volunteers
who were not able to secure the funding, in which case the Arkansas Project solicited support
from outside affiliates.
In soliciting financial support for the Freedom Center in Gould, SNCC volunteer Jerry
Tecklin described the dire need it was in. They had a two-story building, but it needed repairs,
furniture and basically all the supplies necessary to serve its purpose. He explained that the
community was supportive of SNCC and the Freedom Center, but they simply needed help to
open it in time for the summer to begin.49 Carrie Dilworth was an active member of SNCC who
wanted to create a space for African American children to learn and play in a safe environment
and she ran much of the operations in Gould. This school provided an informal learning
experience for children to learn African American history, culture, and civil rights while also
helping adults with the voter registration process. It had a library where patrons could check out
over 1,500 books, covering a wide range of topics on African American history and culture.50
Freedom Schools were part of this larger effort to uplift the local black community and raise

“Some Important Security and Conduct Regulations,” Box 2, F 3, Arkansas Project Papers.
Arkansas Summer Project Application, Box 2, Folder 3, 1965, Arkansas Project Papers.
49
Jerry Tecklin to Mrs. Elliott Feigenbaum, June 1, 1965., Box 1, Folder 1, Arkansas Project Papers.
50
Linda John Lewis, “Gould ‘Freedom School’ Primarily Teaches Pride,” Arkansas Gazette, March 27,
1966. Box 33, File 335, ACHR Papers.
47
48

221

children who could be proud of their race and heritage and understand the Civil Rights
Movement that was going on around them. This was increasingly important as the Civil Rights
Movement progressed, and black power began to emerge as an alternative to the nonviolent
direct-action protests of the early SNCC era.
In the midst of Arkansas’ Freedom Summer, President Johnson signed the long-awaited
Voting Rights Act on August 6, 1965. This Act broke the lock on “the ballot box for blacks,” by
outlawing discriminatory voting practices such as poll taxes and literacy tests that prevented
mostly African Americans from voting in the South.51 The Act also ensured federal oversight of
elections in states that had historically denied African Americans their constitutional right to
vote, opening the way for black voter registration to skyrocket across the South. Indeed, between
1964 and 1968, the number of black registered voters increased from 22 to 57 percent in
Alabama and 7 to 59 percent in Mississippi.52 This was a momentous victory for the civil rights
establishment who believed voting was the key to long term equality for African Americans.
This was also a victory for the Arkansas Project who now had an additional resource to convince
unwilling black voters to register. It was now the law, sanctioned by the federal government who
would investigate claims of misconduct in the voting process.
By September 1965, SNCC, in keeping with their ideals of working with local problems,
coordinated with high school students in Forrest City to protest continued segregation of public
schools. On September 16, 1965, tension was high as SNCC, in coordination with students from
the still segregated Lincoln High School, demonstrated and picketed for integration and an
improvement of facilities. This followed a petition signed by the parents of the students to the
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school board that was subsequently passed onto the Governor’s office, with 1,175 signatures on
it. The parents listed sixteen demands that included: an end to “profanity being used by the
teachers upon the students;” a free lunch program for poor students; “integration of the student
body, faculty and school buses;” and buses for students “who live on the outskirts of town.”53
The protests lasted about two days in which students and some adults, notably members of
SNCC, participated in a variety of nonviolent protests. On September 16, the students sat-in at
Lincoln High School and sang freedom songs. No arrests were made that day. On September 17,
about 195 protestors marched from Lincoln High School to Forrest City High School where
school superintendent Bill Irving’s office was located. Irving summarily expelled all of the
students present and then the police arrested 198 protestors for disturbing the police.54 Most of
those arrested were minors but SNCC volunteer Millard “Tex” Lowe was arrested after the fact
for “contributing to the delinquency of a minor,” and sentenced within just a few hours to
eighteen months in jail. This protest, led by high school students, focused activism on a town that
had otherwise mostly avoided public scrutiny on its integration, or lack thereof, of public
facilities.
Governor Faubus was kept aware of the situation in Forrest City but he described it as
“not a matter of Negroes against whites. It is…a matter of Negroes wanting to get the principal
of the Negro High School fired.”55 This undermines the true nature of the protest and how the
school, in 1965, was still segregated and thus out of compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
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Perhaps Faubus was trying to downplay the significance of the demonstration and keep media
attention to a minimum but this was about high school students demanding their rights and
privileges be acknowledged and provided to them. Indeed, in an unauthored report on the Forest
City situation, it appears that Faubus sought to compromise, using Dr. Earl Evans as the
negotiator. According to this report, and Hansen, Faubus wanted to end the situation and
“everything the state can do, it’ll do,” but that did not include all the demands of the students and
so the deal, such as it was, was turned down.56 To emphasize their determination, the students
established the Student Action Council, and alongside the St. Francis County Achievement
Committee, announced seventeen demands to the school board that had to be met before the
protests ended.57 At the same time, the Committee met with the school board, L. C. Bates, state
director of the NAACP, and Dr. Earl Evans, employed by Faubus in the Office of Equal
Opportunity, to negotiate the issues that had led to the demonstrations. Bates was an odd choice
to help negotiate as he and his wife, Daisy Bates, had aggressively sought integration of Little
Rock Central High School in 1957 and had run the only black owned state newspaper, the
Arkansas State Press, until it ran into financial trouble in 1959.58 Unlike his wife, Bates had been
fairly critical of SNCC and the student sit-ins and sided with the older generation of black
leaders who sought to control the racial situation in the state. However, as director of the
NAACP, an organization that was increasingly seen by whites as the more accommodating civil
rights group, perhaps Bates was thought to have enough clout with African Americans to
peacefully end the protests and seek a resolution. The Committee especially sought to exclude
members of SNCC from any negotiations as they were seen to be only interested in the “creation
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of” and not the “solution of problems.”59 With the help of Bates and Evans, the Committee was
able to convince the school board to reinstate the expelled students and drop the charges against
them. They even promised to “give strong consideration to many of the students’ demands,”
although it appears little changed before the end of the year.60
It was not just in Arkansas that SNCC began to take up the cause of school
desegregation. On September 30, the national organization released a report that called on the
federal government to intervene on the lack of school integration in eleven states more fully. The
failure to comply with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and demand for meaningful integration was a
concern for many parents and students and Arkansas was no exception. The report called into
question the integration plans of the school districts of West Helena, Forrest City, Gould,
Marvell, and Star City. According to the report, these school districts had enacted plans that
continued not only to discriminate against black children, but also denied them admittance to
formerly all-white schools in direct contravention to Brown and the Civil Rights Act.61 Upon
received the report, the Office of Equal Educational Opportunities (OEEO) opened an
investigation into the situation in Forrest City. In speaking with students and SNCC officials, the
OEEO promised to discuss their demands with the school district and ensure that black students
could transfer to the white high school.62 It does not appear that anything came of the OEEO’s
investigation into Forrest City. By November 15, students were clearly so frustrated by the
situation that they again tried to enroll at the all-white Forrest City High School. Nine students
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were arrested for failing to leave the school when they were told they could not enroll. With no
end in sight to the problems in Forrest City, SNCC continued to work with high school students
there while the national office dealt with increasing internal strife that was set to tear them apart.
However, as 1965 closed out, the Arkansas Democrat reported rather favorable statistics
regarding school integration across the state. The fall 1965 semester saw thousands of black
students enter white schools and truly being meaningful integration with little unrest. A sign of
the general success of the Civil Rights Act and the state’s unwillingness to disobey federal
orders, the only situation regarding integration occurred in Forrest City and Gould, the site of a
failed SNCC protest over their integration policies.63 On the whole, Arkansas had complied with
the law and school integration was finally a reality in the state that had been the face of massive
resistance.
As the national organization made a clear path toward black power, the Arkansas Project
continued to aid local African Americans reach their full economic and political potential. With
offices in Little Rock, West Memphis, Helena, Pine Bluff, and Forrest City, they continued to
serve much of the Delta on their meagre budget of less than $3,000.64 Much of the focus in
Arkansas was on growing the economic status and power of rural black Arkansans. By the end of
1965, the national organization was once again left questioning their purpose and tactics
following the success of civil disobedience in Selma, albeit a SCLC initiative. The passage of the
Voting Rights Act was also a success that technically eliminated the need for extensive voter
registration drives across the South, although the Act did not remove the fear felt by many
blacks. It was at this point that SNCC more fervently split from the nonviolent civil rights groups
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and began to pursue black self-determination and nationalism in an attempt to undo the centuries
of psychological damage inflicted upon blacks.65 In early 1966, members of the Atlanta Project
called for the exclusion of whites in the movement despite there being only a handful who still
formally worked for SNCC. The Atlanta Separatists, as they became known, believed that black
freedom could not be achieved within an integrated society and that SNCC must work for black
empowerment and separatism.66 Although Stokely Carmichael did not agree with the totality of
the Separatists argument, he used this divide within SNCC to unseat John Lewis and become the
new chairman.
In May 1966, SNCC became a more militant organization when it elected Stokely
Carmichael as its chairman, replacing John Lewis (current congressman for the fifth district of
Georgia). This rise of back power and the expulsion of white members from the ranks of SNCC
was the death toll for the civil rights organization in Arkansas.67 Upon his election, Carmichael
stated, “racial integration was “irrelevant” and that he wanted to move toward the creation of
“third parties in largely Negro areas.”68 Underlying Carmichael’s dislike for integration was that
it did not solve the issue of poverty within the African American community. He argued that
integration maintained white supremacy while minimizing the role systematic economical
disadvantages had cost African Americans. The only way, according to Carmichael, to overcome
the economic problems, was to establish a black political party to directly challenge the authority
of white America, using violence if necessary.69
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Ben Grinage, the Arkansas state project director, did not approve of the new militancy of
the national organization. Just one week after Carmichael was elected leader, he threatened to
resign if the new policies were forced upon Arkansas. Grinage believed that they were not a
feasible option in Arkansas where African Americans comprised only 22 percent of the
population. He argued that integration was “vital if this country is concerned with showing the
rest of the world that peaceful coexistence is really what we are trying to achieve.”70
Highlighting the grassroots origins of SNCC, Grinage understood that, in Arkansas at least,
white and black cooperation was key to the group’s success. Indeed, the majority of SNCC
workers and volunteers in Arkansas were black and it would not have been difficult for Grinage
to go along with this rise in black separatism that gripped the national organization. But Grinage
understood that that path did not make sense in Arkansas and he refused to capitulate to
Carmichael’s demands.
On May 29, 1966, Grinage released a similar statement that further highlighted his
position on integration and the role of SNCC in Arkansas in which he hinted that while SNCC
might not remain a formal organization in Arkansas, the workers would continue their efforts to
uplift all Americans. Grinage wrote that regardless of national policies, the work in Arkansas
would continue on an integrated basis. They intended to “encourage programs that are designed
to give relief to the here-to-fore neglected people of this state and will individually participate
and or implement self-help programs for all people.”71 This statement really put his leadership at
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odds with Carmichael as he refused to back down on making SNCC a segregated organization
under the banner of Black Power.
Grinage resigned as project director of SNCC in June 1966. While he claims it was for
financial reasons, there can be no doubt that it was also related to the change in the national
organization and its move toward separatism. The division between the Arkansas Project and
national organization was clear. But so was the determination of SNCC workers in Arkansas to
continue their work, simply outside the purview of SNCC. Grinage and Jim Jones both began
working for the Arkansas Council on Human Relations (ACHR) where they continued their
efforts toward economic and political uplift of minorities and the poor.72 The departure of
Grinage and Jones signaled the collapse of SNCC in the state. While some workers remained in
Arkansas and turned to other projects, all references to the state organization stop in the state’s
major newspapers and much of the attention turned to the upcoming gubernatorial election
between Jim Johnson and Winthrop Rockefeller.
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Conclusion
Even before black power became a breaking point for SNCC in Arkansas, integration was
“here to stay and there will be no turning back of the clock,” according to one newspaper
editorial.73 This was in light of the upcoming election for governor that for the first time in
thirteen years did not include Orval Faubus. The Arkansas Democrat editorial discussed the
potential role of African American votes in the election as well as the role race was to play as a
platform issue. By 1966 then, it was clear that even if white Arkansans did not like integration,
there was nothing they could do about it. SNCC had ensured that integration was fairly
widespread around even the most segregationist areas of the state and federal lawsuits across the
nation protected the rights of African Americans to attend any public facility. The editorial also
noted how the prospective governors needed to focus their attention on real issues – education,
roads, taxes – and not to arguing what was at this point a dead issue.
SNCC made much progress towards integration, voter registration, and the education of
African Americans in its four years in the state of Arkansas. The field secretaries and volunteers
were successful in mobilizing a substantial number of local African Americans to challenge Jim
Crow laws and customs that had for too long relegated them to second-class citizenship. They
were willing to be jailed and challenge the legality of discriminatory practices and laws in order
to ensure the uplift of black Arkansans. Although the Arkansas Project could not survive the
crushing blow of black power, their work allowed for the improvement of race relations in the
state and an increase in African American voter and political participation that saw the state elect
a Republican for the first time since Reconstruction in 1966.
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Rockefeller spent the better part of 1965 preparing to take on Faubus for the upcoming
election, a rematch to prove that Republicans could win in Arkansas. Much to the
disappointment of Rockefeller, Faubus declined to run for a seventh term in office; he had been
caught up in a number of corruption scandals and polls suggested he could not get out of the
Democratic Primary election. And thus, the Democratic candidate became Jim Johnson, the rabid
segregationist who had challenged Faubus for the governor’s seat fourteen years earlier.74 The
two men could not have been more different. The Democrat bucked the national trend of civil
rights support and relied upon the declining white segregationist voters of the state to elect him.
The Republican relied upon black voters who had turned their attention to Democratic Party
politics to elect him or those who valued the economic background of Rockefeller. As the
November election rolled around in 1966, Rockefeller secured the black vote, and many more
who could not stomach the thought of Johnson as their Governor. It was not necessarily that they
wanted Rockefeller to win, but he was preferable over Johnson. This was a historic moment for
Arkansas who had not elected a Republican as Governor since 1872 and he did so with the
support of the black vote. And for that, he had SNCC to thank.
To win the election, Rockefeller had to situate himself not as a Republican, but as a
politician who understood the day to day issues facing Arkansans. And this meant his platform
was very similar to the post-war Democrats who preceded and even included Faubus.
Economics, education, highways were the major issues that Arkansans wanted to be improved
and so Rockefeller, former head of the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission (AIDC),
positioned himself as the man that could get things done.75 This was easy to do against Johnson,
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whose well-know history of racism was at odds with many in the state by 1966 and so
Rockefeller was able to concentrate on garnering the large moderate population of the state as
well as African Americans who almost certainly would not vote for Johnson. The election was
too close to call on November 8, but Johnson finally conceded the next day to Rockefeller’s
fifty-four percent of the vote.76
This unprecedented victory of a Republican Governor in theory foreshadowed the
changing allegiance of white Southern voters to the Republican Party but this was not the same.
Rockefeller was a moderate, particularly on race relations, and aligned much more with
Democratic politics than Republican. While most voting Arkansans had been loyal to the
Democratic Party for over one hundred years, Rockefeller offered an alternative future that did
not include racism as a prominent platform issue. They voted for the man, not his political party
allegiance.
Discord between Governor Rockefeller and the Democratic-controlled legislature began
the moment he was sworn into office in 1967. Faubus supporters who remained in the legislature
sought to block many of Rockefeller’s reforms and generally undermine the power of the
Republican governor. This was despite Rockefeller’s appointment of many Democrats to fill
administrative positions and his intention to “represent all” Arkansans.77 Despite these struggles,
Rockefeller was able to institute a number of reforms to the state in his first year in office.
Democrats supported legislation to increase funding for higher education, raises for teachers and
governmental employees. They also passed legislation to provide “free high school textbooks…
[and the] creation of a governmental efficiency study commission” all suggested that Rockefeller
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was in line with Democrats on spending, education, and improving governmental efficiency.78
Yet, he was deep unpopular among the electorate who still saw Rockefeller as an elitist who did
not understand the day to day lives of average Arkansans. This hurt him even as he continued to
seek reform in the state that he had made his home, reforms that would have improved the lives
of these average Arkansans had they truly listened to him and allowed his legislation to pass.
Rockefeller’s moderate stance on race relations was proven eighteen months after his
election victory. On April 7, 1968, Rockefeller held a memorial service for Martin Luther King,
Jr., following his assassination three days earlier. The only Southern governor to publicly honor
the memory and legacy of King, Rockefeller promised that Arkansas would set the path for the
nation on race relations, suggesting that it would be a beacon for others to follow as it eschewed
racism and worked “together for equality of man.”79 Rockefeller understood the nature of race
relations in his adopted state and the long history of racial progression that Arkansas had
undertaken since Reconstruction. He was able to use the moment to praise the work that had
been done on race relations while underscoring that racial equality was not yet a reality in the
state. Rockefeller’s unbridled enthusiasm for Arkansas’ potential stems from his time as the head
of the AIDC and witnessing how the state experienced the Civil Rights Movement.
Rockefeller was never indoctrinated into the Southern understanding of racism and white
supremacy. Perhaps due to his upbringing in New York to one of the most prominent families in
the United States, his focus and understanding on race relations seemed to center around
economics and economic opportunity, or lack thereof. According to his wife, Jeannette, they
both believed that “the average black person was intrinsically as able as the average white
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person, and the only difference in terms of performance was that the black person had not had
the opportunities that the white person had had.”80 Rockefeller understood the barriers that had
for centuries limited the ability for African Americans to excel and prove themselves in
American society. He wanted to ensure that in Arkansas at least, those barriers would be
dismantled, and everyone given the chance to succeed economically. And to achieve this,
Rockefeller created a Council on Human Resources that was led by Ozell Sutton – the former
assistant director of the ACHR. This council served as a sounding board for Rockefeller and
Sutton often advised the Governor on racial affairs taking place in the state. He also appointed
William Walker to direct the Office of Economic Opportunity, the first African American to
lead a state agency.
The continued focus on economic growth was the core of Rockefeller’s administration, as
had been the case for all post-war governors. In order to continue racial progression,
meaningfully integrate all schools, and improve black and white economic security, the state had
to work to reform its government and industry. Rockefeller was not able to fulfil these goals, but
no governor in the state of Arkansas can claim this victory. However, Rockefeller emerged as the
symbol that Arkansas was not like the Deep South, that it never had been. Even during the worst
racial atrocities that took place in the state, the intent behind them was always economics. Race
relations ebbed and flowed like the Mississippi River. When white landowners or the state felt
stretched economically, violence against African Americans in the Delta increased as a method
to regain control of the situation. When times were good, racial progress proceeded with little
fanfare or concern for the white race.
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Of course, this was not the situation across the state. Geographic diversity ensured that
most of the racialized incidents and violence occurred in Little Rock and the Delta. The small
percentage of African Americans West of the capital ensured that progress was often light years
ahead the Deep South in these regions. The University of Arkansas, for example, voluntarily
integrated thirteen years before Mississippi, Alabama, or Georgia, and then only because their
hand was forced by court orders. Civil rights activism had long existed in the state from leaders
such as Scipio Africanus Jones, Harold Flowers, Daisy Bates, and Ben Grinage. Each lead their
generation through periods of racial progression – the Elaine Massacre, voter registration, school
integration, and public facility integration. These men and women found their message of racial
equality and compliance with federal law powerful in a state that did not want to give
justification to its reputation as a Deep South state. As Rockefeller said, Arkansas could “set a
pattern for the rest of the nation.”81 It always had.
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